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## MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH JOURNAL

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MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH JOURNAL

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CONTENTS

FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES

130 YEARS OF POSTERITY - A HOMAGE TO EMINESCU

EMINESCU AND HIS EVERLASTING PRESENCE

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"We love our country and our people like no one else, as no one else has the power to do".[1]
"We are going through very difficult days and we finally need to realize that this is what we need to pay, too dearly perhaps, for our political mistakes of the last thirty years."[2]
"The essential evil that threatens the vitality of our people is moral, it's demagogy. From the beginning of Romanian history to our age there were no demagogic movements in our country, it did not come to mind, at least to the Romanian that, without work and without merit, man can come to something.... Only in your days individuals without talent, without character, without work become ministers and great people; only ye teach the people daily that they need only cunning and a miserable character to get anywhere... You show through your daily example that corruption is the easiest means of living in Romania... This is the evil spirit that unfolds human societies and dissolves them finally; This is the venom that gives way to social movements and dissatisfaction."[3]

Abstract: 130 years after his death, Eminescu's relevance is more important than ever, for a Romanian society that is characterized by human entropy. Thus, researching Eminescu's political and journalistic work gives us the opportunity to comprehend the viability of the Romanian anthropological model that Eminescu created, with a critically moderate socio-political thinking. From this perspective, his ideas can undoubtedly constitute authentic landmarks for us today. As a theorist of political life, Eminescu polemizes with history and

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[1] M. Eminescu, *The Time*, February 22nd, 1979.

[2] Idem, *The Pathology of our Society. Political Articles,* Bucharest, Vremea Publishing House, 1998, p. 218.

[3] Idem, *Political Works,* Vol. II (1880-1883), ed. by Bucur Popescu, Bucharest, Eminescu Publishing House, 2000, p. 454.

society, criticizes the morals of politicians with a great journalistic ability (in the Time newspaper, especially). Our intention in this study is to argue, based on the analysis of the original texts, the timeliness of the political work of the Romanian thinker, starting from his approach of the Romanian Ethos.

Keywords: *nation, state, history, religion, culture, love, truth.*

Eminescu is the thinker who perhaps managed to perceive the most indepth structure of the Romanian people's being, because he infinitely loved his people and homeland. „*I love this people*, he said in a memo misplaced among his manuscripts, *who is good-hearted, gentle, humane, on who's back diplomats build maps and make wars, and imagine kingdoms of which it has no idea, I love this people who serves only as props for those who rise to power, wretched people who moan under the greatness of all the icy palaces we lay on their shoulders"[4].* Eminescu loved his people instinctively, with a kindnesss of Apostle, this being, in my opinion, the basis of the actuality of his thinking. The ideas that emerge from his socio-political work[5] can be an authentic reflection theme for understanding today's Romanian reality. The Eminescian perspective is, at the same time, a positive one, thus differing from Cantemir's[6] or Emil Cioran's[7] approaches. Unlike the latter two, Eminescu lived in the midst of his people, thus realizing an authentic inventory of Romanian qualities, noting the positive aspects, and then the defects in the configuration of the Romanian Ethos. No "evolution" will ever shade Eminescu's posterity and the longer the time passes, we discover the depth of his work, the more we realize that he is, and will be, our contemporary *in aeternum.*

We celebrate Eminescu every year, we celebrate him even twice a year, but we continue to remain largely indebted to him. With as much success in critical and historical research on him, we continue to be guilty in two respects, as regards him: first we don't know him yet entirely, secondly, we don't make him known to others entirely, as he was. Eminescu is not wholly known, even to the specialists, this is the

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[4] M. Eminescu, *Works, vol. IX,* Bucharest, Eminescu Publishing House, p. 488.

[5] Idem, *The Political Work*, vol. I, ed. by Bucur Popescu and Petru Demetru Popescu, 1999, and Vol. II (1880-1883), ed. By Bucur Popescu, Bucharest, Eminescu Publishing House, 2000.

[6] G. Pohoață, „*The Cantemirian Anthropological Model"* in *Philosophy and Consciousness with the Romanians,* Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, 2018, pp. 185-193.

[7] I. Necula, Cioran, *From the Identity of Peoples to the Wallachian Nothingness*, Bucharest, Saeculum I.O. Publishing House, 2003, p. 101-102.

unfortunate truth..."[8] Even though important steps have been made to research Eminescu's work, from Noica onwards, through printing a complete academic edition of his work, through the facsimilation of all his manuscripts, we rally on the position of Constantin Noica, but adding that Eminescu cannot be understood against the background of prejudices or by realizing a superficial, unilateral and incomplete reading of his work. In such a way we will not be able to get close to the depth of the Eminescian spirit, and really know it, and so we will not be able to make it known to others. We naturally ask, 130 years after his death, how well is Eminescu known in the United States, England, France or Spain?! Can we not compare him with Victor Hugo, Skeaspeare or Cervantes?! On the other hand, with the occasion of research grant at Sapienza University in Rome, in 2014, having as research theme „Eminescu's Reception in Italy 125 years after his death", I realized that Eminescu is valued in Italy more than in his own country. I followed the research of Rosa Del Conte[9], who europeanized Eminescu, organizing the first Eminescu Conference in Venice, 75 years after his death. Meeting professor Roberto Scagno (a brilliant Italian romanist) at the University of Padova, I could obtain a copy of the Conference Papers which undoubtedly prove the universalization of his work. These are aspects less known in Romania, which I want to publicize with this occasion.

Discovering a Romanian Consciousness

I had the extraordinary opportunity to discover the depth of Eminescian thinking since college, when I read his social-political writings, in the Cernauti edition, and although I was a philosophy-history student, I realized that from Eminescu's work you can learn the history of Romanians better than from any treaty of Romanian history. I bring in support of my appreciation the following text belonging to Nicolae Iorga: "Eminescu mastered the knowledge of the Romanian past and was perfectly initiated in universal history; no one in his generation had to this degree the instinct of the true meaning of history, and with no one else it became such a permanent and decisive element of his entire judgment.

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[8] C. Noica, *Introduction to the Eminescian Miracle*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1992.

[9] Rosa Del Conte, *Mihai Eminescu o dell Assoluto*, Modena, S.T.E.M., 1961, *Eminescu or On the Absolute,* (appreciated by Mircea Eliade as being the most profound study of modernity), translation, notes and preface by Marian Papahagi, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2016. Rosa Del Conte (1907-2011) is a name with symbolic resonance in eminescology. The famous Roman university professor was one of the most important researchers, translators and promoters of Eminescu's work abroad (as I could find out by studying prof. Del Conte's private files from the Archives of the Alexandrine Library in Sapienza University, Rome).

Someone is amazed today, at the end of so many thorough and patient research, after a huge amount of information, and so much criticism was added, when he finds out how much he knew, how much this man understood, and the political thinker must admire his great power to integrate the small and fleeting deeds of contemporary public life into the majestic flow of historical developments. No wonder that such a language that would have honored any country of ancient culture was not understood by contemporaries with such poor preparation, whose mind could not rise to the recognition of the same eternal truths. For him the nation is a being, a true organic being, to whose natural development we can only add, for its own safety, and that we cannot change according to abstract ideas or undigested loans from political situations that are not really justified, as the interested or naive imitators claim."[10] Moreover, Eminescu never missed a chance to glorify our ancient history and deeds, for the preservation of our unspoiled language, religion and traditions. To this effect, Eminescu pointed out that: *It would be an act of crude ingratitude towards our ancestors to believe that the world begins with us, generally, and in Romania in particular, that only we had the instinct of being independent, when in fact, we did nothing but maintain more or less successfully what they have won, either through bloody battles or by the development of extraordinary intelligence, both often placed in the service of this unique concern, the preservation of the nation and the country."[11].* The principle of national identity that is the hard core of Eminescu's thinking has influenced the 20th century in its entirety, as the two World Wars and the triumph of the idea of self-determination prove. It is worth pointing out that Eminescu regarded the state as a „*natural object*", analyzing it along with its history, customs, race, and the nature of its territory[12]. Oftentimes, as the critic G. Călinescu pointed out, Eminescu imagined the "peasant-emperor from fairy tales who comes out on his porch in the evening to keep counsel with his country"[13]. He sincerely believed that the modern Romanian state must come out from history, legitimizing and giving continuity to traditional forms of evolution, and not to venture into imitative actions and borrow models that are not in tune with the local spirit. The *national principle* is, „fundamental and unmovable"; it is the only viable one, which can be taaken as the foundation of the modern state. In this respect, Eminescu argues: „*For us the only reason to be of this state is its Romanian nationality... If this*

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[10] Nicolae Iorga, *History of Contemporary Romanian Literature*, Bucharest, 1934.

[11] M. Eminescu, *The Time,* July 22th, 1880.

[12] Ibidem, August 17th, 1879.

[13] G. Călinescu quoted by A. Botez in *A Century of Romanian Philosophy*, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2005, p. 55.

state is to cease to be Romanian, then we say it squarely that we are utterly indifferent to the fate of his land"[14]. The formation of a nation is a long and continuous process, which can be accelerated or slowed down by one generation or another, but which cannot be interrupted: "you are not the nation, neither some of you, nor others, not even all together, not even the whole generation, for the nation has dozens and dozens of generations. You can be a generation, a fragment, to tell the truth, a rather miserable and rotten one, from this body that lives for tens of centuries – that is the nation"[15]. In another article Eminescu emphasizes the idea that: "The character of a people, its insctincts and inherited inclinations, its genius which often, unconsciously pursues an idea while weaving the thread of time, these should be the decisive factors in the life of a state, not the mimicry of foreign laws and customs."[16] However, the text that somehow crystalizes his entire system of political thinking, and is a sort of political creed for Eminescu, is also categorically imperative for the Romanians: "The most important issue for the history and continuity of this country is that the Romanian element stays the decisive one, that it should determine the pattern of this form of state, and the language, the honest and generous inclinations, the common sense, in a word the genius of the Romanian people should continue to be the rule for its development".[17] These are ideas that emerge from a thorough knowledge of our historical past, from Eminescu's unsurpassed love for the Romanian country and people, from the understanding of our social, cultural and economic realities, from his awareness about the mission of the Romanian state in this part of the world. But Eminescu added something more to these beliefs, something that was meant to configure the Romanian reality, to give it identity, meaning and messianic perspective. "We must - he wrote in *The Time* of July 22nd 1880 - be a culture state at the mouths of the Danube, this is the mission of the Romanian people, and whosoever will divert our energies to another purpose, risks the future of our descendants and tramples on the efforts of our ancestors"[18]. The idea that our state must become a state of culture in this part of Europe sets the conceptual and paradigmatic framework of Romanian evolution and makes the spiritual dimension of our construction into an imperative command. The determinants of this concept are not detailed by Eminescu, but are inferable. They are the ones that he stressed in all his articles: language,

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[14] M. Eminescu, *The Time,* 31.07.1880.

[15] Idem, *Mss. 2257, Fragmentarium,* manuscripts edition with variants, notes, addenda and indexes by Vatamaniuc, M.D., Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1981.

[16] Idem, *The Time,* 01.04.1882.

[17] Ibidem, December 17th, 1881.

[18] Ibidem, July 22nd, 1880.

nationality, culture, religion, history, honest and producctive work, ancestral customs and traditions, competent and fair government.[19]

The anthropological eminescian model or Eminescu's "lesson" on love and truth

To the questions*: How is the Romanian people, how are the Romanians? Eminescu offers as answer the brightest anthropological model in Romanian culture*. The explanation we dare to give in support of the previous appreciation lies in the idea: *Truth springs from Love.* This is the true "lesson of patriotism" that Eminescu gives us over time. Eminescu also saw the evil in Romanian reality, but explained it by the derogations from "merit and qualities", by the naturalization and uplifting in public positions of foreigners who did not care about the country, and its values. He did not question the Romanian genes and did not extend the evil to all historical becoming. Although he did not overlook the historical errors, the state of vegetation and moral wickedness, he considered that all of these were mostly due to unworthy rulers and bad management, and not to a general worthlessness[20]. The essential feature of the Romanian is the attachment to his language and nation; the Romanian is able to become Catholic or Mahometan in order to remain Romanian, but to change his language and nationality he will never accept. Any attitude that would jeopardize these, which count for him, even more than his relationship with God, he not accept nor agree with".[21] A basic given of the Romanian people is "its characteristic gentleness"[22] but this kindness has a limit, "we know the people. In appearance so gentle and governable, there is a limit to its gentleness that is dangerous to pass"[23];"it is a brave, righteous, very tolerant people, and perhaps it began to regain even its old and admirable quality to judge all things in cold blood and not to prize empty words"[24], "an honest, intelligent people, capable of truth and patriotism."[25] This amount of qualities of Romanians, to which is added "their natural mind, their innate courage and the love of work, make them worthy for a greater future."[26] The Romanian "has a warm intelligence open to truth, and as regards the honesty of his thinking and inclinations, he is incomparably superior"[27]; also, "the Romanian does not have a slow mind and you

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[19] Angela Botez, *op.cit.,* p. 55.

[20] I. Necula, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

[21] M. Eminescu, *The Time,* 16.12.1879.

[22] Ibidem, 23.12.1877.

[23] Ibidem, 13.11.1881.

[24] Ibidem, 27.06.1981

[25] Ibidem, 29.07.1879.

[26] Ibidem, 26.09.1878.

[27] Ibidem, 8.04.1882.

cannot fool him with empty words."[28] But in addition to the affirmation of these qualities of the Romanian people, the poet does not overlook the flaws, small and large, of the "national character": "we have long despaired to ask from the Romanians the virtue and dignity of the ancients, nor do we believe that we might be able to awaken in it the sense of the Roman citizen; but neither do we appeal to feelings that we ourselves are not capable of. But only to the simple feeling of dignity and pure human pride."[29] A tendency to be divided and "a very vehement character"[30] are other flaws of the people, whom, "we find always divided among themselves, and divided as regards foreign policy and the attitude towards the neighbors."[31] The great flaws of our national character are, "our restlessness, propensity for always changing our mind, the frequent overthrow of all the foundations of the state and the childish rivalry and desire to be better than everyone else."[32] The gentleness of the Romanian people, accentuated by carelessness, leads to fatalism: "the Romanian people is too good and too settled in its ... disregard for forms of civilization that do not stick to its soul, and have not risen from its heart", "with that fatalism of the unfortunate races, it leads its hard life without joy and without peace."[33]. The Romanian people does not lack memory, or irony: "seemingly so quiet, but terribly willful at the bottom of his heart"; "the Romanian forgets neither the good nor the bad ... the Romanian never forgets the bad that others have done him. He keeps intact his legacy of aversion and of love"[34]; "our people, losing all hope of straightening, takes things more in mockery, as if God would have liked to drape the tragedy of our fate with many comic scenes"[35]. This final argument is placed at the opening of an article called suggestively: "We are unique"[36]. The above mentioned article ends with an observation that seems to be not very far removed from what happens in today's Romania, thus making Eminescu very contemporary: "Let us thus expect soon the abolition of justice, the green light given to all forms of thievery, perfect corruption, under the pretext that the courts are biased. But, however biased they may be, they are better than courts with jurors, for in any case it is more preferable to have a lenient justice, as it is not yet accustomed to criminal researches,

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[28] Ibidem, 12.05.1882.
[29] Idem, *The Federation*, 3.04.1870.
[30] Idem, *Literary Conversations*, 15.09.1870.
[31] *Ibidem*, 1.08.1876.
[32] *The Time,* 26.09.1878.
[33] *Ibidem,* 31.08.1878.
[34] *Ibidem,* 4.11.1882.
[35] *The Time,* 12.09.1878.
[36] Eminescu, *Political Works*, vol. I, *op.cit.,* p. 349.

than no justice. For, the jury is no justice."[37] Interestingly, after 130 years, problems like these come back, equally harsh and diseased, it seems, in the actuality of our days. These are arguments highlighting the fact that Eminescu understands better than no one else the great meanings of history and politics. The complexity of the Eminescian work can only be understood by following meanings and directions in which Eminescu saw the solution of the acute and essential problems of society. A patriot by his structure and substance, never declarative or demagogically exacerbated, he used his personal example, the spirit of sacrifice in the service of the country and his nation, to fight his daily war for the betterment of his country. For such a purpose, nothing you do is too much. Starting with an analysis of the past, he discards the social and political ballast so that he may imagine a better future, and thus he becomes a profound visionary with prophetic propensities. In fact, the depth of thinking is somehow the essential aspect of the Eminescian political conception, but it does not appear out of the blue. At its base is a titanic work, best expressed by the Latin dictum: "*Labor improbus, omnia vincit*!" (*Persistent work defeats everything*!). Eminescu searched assiduously in the great libraries of Europe authentic sources in his battle for discovering the truth, so that based on competent research he could draw up theses and conclusions in prestigious articles. He studied the evolution of resources, from the classical world to the present, selecting with analytic spirit all that was useful, in order to reach fundamental demonstrations based on judicious calculations (citing the great thinkers) in the field of economics, philosophy, mathematical sciences and the vast field of diplomacy. Being thus an example before the Romanian nation, Eminescu speaks with full justification about the fact that the only way the Romanian people can rise to an appropriate level of economic development and to a level of culture and civilization comparable to the great countries of Europe, is work and only work. Moreover, the principle of labour and the social theory of compensation are other cardinal ideas of his journalism, alongside the national principle, the principle of natural evolution, the principle of reverse selection, and others. Eminescu is convinced that the foundation of freedom and of economic and social development is work, in its two aspects: effective work and work converted into capital. "It is not the natural resources, but the work for their exploitation, that constitutes the wealth of a society: the system of freedoms is the system of labor. That is what we would like to enter finally in the conviction of everybody; It is necessary for the citizen to realize that without work and without its capitalization, that is, without economics there is no freedom"[38]. Eminescu

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[37] *Ibidem*, p. 350.
[38] *The Time*, 9.01.1879.

fights the established view that Romania is a rich country, which could afford wasting without work: "then, there was another wrong opinion spreading, which is now almost generally accepted, that our country is terribly rich and you can spend a lot, she's still going to have enough to pay. No one understood that wealth is not in the air or in the ground, but in the arms, and that where the arms or quality of production are lacking, there can be no rich country"[39].

Instead of conclusions

Modern nationalism, which has its roots in the critical nationalism expressed for the first time by Eminescu, does not admit the removal of truth, even if it would be done on national grounds: "nationality in the margins of truth". More specifically: "What is untrue does not become true by the fact that it is national, that which is unjust does not become right in that it is national, what is ugly does not become beautiful in that it is national; What's wrong is not getting good in that it's national... Finally, the bad deed or the wrong does not become good because it was committed by a nationalist or on behalf of the nation, but it is and remains bad"[40]. Eminescu's nationalism means, in our opinion, sincere patriotism, the total adhesion of the Romanian thinker to the realization of the great ideals for which the people have always fought and with whom the creator blends into an indestructible whole. Here we realize again the actuality of the Eminescian work, in this dualism of a perfect identity between nationalism and patriotism, a political force that is based on "pure Reason" and, the "incandescent patriotism" that had put to the pillar of infamy the activity of the leaders, political class, political parties, institutions and crooked laws, meant not to serve the people in its entirety but only a small group of interests. Indisputably, the national value of his political work is given especially by its actuality.

The message of the Eminescian political work can be decoded by understanding the period during which the great thinker lived and by bringing Eminescu back into the Romanian socio-political reality today. Moreover, the Eminescian approach is the apanage of a constructive critical rationalism that can be understood amid the knowledge of Romanian history and socio-political reality in general. From this perspective, let's understand how relevant Eminescu is at present, but also what we must do.

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[39] Ibidem, 18.12.1877.
[40] Eminescu, Mss. BAR 2257, in *The Pathology of Romanian Society, op.cit.,* apud. N. Henegariu and C. Tomescu, p. 26.

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A FORGOTTEN ACCENT

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Abstract: We are talking about Romanian words which have different meanings according to where we put the accent. As it concerns the verse 84 from "Epigonii" ("Epigones") by M. Eminescu, where the Present form /voi/ mergeţi is considered by certain editors as an Imperfect form: /voi/ mergeaţi, we compare the Imperfect forms stressed by M. Eminescu himself with the same forms unstressed by the poet, and we conclude that the poet stressed only under rhythm, with a prosodic aim, provoking what he called "the ethic accent", i.e. the word is not stressed so as to underline its relevance in the context. To sum up, the accentual forms must be kept to differ from the unstressed ones, as it is the author's personal writing system, which has a poetic meaning, and must be understood.

Keywords: accent, Eminescu, Epigones, Perpessicius, text editing, pale, visionary.

Unlike its European sisters, French, Italian or Spanish, the Romanian language remains the only Romance language in which the graphic accent is not marked. Of course, there are studies attempting to establish accentuation rules on series of words - but the rules are few, the exceptions many – and the words of a language... are very, very many, of the hundreds of thousands order. Romanian remains in the situation of English or Russian where the accent is a matter of habit – or it can simply shift out of the speakers' desire/ignorance. As far back as 1962 the writer Romulus Vulpescu wrote, in the „Limba română" ["The Romanian Language"] Magazine: "... if the graphic accentuation will not be considered by linguists as a necessity and will not therefore be transformed into a spelling rule, I suggest (...) that a paragraph should be inserted in which to record that any writer (not in a narrow, professional sense, but in the broad one of the man who writes) has the discretion to use the graphic accent whenever and wherever he deems it necessary".[1] The illustrious writer particularly envisaged the emphases with a stylistic role, indicating the origin of a character from a certain social class, his desire to climb the latter by using unassimilated words,

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[1] Romulus Vulpescu: Accentul în limba română [The accent in Romanian language]. In "Limba Română" ["The Romanian Language"], No. 2/1962, pp. 188-189.

etc. – but he also addressed the accentual doublets current in the language accepted by rules: each should mark them according to the form chosen or cultivated. Under the rather entropic conditions of the years before 1989, when communication had the language limits, that certainly remained an internal matter. After 1989, however, along with the journalism boom, with the diversification of communication, this lack of concern for the graphic aspect of writing is increasingly felt... how should I say? – more uncomfortable. In a Europe of nuances, in a Europe in which most of languages take care to mark the graphic accent, Romania continues to behave like in the 60s of last century. Before those years, however, the interwar years lapsed, then the years of our classical literature followed – when the accent used to be marked within the limits of common sense.

... We are not saying that the Romanian language is learned from the classics, but we insist that one can understand it better studying their works. We are not talking only about the spoken language, but also about the written one. The classical literature can also offer solutions in this case. Let's take the accent for an example. Its noting in writing, especially when relevant, is compliant exactly with the phonetic principle of writing, i.e. that imperative: "Let's write as we speak." We know very well that the accent is movable (variable) in Romanian. The more recent norms accept easily even accent doublets (*edítor* and *editór*, etc.), but they overlook much too easily the numerous cases when the meaning of the word changes according to the accent. The difference between *cópii (copies) / copíi (children)* is rarely noted in writing (as it is obvious!), but, usually, the text is left without diacritical signs, at the reader's discretion.[2] It is true that the great writers used to create puns sometimes, based on the not noted accent. Marin Preda said somewhere about a character that he used to spell the name of *Stalin* as if spelling „Mărin". As the author could not write the accent, he suggested it using another word with a unique accentuation.[3] Somewhere else, he said that Nicolae Moromete used to spell the word *umanism (humanism)* as split in two and with a long accent on *u*: He wanted to make a cult pun on the title of the work written by Thomas Morus, *Utopia* (originating from *ou, ouk*, negation in Greek, and *topos*, "place", the meaning being "the inexistent place", as the humanism

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[2] Academia Română. Institutul de Lingvistică "Iorgu Iordan – Al. Rosetti" [Romanian Academy, "Iorgu Iordan – Al. Rosetti" Linguistic Institute]: *Dicționarul ortografic, ortoepic și morfologic al limbii române* [*Orthographical, orthoepic and morphological dictionary of the Romanian language*], Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 2005, pp. LI-LII (Accentul [The accent]).

[3] Marin Preda: *Moromeții, 2ⁿᵈ volume,* Cartea românească Publishing House, 1974, p. 83.

was inexistent for the young son of Moromete...).[4] These are the artist's possibilities to use the writing system given to him/her. When Titu Maiorescu used to be presented more insistently in schools, we knew that the title of his critical study, "În lături" ["Aside" or "In Slops"], although not bearing a graphical accent, was written as stressed on *u [i.e. "In Slops'],* according to the author's will[5]. In the 60s of the past century (the years of the book "Moromeții"), Mr. Romulus Vulpescu published in *Limba Română* magazine of the Institute of Linguistics of the Romanian Academy, a whole list, a real dictionary, of Romanian words with different meanings according to the accent, of course, so as to signal to the linguists the necessity to introduce the actual graphical sign in writing. His attempt had no echo. The dictionary of Romulus Vulpescu would deserve to be published as a sample of Sisyphus' work, both properly, and figuratively.

There is at least one field where the accentuation should be compulsory: that of the proper names (of people, places, waters, etc.). In Bucharest, for example, all the people say *Mânăstirea Caşín (monastery),* but in Oneşti, where I graduated high-school, they say *Râul Cáşin (river).* Mr. Valentin Talpalaru reminded me in this context that we were debating at a literary soiree, somewhere near Galaţi, of the name of Calistrat Hogaş. Although the author himself, during his life, pointed out that his name was *Hogáş,* his name coming from *hogaş, făgaş (rut),* the other accent remained in the end, *Hógaş* (functioning here, maybe, the rhythm of the whole phrase, with the need of censure after the three-syllabic *Ca-li-strát* before the disyllabic *Hogaş.* You should compare it with *Hogaşu,* with a final syllabic *–u,* where the stress would fall almost compulsorily, naturally, on *-a*). An older linguistic event makes me insist on it. I used to teach in Târgovişte, together with other professors, and a young man used to take us with the institution car. Invariably, about the 60th kilometre, we would make comments, of course, for the time to pass easier, about the road sign: "Matraca 3 km". The second and the third time when we passed by, a distinguished French professor told us that he noticed a very peculiar resemblance between that word and the French term "matraque", a word probably of Gallic origin, meaning "cudgel, club, mace". You can see how close we are to the French, even by toponymy.[6] The time passed, but the information remained in my mind. After a year or so, I was accompanied

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[4] *Idem, Ibidem,* p. 98.

[5] Titu Maiorescu: În lături! [In Slops!}. In "Convorbiri literare" ["Literary Conversations"], XX (1886), pp. 532-537.

[6] See also DEXI (*Dicţionar Explicativ ilustrat al limbii române* [*Ilustrated explicative dictionary of the Romanian language*), Arc Publishing House and Gunivas Publishing House, 2007, p. 1105, *matracà* meaning "Knobbed stick with a shape of a cudgel, Wooden or rubber baton used by police forces", with reference, for etymology, to fr, *matraque.*

by other persons, on the same road, and the car stopped near the road sign "To Matraca". (I think we had a puncture... of cigarettes, near a kiosk). With this occasion, I asked an inhabitant if that village, Matraca, was far away from there. He did not seem to understand what I was asking him, so I repeated the question, pointing out to the road sign. "Ah, *Matracà*!? No, it's not very far from here, around 3 kilometres", replied he looking at the same road sign. How could I ask him about club, cudgel, mace, and if they have any term similar to *matraque*! The man had pointed out to me that the word was differently stressed, the name of the village Matraca from Dâmboviţa county entering the accentual series with *macara, tuslama, ciulama* etc. Thus, *Matracà* has nothing to do with the Gallic cudgel. It comes more probably from *matracúcă, matracúc, matracà (vulgar, immoral and unpleasant woman)*. It derives from the old *mătrăgună (belladonna)*, related by Haşdeu with the Spanish *mandragora*.[7]

Then, what can a scientist or a simple fan of etymologies and similitudes do in such cases? The graphical accent is necessary for clarifications. I am thinking of a foreigner: how does he/she spell *Vâlcea*, for example? We still have to discuss whether we should use a single kind of accent, the sharp accent, for example, or two, or all the three accents used in French and Greek. But it is one thing to be "en embaras de choix", and another thing not to choose at all, just because you don't realise that you can choose... Put between two hayricks and not knowing which one to choose, the Buridan's donkey may die of hunger. What about not having any hayrick at all?

I think these examples are just enough for me to return to Eminescu in looking for accents. I start the discussion with an accent which has concerned me for many years. I am talking about the verse 84 of *Epigonii* (*Epigones*). In the present editions, after Perpessicius[8], the context is the following (vv. 82-84): "Voi urmaţi cu răpejune cugetările regine, / Când plutind pe aripi sânte printre stelele senine, / Pe-a lor urme luminoase voi asemene mergéţi." ("You follow with tumultuous flight the mounted glory of your thought / And in among the gleaming stars on sky-born wings you lightly sport, / While up the comets' blazing track your spirit in its swiftness soars.") This sharp accent on *mergéţi* gives me great trouble, so to say (I remained with the image of the club from Matraca in mind...).

[7] B.P. Haşdeu: *Două descîntece: un descîntec român şi un descîntec sanscrit din Veda. Notiţă* [*Two spells: a Romanian spell and a Snaskrit spell. Note*]// Studii de folclor [Folklor studies] / Edition attended and notes by Nicolae Bot / Preface by Ovidiu Bîrlea. – Cluj-Napoca: Dacia Publishing House, 1979.

[8] M. Eminescu: *Poezii tipărite în timpul vieţii.* Ediţie critică îngrijită de Perpessicius [*Poems edited during lifetime.* Critical edition attended by Perpessicius], Bucharest, Fundaţia Regală Pentru Literatură şi Artă [Royal Foundation for Literature and Art], 1st volume, 1939, pp. 31-36.

Until 1939, when Perpessicius edition appeared, the previous editions (the 11 editions of Maiorescu, the editions of G. Bogdan-Duică, G. Ibrăileanu, G. Călinescu, C. Botez etc.) had *mergeţi*, the Present, with an accent at the end in rhyme with *îngheţ* from the verse 81. Again without accent, the text also appears in *Convorbiri literare*, on August 15th, 1870, the first printing of the poem.[9] But Perpessicius read a handwritten draft of Eminescu, that from manuscript 2257.84 (in fact, an almost finished form of the poem), that he gave also in facsimile, and had the following comments: *"As we can infer from the context, where the other verbs are at the Imperfect tense, and as we can notice also from the pattern from page 34, Plutéţi, mergéţi are Imperfect and represent two successful cases of visual rhymes."*[10]. The facsimiled manuscript has "Pe-a lor urme luminóse voi asemine plutéţi mergéţi" (deleted *plutéţi*), and the stressed vowel notes, in the traditional writing of the Romanian language, the diphthong: *luminoase, pluteaţi, mergeaţi*. In the second edition[11], Perpessicius kept it the same and explained in the note: "... as two verses above: *Voi urmaţi cu repejune.*" These three verbs are, as the logic requires it, in the Imperfect tense. The dialectal spelling (with an open *e* instead of the diphthong *ea*: *plutéţi, mergéţi*) offers two perfect visual rhymes (*îngheţ-mergéţi*)" (p. 279).

I do not know if this argument convinces somebody, but the text froze in this form after Perpessicius, at D. Murăraşu[12], at Petru Creţia[13] (MLR Edition), and in Alexandru Spânu Edition issued at "Minerva" Publishing House, in 2003, BPT collection, which copies identically the MLR

[9] M. Eminescu: *Epigonii*. În "Convorbiri literare" [*Epigons*. In "Literary conversations"], Iasi, IV (1870), No. 12, The 15th of August, pp. 185-186.

[10] M. Eminescu: *Poezii tipărite în timpul vieţii*. Ediţie critică îngrijită de Perpessicius [*Poems edited during lifetime*. Critical edition attended by Perpessicius], Bucharest, Fundaţia Regală Pentru Literatură şi Artă [Royal Foundation for Literature and Art], 1st volume, 1939, p. 296, Note.

[11] M. Eminescu: *Opere alese*, Ediţie critică de Perpessicius [Selected works, Critical editon by Perpessicius], Minerva Publishing House; I look into the edition from 1973, identical with the editon mentioned before. Notes: p. 279.

[12] M. Eminescu: *Opere. I. Poezii (1)*. Ediţie critică de D. Murăraşu, Postfaţă de Eugen Simion [*Works. I. Poems (1)*. Critical edition by D. Murăraşu, Afterward by Eugen Simion], Grai şi suflet – cultura naţională Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 93.

[13] M. Eminescu: *Versuri lirice. (Opera poetică)*. Ediţie îngrijită de Oxana Busuioceanu şi Aurelia Dumitraşcu. Coordonare şi cuvânt înainte de Alexandru Condeescu [*Lyrical verse. (Poetical works)*. Editon attended by Oxana Busuioceanu and Aurelia Dumitraşcu. Coordination and Forward by Alexandru Condeescu], Bucharest, Muzeul Literaturii Române Publishing House, 2000, p. 83). (As this edition was supervized by Petru Creţia – see The note about the editon, pp. 19-20, it is symbolicaly considered "Petru Creţia edition".)

Edition[14], and at Dumitru Irimia (all three editions)[15]. A forgotten accent, in an orthographical system where the accent cannot find its place – *id est*: it is refused ostentatiously... Forgotten and unexplained. Only the edition of Petru Zugun (2002) had the courage of a stressed Imperfect: *mergeați*[16]. Why cannot Perpessicius persuade me here? First of all, because I cannot accept the rhyme "*îngheț-mergeați*" at Eminescu, no matter how openly the diphthong would be read. Then, what kind of visual rhyme would be this? You see *marea de îngheț* ("the sea is frozen"), and you put over it *mergerea*, as a kind of sliding/skating? But it is all about soaring among stars and thoughts... Then, Perpessicius does not persuade me also because he amends a text belonging to Eminescu, published during the author's life, after manuscript forms, method much criticized by himself at Ioan Scurtu (who changed words from the printed text with others from the manuscript, saying that it was more beautiful, etc.). Any manuscript belonging to Eminescu is previous to the final form, i.e. the printing form, and, in any variant, version, draft, etc., the author is entitled to experiment forms, punctuation, etc. But his last will is that from the printed text. If you want to make comments, for example, that the editors made changes, you do them taking into account this text. And neither said Perpessicius as it is in *Convorbiri literare* magazine, at Titu Maiorescu, etc., i.e. at the editors before him. (To this end, the discussion over the manuscripts is like inspecting some closed-down scaffoldings: obviously, if we stick to it, we must compare the accents in the spoken language: *a pluti (to soar)*, verb of the 4th conjugation, makes the 2nd person plural at the Indicative mode, Present tense *voi plutiți* and, at the Imperfect tense, *voi pluteați*, and *a merge (to go)*, the 3rd conjugation, *mergeți/mergeați*, with the observation that the paradigm tends to regulate at the accent on theme: *voi mérgeți*. They also used the accentuation *voi mergéți*, as we use it today. However, it is easier to discuss about the poetic license *mergéți*,

[14] Mihai Eminescu: *Integrala poetică*. *Vol. I. Antumele*. Precuvântare de Tudor Arghezi. Ediție îngrijită, selecție critică de Alexandru Spânu [*Poetical integral. 1st volume. Publisehd during his lifetime.* Forward by Tudor Arghezi. Attended edition, critical selection by Alexandru Spânu], Biblioteca pentru toți Collection Bucharest, Minerva Publishing House, 2003, p. 37.

[15] Mihai Eminescu: *Poezii*, Ediție îngrijită de Dumitru Irimia [*Poems*, Edtion attended by Dumitru Irimia], University Alexandru Ioan Cuza Publishing House, 1997, p. 26 (2nd edition 2000, 3rd editoin 2006). Attention, anyway: in "Dicționarul limbajului poetic eminescian" [The Dictionary of Eminescu's poetic language"], Dumitru Irimia coordinator, 2nd volume, p. 18, the verse appears without an accent (probably because the first sorces, the journal, and the Maiorescu editions are regarded).

[16] Mihai Eminescu: *Opera poetică*.Volumul al doilea. *Poeziile și poemele naționale*. Ediție tematică de Petru Zugun, Prefață de Dan Mănucă [*Poetical work.* 2nd volume. *Poems and national poesye*s. Thematic editon by Petru Zugun, Preface by Dan Mănucă, Iași, Tehnopres Publishing House, 2002, p. 77.

than to enter into complicated problems of sequence of tenses: when the author stressed equally *plutéți*, *mergéți* in the writing flow, he may have thought of Imperfect forms of the verbs, but, when he cut *plutéți* afterwards, he must have thought only to keep the accent in the same position for the other verb, the selected one. We repeat: these are the discussions among closed-down scaffoldings, forms prior to the publication.

I think that Perpessicius amends after another context belonging to Eminescu, the verses 246 and 250 from "Strigoii" ("Ghosts"), where, for rhyme (and meaning), the text from *Convorbiri literare* magazine is as follows: "Miroase-adormitoare văzduhul îl îngrèun' /.../ Când gurile'nsetate în sărutări se 'mprèun'."[17] ("A soft and soothing scent is in the air dispersed, /.../ While do in tender kiss unite their lips athirst."). Titu Maiorescu did not agree with it and took it over without accents, changing the terms, changing the rhythm, and even the meaning: "Miroase-adormitoare văzduhul îl îngreun /.../Când gurele 'nsetate 'n sărutări se 'mpreun'."[18] (He kept it in all his editions, forcing the accents for the possible reciting: "*'n sărùtări se 'mpreùn'*", a vulgar, maybe even licentious, meaning, that the author had tried to avoid by his elegant accents). Having such a final accent even in the works of Eminescu, Perpessicius considered himself entitled to use that method. But he should have pointed it out to us.

There is one more reason for which I cannot be persuaded by this text amendment: comma after the verse 83. The text from *Convorbiri literare* magazine is as follows:

82. *Voi urmați cu răpejune cugetările regine,*
83. *Când plutind pe aripi sânte pintre stelele senine*
84. *Pe-a lor urme luminoase voi asmene mergeți.*

Convorbirile have a comma, as we can see, only after the verse 82. The other comma, after *senine* V.83, appeared at Titu Maiorescu and was kept in all the other editions, until today (including at Perpessicius who, most of the times, took over the punctuation inertially from the previous editions, without discussing it, although he looked sometimes for the consensus of the previous editors, but, again, you realize that there is a consensus only by comparing the editions among them, but it is not mentioned anywhere). The meaning in *Convorbiri* is clear: (voi) **plutind mergeți**. The Gerund keeps the action in a continuous Present, where the above-mentioned **urmați** is attracted, too. Only by interrupting the movement by comma,

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[17] M. Eminescu: *Strigoii* [*Ghosts*]. In "Convorbiuri literare" ["Literary Conversations"], 1 Dec. 1876, p. 343, column I.

[18] *Poesii de Mihail Eminescu* [*Poetry by Mihail Eminescu*], Librăriei Publishing House, Socec et Comp., Bucharest, 1884. (With a preface by Titu Maiorescu), p. 230.

this *mergeți* remains rather suspended, and suspicion rises that it should be an Imperfect. It is not the case, as punctuation solves everything.

Then, to whom belong *urmele ("blazing")* of the stars or of the thinkers? With comma, the text relates to the verse 83, so you follow the thoughts and so you follow their blazing. The comma of Maiorescu helps the meaning here, but for what price?! – The following actions are simultaneous without comma (*plutind mergeți: mergeți plutind*) and, divenely, separated by comma, subsequent or in causal ccordination (*plutiți și mergeți; pentru că plutiți mergeți* etc.). As it concerns the light, the explanation comes immediately beneath: "Cu-a ei candelă de aur palida înțelepciune / Cu zâmbirea ei regală, ca o stea ce nu apune / Lumină a vieței voastre drum de rose semănat." ("Pale wisdom, understanding's child, her sacred taper burning gold, / Her royal smile as of a star that never sets, that grows not old, / Unshades her light to guide your path, to make secure your flowery road.")

Here is another accent of Eminescu, taken over from *Convorbiri* in all the editions, taken out only by C. Botez[19] and, of course, by Perpessicius, ever since 1939, of course, because the Imperfect can be understood without a final grave accent. Maybe he inspired from here for the above *mergéți*, but it is strange that he did not put the grave accent in 1939: *mergèți*: He complies with the manuscript, as we can see from the facsimile, but we can infer that in Eminescu's times, the Imperfect was stressed with a *grave accent*, and the diphthongising with sharp accent, while in *mergéți* from the manuscript, both situations are present: *Imperfect* expressed by *diphthong.* I think it is better to consider, in this handwritten draft, that the sharp accent marks only the accent in spelling. The poet could not pay attention to two things at the same time in his hurry to write. Maintaining the form in 1966, the editor probably had to put the sharp accent, so as not to complicate things any more... Maiorescu has also comma after *nu apune,* kept scrupulously by the editors, making opposition (the pale wisdom is a star which does never sets down.) T*he mea*ning is that this star *lumină* (unshades her light) to guide your path. She is the agent. The above lights (*pe-a lor urme luminoase*) of the thinkers are thus given by the golden icon lamp of the pale wisdom. "Palida" (pale) cannot be but a pun related to the name of the Goddess of Wisdom, *Pallas* Athena (Greek Genitive: Pallados; *At Vergilius, Palladium* is the statue of the goddess for the Trojans) combined with the Latin word *pallidus,-a,-um* (pale, frightened, etc.). The manuscript 2257.72 is *pallidă*

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[19] Mihai Eminescu: *Poesii.* Ediție îngrijită de Constantin Botez [*Poems.* Edition attended by Constantin Botez], Bucharest, Cultura națională Publishing House, 1933, p. 17.

înțelepciunea, with *−ll −* and, if we should amend it, we would restore it to the definite form.[20]

We have again Imperfect, but this time stressed in the magazine and in the old editions. But Eminescu also used, besides the usual Imperfects of the language, one of understanding, for example in *Luceafărul (Evening Star),* the speech of the Demiurge: "Tu *vreai* un om să te socoți..." ("Thou wantest to count among men") (with the meaning: I realize now that you wanted for a long time to consider yourself a human being). The form is refused by the editions, but its presence in *Almanahul România jună* is a perfect clue to know the author's will.[21] In *Epigonii (Epigones),* we have forms with this regime, in verses such as: "Și de aceea scrisa voastră erà sântă și frumoasă / Căci din minți erà gândită, căci din inimi erà scoasă,/ Inimi mari, tinere încă, deși voi sunteți bătrâni." ("'And therefore sacred are your words and destined to eternity, / For in your minds were they conceived and by your flooded hearts set free; / Great souls have you, and ever fresh you keep your youth though you grow old") The present dull forms (i.e. without accent) give a conclusive value: "Și, de-aceea, scrisa voastră era sântă și frumoasă..." ("And, therefore, sacred are your words and destined to eternity"). (I put commas for you to understand the present meaning.) But the repeated accents of Eminescu and the connected form give, in the original text, the meaning followed by us, the Imperfect of understanding: the author realizes now, writing, the cause, emphasizing *era* during speech stronger than *sântă, gândită, scoasă (holy, thought, taken out).* We have many other examples where the Imperfect is not stressed graphically by Eminescu, as in *Rugăciunea unui dac (A Dacian's Prayer)*: "Pe când nu era moarte..." ("When death did not exist...")[22], etc. But one can reply that *Rugăciunea unui dac* was printed in 1879, and *Epigonii* in 1870, 9 years earlier. We could refer to *Venere și Madonă (Venus and Madonna),* also since 1870, v. 35: "O fecioar' a cărei suflet era sânt ca rugăciunea" ("Holy was the Virgin's spirit, prayer's very counterpart")[23]. To compare: scrisa voastră erà sântă − a cărui suflet era sânt ca rugăciunea: At first, *era* is powerfully stressed under rhythm, while

[20] M. Eminescu: *Poezii tipărite în timpul vieții.* Ediție critică îngrijită de Perpessicius [*Poems edited during lifetime.* Critical edition attended by Perpessicius], Bucharest, Fundația Regală Pentru Literatură și Artă [Royal Foundation for Literature and Art], 1st volume, 1939, p. 34.

[21] M. Eminescu: *Luceafărul* [*The evening star*]. In *Almanahul Societății academice social-literare "România jună"* [*The Almanac of the social and literar academic society "România jună"*], Vienna, România jună Publising House, p. 54.

[22] M. Eminescu: *Rugăciunea unui dac* [*The prayer of a Dacian*]. In "Convorbiri literare" ["Literary conversations"], 1 September 1879, p. 241.

[23] M. Eminescu: *Venere și Madon*ă [*Venus and Madonna*], *Ibidem,* 15 April, 1870, p. 66.

the second time, *sânt* is stressed, as the quality of the soul is important. That is why the Imperfect is not stressed graphically. We find even in *Epigonii (Epigones)* an unstressed Imperfect, in the verse 9o: "Ochiul vostru vedea 'n lume de icoane un palat." ("And to your eyes the earth is built, an icon hanging kings' abode.") Here, as in *Rugăciunea unui dac (A Dacian's Prayer")* and *Venere şi Madonă* (Venus and Madonna), the Imperfect is not under rhythm. This is why it is not stressed graphically.

The observation which would be necessary is that this "voi" from *Epigonii* (Epigones) is present. It does not refer only to the living forerunners (Alecsandri, Helliade), but it is also a general conclusion: all the forerunners are called, shown in the present, with this grammatical Imperfect, which shoes understanding. Which is, then, the impediment to see two Presents in the starting passage, as in *Covorbiri literare*, instead of the two Imperfects guessed by the edition? You are following now the thoughts full of glory and you are treading in their boots. The author invokes the flight on saint wings among the blue stars: it speaks about the immortal soul, entered in the cosmos of wisdom, in a continuous flight in the world of ideas, of the thoughts. These "inimi mari" ("great souls") make two things at the same time: they follow the precepts of the goddess of wisdom, and follow these precepts, i.e. They look for them in great haste and chase them. They put them into practice, so to say. The poetic art of the forerunners is more clearly explained in the case of Costache Negruzzi: "...şterge colbul de pe cronice bătrâne (...) Moaie pana în coloarea unor vremi de mult trecute / Zugrăveşte din nou iarăşi pânzele posomorâte / Ce-arătau faptele crude..." ("Negruzzi wipes away the dust from parchment that the past records (...) Dipping his brush in the secret well of the hues of history's days gone past, / He takes those times' canvasses and touches them to life at last / Portraying perhaps some prince who ruled the land in ages dark...") *The repetition is more important here.* In the previous poem, "Venere şi Madonă" ("Venus and Madonna") (C.L. April 15th, 1870), Rafael took from the old statues from Rome the face of the goddess Venus and transformed it into Madonna by his art, i.e. he added the crown of stars, the Christian Heaven, etc. to a pagan face. In the same way, the poet makes a saint out of a whore. Realizing that he committed an impiety, he put the created saint back to the condition of bacchante, by art. Moreover, he understood that he could change the situation again. Such a creator is an epigone, an "apostate", who changes good in evil and evil in good every time he wants, and who can change himself etc. The art (painting, poetry) can do these things, and the author has a great responsibility. Unlike *Venere şi Madonă (Venus and Madonna),* in *Epigonii (Epigones),* Costache Negruzzi goes back in time without changing a thing: "zugrăveşte din nou iarăşi pânzele posomorâte" ("He takes those times' canvasses and

touches them to life at last"). It is an apparent pleonasm. In fact, *iarăşi* ("again") must be understood as "iarăşi pânzele posomorâte" (just the same canvasses). The forerunners do not change the past. They give life the past as it was. They act by *eponym*: apparently, they do the same thing twice, going back in time and bringing it in the present, reviving what seems dead, but without changing the essence. They all look for thought, and go towards it. They do not only name it, define it, show it, etc. It is the difference between existence and affirmation: therefore sacred *are (erá)* your words and destined to eternity, etc., but the p*eople* from nowadays "Numesc sânt, frumos şi bine ce nimic nu însemnează" ("And call them beautiful or good, according to their varying lights"). The ideal *kalos kai agathos kai dikaios* exists, or it is just affirmed, it is cited, without meaning anything.

The contemporaries, the epigones, also affirm that "Privim reci la lumea asta – vă numim visionari." ("We call you poets mystic fools and fitting subjects for our mirth.") In the present context, being mystic is an important quality of the genius. Professor Florea Fugariu, to whom I thanked several times, but never enough, pointed to me that, in Eminescu's times, the term had magical, negative connotations, maintained until the 20th century, if we are to cite only the definition from Candrea Dictionary since 1931 for the term *visionary / mystic*: "someone who believes that he/she has strange, extravagant ideas."[24] For the epigones, the forerunners are only "eccentrics". This poem rehabilitates them in a memorable expression: "Rămâneţi dară cu bine sânte firi vizionare". ("I bid farewell to all you poets dreaming fanciful fantastic dreams.") Could we put here the Vocative comma as did the editions, against *Convorbirilor literare* magazine? It is better to let it without commas, in regime of direct complement (or predicative name): Remain as you are. The text needs explaining, both for the meaning of the words, and for their form, even for the punctuation or the diacritical signs initially used. But, first of all, to remain as it is.

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[24] Dicţionar enciclopedic ilustrat [Encyclopedic illustrated dictionary], Cartea Românească Publishing House, 1938, s.v.

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HAPPINESS, AS A SENSE OF LIFE

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Abstract: Humans strive for some kind of happiness in a world that is not conducive to it. As each human life is a collection of random thoughts, choices, experiences, memories, and their interpretations, a permanent state of vague happiness does not exist, since everything is temporary. The pursuit of happiness, or the pursuit of anything in life, does not lead to a permanent state or thing. One can only experience moments of contentment in life. Some measure of temporary sense of perceived happiness is achieved not by pursuing it but by recognizing meaningful moments that could be missed during the pursuit itself.

In this paper I aim to show that happiness should not be understood in a restrictive manner as the actualization of one virtue, even if this virtue could be considered the most important among all other virtues. Happiness should not be equivalated in an exclusive manner with the activity of contemplation. The context in which the problem I approach here ranges within the domain of searching for the good of man which is nothing but happiness.

Keywords: Happiness, contemplation, morality, meaning of life, pleasure, sensory world, contemporary man.

Human nature bears in its essence the craving for the paradisiacal state, the nostalgia for the Eden and perfection. As descendents of the Adam's sin, humans have always felt the calling of the Spring, though, the allienation from It amplifies the craving until it becomes oblivion. These combined joys can generate happiness, and this cycle keeps repeating and cannot cease because both the Spring and the spiritual nature of the human is inexhaustible.[1]

It is difficult and maybe useless to think that there is a general, precise or complete definition of Happiness.[2] From the earliest times onward the human has been interested in knowing what could bring him the state of happiness. Happiness is not the result of an eudaimonistic or hedonistic quest because, searching for pleasure due to the love we have for ourselves

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[1] William Keith, *A History of Greek Philosophy, The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, Cambridge University Press, 1962, vol. 1, p. 113.

[2] Romanian Academy, *Romanian Language Explanatory Dictionary*, Bucharest, Enciclopedic Universe, 1998, p. 374.

and by trying to avoid pain, as the opposite of happiness and joy, we generate sources of passion that lead to moral decay.[3]

The complete attachment to the material things and especially the sorrow we experience in trying to obtain possible happiness, alter our aspirations to become like the Spring and to achieve spiritual Happiness. We cannot deceive ourselves that we can experience the same state of happiness by having material pleasures. Experiencing the pleasures that we cannot touch, but which are more profound, is something completely different. All these assumptions lead us to a preliminary conclusion that Happiness is about Being and not Having.

The contemporary man is plunging deeper and deeper in pleasures that shadow the real Happiness. The ilussion of a pseudo-happiness, here, on earth, is thus created and the thought of an endless Eternal Happiness is atrophied by a hedonistic concept that states that everything is here and now. We have forgotten that we are strangers/travellers on this earth and our root is in heaven not on earth.[4] The desire to achieve Happiness while we are still here, on earth, enhances our solicitude for heavenly, eternal things and pushes us away from material and temporal things. The „little pleasures of life" make us overlook our own state of deception and darkness.Material happiness, understood as the only purpose of life, prevents the human senses from rising to the likeness of Who's image the man is.

For the contemporary man happiness is a way of living limited to Having, Doing and Consuming, without realizing that the human being itself is consumed and lost. It is much easier to have at the horizon a touchable, empirical Happiness, rather than an ideal difficult to touch, unobtainable for the most of the times. We would risk a failure that would send us towards pleasure and we would find in this pleasure our temporary happiness.

Although philosophers define the concept of happiness in many ways, for Christians it represents a paradoxical notion. The human who is oriented towards God is bipolar. On one hand he endures with patience the hardships of life and, on the other hand, he finds the happiness of approaching the absolute. Thus we can talk about the so called „happy sorrow".[5] The daily hardships do not hinder the joy of Being, and the problems the Christians experience because of their love for Christ,

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[3] Saint Maximus The Confessor, *Answers for Thalassius*, Bucharest, The publishing house of the biblical and missionary institution of The Romanian Ortodox Church, 1994, vol.3, p. 33.

[4] Saint Ignatius Briancianinov, *Ascetic Experiences*, Bucharest, Sophia Publishing House, 2000, vol. 1, p. 98.

[5] Saint Gregory of Nyssa: *Ascetical Works*. Translated by Virginia W. Callahan, Washington, Catholic University Press, vol. 58. 1967, p. 134.

become new reasons of joy. Christ Himself blesses those who are persecuted and suffer for Him.[6] The desire for Christ is a source of happiness that erases every sorrow.

This paradoxical logic becomes for some human beings a way of life in which happiness is not seen as a momentary joy but a continuous perfection. As soon as the person becomes self conscient, he wonders what can really make him happy, and according to the answer he receives, he establishes his position in front of the daily problems. The moment one offers for himself an answer that he considers satisfactory for the time being, the maturity necessary for the appropriate approach to the happiness issue is created. If this does not happen, the person becomes confused, incoherent and bewildered and he finds a deviant way to reach the state of happiness.The continuous transformations of the social and moral issues, the consciousness that urges him to reach self perfection reveal the lack of an exact answer in the problem of happiness. And thus he sees the pursuit of happiness as the ultimate goal of his life.

Unfortunately the outlook on life has recently got a profound incoherence. In this context it is fair to ask ourselves whether happiness is the purpose of our life or it is life where we must search for happiness. Of couse we can answer affirmatively to both questions, but the difference of meaning lies in the profoundness each person seeks when approaching the concept of happiness. It is relevant the fact that the greatest failure in giving an unanimous answer happens nowadays when the human has done amazing progress in science and technology by expanding his knowledge horizon beyond the planet where he used to find peace and happiness in the past.

The contemporary man makes a teporary happiness out of any discovery, he is enthusiast and assertive, but soon the place of this kind of happiness is taken by another one, which is also relative and prone to death just like the previous ones.

The absolute happiness cannot be experienced within a limited space because everything that is material is in a relative state of perfection.[7] The human, who has been made out of nothing, cannot find the sense of life or happiness if he searches for it inside the boundaries of the material world- which is also made out of nothing. As long as we stick to the created world, we become slaves of the natural needs, and thus happiness becomes a temporary necessity towards a purpose that we do not know well enough. That is why the one who approaches life from an immanent point of view

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[6] The Holy Scripture, *Matthew*, cap 5, verse 11, Bucharest, The Publishing House of the Biblical and Missionary Institution of The Romanian Ortodox Church, 2006, p. 612.

[7] Richard Kraut, *Two Conceptions of Happiness*, Philosophical Review, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1979, pp. 167–197.

fails to grasp the susbstantial purpose, the best example being given by the atheist existentialism which denies any purpose of life and which limits the concept of happiness to the ephemeral and material things in our contemporary consumption world.

The spirit of rationalism and illuminism led to the continuous search for some metaphisycal solutions in finding the purpose of life for the modern human being. This way it has been created a strange mixture of western rationalism and easthern mysticism that is very well expressed by the New Age movement that promotes the concept of happiness through sensual satisfaction, the variety of products, of the offers, the multitude of possibilities and the systematic promotion of useless needs.The main unifying factor of the humanity is no longer the common aspiration towards collective happiness, but the saying: Live your life! That is why happiness that can be found in this world is summarised to everything that can be promoted: the intense living of a life seen as a finality, a life outside the senses being excluded, and together with this, the possibility of eternal happiness. One may experience the decay of the society in his personal life, seeking self confirmation and self accomplishment in different parts of the world to fill the void in his soul.

To consider that one needs only pleasures given by external goods, such as moral or intellectual pleasures, is a simplistic outlook. The philosophical views which integrate all the things a person desires-pleasure, morality and knowledge- are adequate for the complex structure of man.

Aristotle is such an example, although many commentators on his works, claim that he supports the idea of happiness as a contemplative activity of the intellect.[8] It is true that Aristotle considered this activity as essential for happiness because it is specific for human beings. Intellectual activities are ingrained in the human nature, and contemplation is the highest and the best form of activity of the rational part of the human soul.[9] But is it possible that Aristotle forgot that a human being is more than just Reason? Under no circumstances, but all the other goods just bring a plus of happiness without providing it by themselves, while contemplation can provide the type of happiness specific to human beings. We can consider Aristotle as a forerunner of the philosophical ideas specific to Christianity, because no matter how many joys one can experience in this world, the absolute happiness cannot be considered and experienced at the personal level unless there is a detachment from the

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[8] K.V. Wilkes, *The Good man and the Good for Man in Aristotle*, Canada, Western University Press, 1980, pp. 341–358.

[9] V. Muresan, *Commentary on Nicomahic Ethics*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2007, p. 336.

material world. Through the intellect and thus through the thought of perfection, the person is able to leave behind his mortal condition and can build his happiness on a basis that has as a foundation his faith. Only by thinking about the things one does not know, is he able to reach the apophatic knowledge of happiness that is transcendental but achievable.[10]

Morality and external goods are not excluded by Aristotle when talking about happiness. The human is a social being who lives in a community and must behave accordingly. Thus he can enjoy a variety of goods (glory, health, financial wellbeing) that might bring him a plus of happiness.[11] Morality and other goods are not the core of happiness the way contemplation is, but they are not excluded from the list of the things that may make a person happy. Aristotle's view, as described above is to be admired, because it reaches three important features of the human being itself. A person is a fleshy being who respects the moral rules necessary for social wellbeing and more than that, is capable of contemplation. What it is very interesting is the fact that the Greek translation of contemplation is "theoreia". "Theos" means God, and Aristotle often speaks about the Great Mover Who makes possible the entire motion of the universe.[12] The contemplation of the God of the universe is for Aristotle a specific activity of the human being and thus a crucial reason for his state of happiness. One can have as many goods as possible, and he might be a moral person, but if he lacks contemplation, he cannot be happy because he does not accomplish his special activity as a rational being. What conclusion can be drawn from here? For Aristotle, happiness is first of all a state of the rational side of the human soul that does what is natural for a person-contemplation or "theorizing".

Opposed to Aristotle's philosophy is perhaps the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. The latter is close to the idea that: "X is the cause of happiness" and X is identified as sensual pleasure, the spiritual one being disregarded by the Cyrenaics in the same way as the body pain is felt worse than the spiritual one.

These ideas contradict common sense and logic: physical pain can be endured for the sake of a pleasure of the soul: a very good example in this case is a parent who can suffer any pain for his child's wellbeing. The parent suffers, but in the end, he experiences the pleasure of doing good

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[10] S. Bush, *Divine and Human Happiness in Nicomahic Ethics*, Pittsburgh, Cambridge University Press, 2008, vol. 117, p. 51.

[11] J.L. Ackrill, *Aristotle the Philosopher*, Clarendon, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 138, 140.

[12] G.R. Lear, *Happy Lives and the Highest Good*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2006, cap. 1, p. 96.

and at the same time, the child himself feels some kind of pleasure by understanding the love of his parent.[13]

A philosopher that stresses the idea of morality is Immanuel Kant, but his approach is different from the Stoic one. Kant poses another problem: he says that a person must earn happiness, he must have the so called: "good will".[14] In other words, the good intention must accompany every thought and every action.[15] Kant does not contest the role of the material goods in providing happiness. He insists on the idea that a person must be moral[16] and interesting to notice is the fact that he reminds us about the obligation a human has to ensure his personal happiness (through moral means, of course), because unhappy people tend to break the moral law. As a consequence, a moral person is worthier to be happy and in its turn, happiness rises the chances of a person to be moral.[17] In principle, the theories discussed above are the main paths the philosophers stepped onto to explain happiness. It is not difficult to notice that their explanations have the "cause and effect" pattern and, it couldn't be otherwise because of the type of knowledge philosophy provides.

We cannot expect from philosophy or any other science answers such as "X is the cause of happiness". The recent motivational literature, that also draws its inspiration from the oriental philosophy, seems to open the perspective of a different approach – the internal modulation so as to attract like a magnet the external goods that we desire in order to be happy.

From my personal point of view I consider that working with our inner side (which is an idea discussed by the philosophers who praise human reason) is beneficial and very satisfactory. We are used to think chronologically and that is why we see the problem of happiness as "X is the cause of joy" and also, for the same reason, we tend to think that some external, moral or intellectual satisfactions will make us happy.

I don't think that things function this way, I would rather consider that there is a flow in which the internal state of happiness is continuously

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[13] http://www.enthusiasm.ro/principalele-orientari-filosofice-in-explicarea-fericirii/

[14] Imm. Kant, *The Founding of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Bucharest, Humanitas 2007, translated by Philotheia Bogoiu, Valentin Muresan, Miki Ota, Radu Gabriel Parvu, p. 14.

[15] G. Frege, *Logical-Philosophical Writings*, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 1977, vol. I, p. 256.

[16] Imm. Kant, *Religion within the limits of pure reason*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2004, translated by Radu Gabriel Parvu, p. 65.

[17] Imm. Kant, *The Founding of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2007, translated by Philotheia Bogoiu, Valentin Muresan, Miki Ota, Radu Gabriel Parvu, p. 205.

being constructed together with the good things that we treasure and consider necessary for the state of happiness.

From a Christian point of view, happiness is revolutionary and paradoxical and this can be very well understood in the light of Christ's Sermon on the mount.[18] People want riches and power, while Christ blesses poverty and humbleness. People seek pleasure and joy, while Christ preches pain and grief. People dream about comfort and soacial wellbeing, while Christ recommends persecution and slander.

Of course there are many poor and humble people in the world. This is not the state recommended by Christ. Poverty in itself is not a virtue and wealth is not an obstacle. There are many people who suffer and cry after material goods or because of the troubles they have in life. Many of them are gentle, but gentle with bad passions. Many of them feel thirst or hunger to take what dooes not belong to them. Finally, many of them seem to be kind and merciful, peaceful and even persecuted- but all these for material purposes and interests. That is why Christ does not bless those in these situations but those who live their lives according to His teachings. If all those unfortunate situations are considered only from a psychological and social point of view, without being related to Christ, they cannot bring happiness to a person.[19]

The Christian dogma recommends the complete detachment from everything that is created. In opposition to any other religious or philosophical ethics, the Christian ethics seems to be unconceivable from a logical point of view because it teaches the complete detachment from material goods. It destroys goods and values as such. Without overlooking the everyday life, and the inherent situations that a person encounters at the psychological or social level, it manages to emphasise the unparalleled value of eternity. This new ethics does not offer rules or social laws, it presents the confession and the perspective of the new cretion.

All things considered, we can say that real happiness transcends the senses and the things that are subjected to them. This does not mean that it has nothing to do with everyday joys, but it rises itself to a higher level, beyond the temporal feature. Saint Cyril of Alexandria makes the difference between the absolute state of happiness and the incomplete one by saying: "The complete and perfect happiness in the one in God, and for

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[18]. The Holy Scripture, *Matthew* 7:12; *Luke* 6:31, Bucharest, Biblical Institute Press, 2006, p.p. 614, 634.

[19] St. Maximus the Confessor, *Chapters of Love*, Bucharest, Filocalia, 1993, vol. 2, pp. 111-112.

God, and the incomplete one is for the world, for things that fly like shadows and ghosts".[20]

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[20] St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentary to John*, Bucharest, The publishing house of the biblical and missionary institution of The Romanian Ortodox Church, 1979 PSB 41, p. 950.

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THE UNOFFICIAL GIFT IN CANTEMIR'S HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS

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Abstract: The gift has been a subject of interest in sociology and anthropology especially since the seminal work of Marcel Mauss, who argued that gift giving is never free. The present paper shall focus on unofficial gifts Dimitrie Cantemir observed and reported in his History of the Ottoman Empire. Cantemir mentions two forms of unofficial gifts that gave rise to reciprocal exchange: peşkeş and bahşiş. The first one of these was a diplomatic gift of great value, a gift of investiture, which was offered to the Sultan and his high ranking officials by the tributary states, Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania and exchanged for insignia. The second one, in Cantemir's words was' a gift not bestowed out of mere kindness but a customary gift', given by the Sultan to the Janissaries, in return for which the Sultan received loyalty and solidarity. Cantemir, as a keen and objective observer, was able to distinguish between official and unofficial gift exchanges in the Ottoman Empire, to diagnose the functions of peşkeş and bahşiş and to decipher the cycle.

Keywords: Gifts, Peşkeş, Bahşiş, Principalities, Dimitrie Cantemir

Introduction

The French socio-anthropologist Marcel Mauss, in his seminal essay, The Gift (1925) argued that gift giving is never free. On the basis of empirical examples from a wide range of societies, Mauss concluded that archaic societies are governed by the logic of gift exchange. The transaction is similar to a binding contract that is regulated elaborately, though the rules are not written. There are basically three obligations: to give, to receive and to reciprocate gifts. In other words, A gift is received 'with a burden attached'.[1] The cycle is iterative: it is repeated over time. If the cycle is broken, the relationship is damaged. Suspending or extinguishing obligations is a breach of contract, with serious consequences.

These gifts are distinguished from forms of commerce or barter in that they do not have to be of use. In other words, gifts remain outside the boundaries of utilitarianism.[2] Mauss observed that gifts accompanied a

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[1] Mauss, Marcel, *The Gift*, London and New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 53.

[2] Ibid p. 92.

multitude of major events such as marriage, birth, circumcision, funerals, arrival and trade.[3] The gifts were not necessarily extravagant. However, they were precisely calculated and recorded.

Then, of course, there is the issue of reinforcement and sanctions, when the gift cycle is broken. Penalties for breach could range from loss of reputation to very grave ones, as Mauss stated, 'To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war.'[4]

So what does this all have to do with Cantemir's History? About two centuries earlier than the studies of gift giving in anthropology, sociology and social psychology Cantemir, in his analysis of the growth and decay of the Ottoman Empire, identified two forms of unofficial gift exchange, *peşkeş* and *bahşiş*.

Neither of these was altruistic according to Cantemir. Both of these forms developed out of usage or custom into norms with sanctions. At the apex of both transactions was the sultan. Maintaining equilibrium was by no means easy and both forms were bound to deteriorate.

Cantemir's first reference to *peşkeş* appears in an annotation:

> ... Among other numberless privileges granted them according to the times, the chief was that wherein it was expressly said, that Moldavia voluntarily and without compulsion offered her obedience to the Turkish Empire, and therefore it is the Sultan's will that all her Churches, religious Rites, and Laws be untouched, and nothing more required of the Prince, but that he send every year by faithful Boyars to the resplendent Porte four thousand gold Crowns, forty bred Mares, twenty four Falcons, in the name of Pishkiesh, a present of gift.[5]

Cantemir is describing a customary gift from a subordinate to a superior, which harbors a potential for degeneration. In 1693, when Cantemir was elected to the Moldavian throne, he was unable gather the required amount of *peşkeş*. Then there is his personal disillusionment with the system upon his second appointment in 1711. Although he was promised by the Sultan that he would be exempt from this obligation, the Vizier had demanded money as soon as he arrived at Jassy.

The second gift Cantemir mentions in his History is the accession fee distributed by the sultan upon his enthronement:

> When the Sultan first mounts the throne, Bakhshish is given to all the chosen troops that are at the time at Constantinople, except

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[3] Ibid p. 11.

[4] Ibid p. 17.

[5] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire*, Nicholas Tindal, J.J., and P. Knapton, Book III, 1734, p. 189.

those belonging to the Bascha, and this is called julus akchesi, the Money of the new or renewed Empire... The hope of receiving the Bakhshish is a perpetual cause of sedition in the greedy soldiers...It has been found by experience that most of the rebelllions and depositions of the Sultans have been raised and carried on by nothing so much as this, that the Janisarries, eager for a change in the government, have been allured by the expectation of this Bakhshish to join in conspiracies with the Sultan's enemies.[6]

What is significant here is the structural similarity between the two cycles, although they were seemingly quite different. Neither of the gifts was free. Both were rooted in custom, both were repeated over and over again, developing into norms with obligations and enforcements. Yet both were doomed to deteriorate due to several reasons that shall be discussed.

This paper shall attempt to address these two categories separately, defining the terms and analyzing the gift cycles. Cantemir's comments regarding each category shall be evaluated under each heading. Main reasons for exaggeration of the gift and the consequences of exaggeration shall be discussed with reference to Cantemir's comments on the subject.

PEŞKEŞ

Peşkeş is a gift presented by an inferior to a superior. The word is derived from early new Persian *piskas* with an Urdu root *pēškaš* (Peš =front and kas= drawing), implying an advance payment. The word *peşkeş* is still in use in modern Turkish for benefits made available to supporters, usually in the pejorative expression *peşkeş çekmek* (to draw a peşkeş). Both Ottoman Turkish and Persian had a very finely nuanced sense of the gift. There were several words defining the status of the giver: *hediye* (*ḥadiya*), *ʿatiyye, inʿām, don, tuhfa, hibe* (*hiba*), and *peşkeş* (*pīshkash*), among others.[7]

Gemil equates *peşkeş* with the "feudal gift"[8] and argues that *peşkeş* predated the *haraç* because "the harach was paid to 'ransom peace', and 'the gift' held special significance in ancient Turkish culture'.[9]

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[6] Ibid. Book IV, p. 453.

[7] Lambton, Ann, 'Pīshkash: present or tribute?' Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Volume 57, Issue 1 February, 1994, pp. 145-158; For a comprehensive vocabulary decribing gift exchange see Muslu, Cihan Yüksel, 2014, *The Ottomans and the Mamluks: Imperial Diplomacy and Warfare in the Islamic World*, London: Tauris.

[8] Gemil, Tasin, *Romanians and Ottomans in the XIVth-XVIth centuries*, Bucharest, Enciclopedica Publishing House, 2009, p. 301.

[9] Ibid.

Haraç designated the official tribute rendered by the Principalities and was complemented by the inoffical gift due by the acccession of the new prince. Gemil dates the earliest peşkeş to the time of Petru Rareş:

> From a document, perhaps of 1532, we learn of the gifts the Moldavian Prince sent the Porte: 12 sable furs, 12 lynx furs, 12 marten furs, 12 thoroughbred horses, and money for the sultan; the Grand Vizier (Ibrahim Pasha), and Second Vizier (Ali Pasha) each received four sable and four lynx furs, twelve thoroughbred horses and 3,000 akçe.[10]

The gifts were sent on several occasions at periodic intervals, including St. George's day which corresponded to Hıdrellez, announcing the beginning of spring and religious days. Gemil lists the gifts added on Holy Virgin's day: four thoroughbred horses, 8 sable furs, 12 marten furs, 8 lynx furs, and 12 hawks for the sultan: four thoroughbred horses, two sable furs, two lynx furs, and two hawks for the Grand and Second Vizier.[11]

Peşkeş, therefore, was invoked more frequently. Maxim, for instance, refers to spring *peşkeş* (*bahar peşkeşi*)[12]. Before the middle of the 16th century, the amount of peşkeş used to be voluntary and occasional. Panaite draws attention to several documents dating to 16th and 18th centuries showing the sultans' anticipation of ' that what was usually given from old times.'[13] The Romanian chronicles and reports used the words *obiceiu*, *obicina*, *datina* to designate the customary relationship between the Porte and the Principalities.[14]

The quantities of specific gifts were regulated. For example, in 1793, the usage was not sending merely falcons, but sending 25 falcons.[15] A gift registry existed under the name of 'Peşkeş defteri', which recorded all gifts received.[16]

The scarcity of the gift (walrus tusks) and the difficulty in its procurement (furs from Russia) were more important than the monetary

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[10] Ibid p. 302.

[11] Ibid p. 303.

[12] Maxim, Mihai, 'Nouveaux Documents Turcs sur les Cadeaux Protocolaires (Peşkeş) et les Insignies du Pouvoir (Hükümet Alametleri)' in *Romano-Ottomanica, Essays&Documents From the Turkish Archives,* Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2001, p. 72.

[13] Panaite, Viorel, 'Custom in the 16th-18th Centuries Ottoman-Roumanian Relationship: Starting Points for a Historiographical Debate', Revue des Etudes Sud-est Europeennes, 31, 1993, p. 174.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid p. 176.

[16] Turan, Ahmet Nezihi, 'Bir Pişkeş Defteri için', Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, 13, 2002, pp. 59-74.

value of the gift. Thus, at least in the beginning, the symbolic value of the gift seemed to dominate its economic value.

But by the 18th century, the amount of tribute (*haraç*) was considerably surpassed by the total monetary amount of the gifts and "the values of the requisitions in kind, not always paid or deduced from the tribute by the Ottoman officials."[17]

The main reason for the exaggeration was the rivalry for the throne:

> But we must add to the tribute (harac, cizye) the extraordinary growth of other payments, notably of official gifts (pişkeş) with a total sum near to that of the tribute, and especially of unofficial bribery (rüşvet). For instance, according to some European sources, the prince Petru Cercel (1583-1585), supported by the French king, paid 1.160.000 gold pieces (4.060 kg. of gold) in order to obtain the Wallachian throne, while his rival, Mihnea II (1577-1583, 1585-1591), supported by the King-Mother (Valide-Sultan) and the grand vizir, had to pay another huge sum of 1.000.000 ducats (3.500 kg. of gold) in order to maintain his throne. Consequently, as a result of this terrible struggle for the throne, in the 1581-1590 decade, the total Wallachian expenses at Istanbul (including harac, pişkeş and rüşvet) reached their peak: some 650.000 of gold pieces, that is 2. 275 kg of gold, per annum![18]

Cantemir also drew attention to the thirst for power as a motivation to increase the amount of the gift voluntarily.

> And, in time out of too great thirst of rule his successors so increased the sum, that tho' at present there are paid into the Imperial Treasury sixty thousand crowns by way of Tribute, and twenty four thousand as an Easter offering...[19]

Overdoses of *peşkeş* were, therefore, sometimes voluntary. There were gifts offered 'more than usage' during the Phanariot regime, e.g. Nicolae Mavrocordat offered 15,000 quruş more than the usual amount in 1716.[20]

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[17] Panaitescu, Damian, 'Ottoman Policies And Wallachia's Public Finances (1714-1774)', in International Balkan Annual Conference (Ibac), Book Series 4, 2016, p. 207.

[18] Maxim, Mihai, 'On the Right to Strike Currency of the Reigning Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia during the Period of Ottoman Suzerainty', in *Romano-Ottomanica, Essays&Documents From the Turkish Archives*, Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2001, p. 53.

[19] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* Book III, p. 18.

[20] Panaite, Viorel, *op.cit.,* p. 184.

Furthermore, the prolonged practice had turned into a customary rule. The Moldavian chronicler Grigore Ureche complained that Moldavia would have been able to satisfy the sultan's claim once, but once the duty became a usage, the Porte would create new usages.[21]

What were the consequences of violating the rule of gift exchange? To fall short meant deposition or resignation, to exceed meant ingratiation. Loss of office could manifest itself as abdication, e.g. in the case of Peter the Lame, who abandoned the throne in 1591 to avoid the consequences of violating the bond[22] or deposition by the Porte as in the case of Cantemir's first nomination to the Moldavian throne in 1693 ('money was more prevalent at the Porte than the father's services and the son's merit').[23]

The Sultan, in turn, reciprocated by sending insignia, symbols of authority to the elected princes.[24] This custom also had its roots in ancient Turkish tradition. The custom of giving a ceremonial robe came from Iran but was also practised by the Byzantine Empire. Orhan, the second Ottoman ruler, had received a robe of this kind from the Byzantine Emperor.[25]

Mustafa Ali, the foremost historian of the 16th century Ottoman Empire attributed the tax revolts of 1594 in Wallachia and Moldavia to the exaggeration of the demands by the Ottoman dignitaries. During the reign of Suleiman I, the Grand Vizier was due an accession fee of 100,000 florins upon the enthronement of the prince. The usage, however, had changed during the reign of Murat III, when the same amount was not only demanded two or three times a year, but was expected to be presented to viziers in addition to the Grand Vizier. The exaggeration of the accession fee led to very heavy taxation, which in turn, triggered rebellions in the Principalities.[26]

This is confirmed by Sugar, who noted that as corruption grew after Mehmed Sokollu's death, more and more officials of both the Birun and Enderun (the outer and the inner parts of the royal households, respectively, applying to the outer and inner administrative services) had to be satisfied with gifts. Furthermore long reigning princes were levied

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[21] Ibid p. 183.

[22] Panaite, Viorel, *op.cit.,* p. 184

[23] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* p. 455.

[24] For documents in the Turkish Archives, especially Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, see Maxim, Mihai, 2001, 'Nouveaux Documents Turcs sur les Cadeaux Protocolaires (Peşkeş) et les Insignies du Pouvoir (Hükümet Alametleri)' in *Romano-Ottomanica, Essays&Documents From the Turkish Archives*, Istanbul: The ISIS Press, pp. 69-151.

[25] Pedani, Maria, 'Sultans and Voivodas in the 16th Century: Gifts and Insignia', The Journal Of International Social Research, Volume 1/1 Fall 2007, p. 198.

[26] Özge, Elif, *Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa and Factional Politics in the Court of Murad III*, unpublished Master's Thesis, Istanbul: Bilgi University, 2010, p. 78.

additional payments. According to Sugar, peşkeş payments had reached an amount of 650,000 akçes when Şerban Cantacuzino assumed his rule[27]

The imposition of the peşkeş seems to be at least one of the causes that brought the relationship between Cantemir and the Porte to a profound crisis:

> On the other hand the Sultan promised Cantemir, that the Principality should be Ebedi, and no tribute nor Pishkiesh demanded while he should continue in Moldavia...[28]
>
> ...Hence it was that Demetrius was so far from making the usual presents to the Sultan and the Turkish Ministers that he was allowed by the Port twenty purses towards his expense.[29]

But then, the oath was broken by the time Cantemir arrived in Jassy:

> He was no sooner arrived at Jassy, metropolis of Moldavia, but he received orders from the Port to build a bridge over the Danube for the pillage of the Turkish army; and withal was commanded by the Vizir to send him the money due to him and the other officers for his advancement to that Principality» although earlier the Sultan had promised that no peşkeş would be demanded. Demetrius was extremely incensed with the last order, and from that moment resolved to be revenged by the Vizir, and embrace the present opportunity of freeing his country from the Turkish yoke.[30]

Subtelny argues that Cantemir's treaty of alliance with Russia and the subsequent manifesto issued to the inhabitants of Moldavia in 1711 were manifestations of the contractual principle that existed between the Porte and Moldavia. It may safely be said that Cantemir perceived the contractual principle and was disillusioned by its breach by the Porte. The principle could be summarized as:'we should serve our sovereigns because they protect us, but if they no longer defend us, then we owe them no more service.'[31]

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[27] Sugar, Peter, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977, p. 130.

[28] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* Part II, p. 452.

[29] Ibid p. 456.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Subtelny, Orest, 'The Contractual Principle and Right of Resistance in the Ukraine and Moldavia', in *Crown, Church and Estates: Central European Politics in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Eds. R.J.W. Evans, T.V. Thomas, New York: Springer, 1991, p. 290.

BAHŞİŞ

'Then he distributed to the Janizaries and Spahi the usual Bakhshish or donative but presented the Ulema and rest of the Ecclesiastics, who officiated his father's funeral with silk robes and money' wrote Cantemir, describing Selim II's accession to the throne.[32]

The type of *bahşiş* Cantemir refers above to is the accession fee distributed to the janissaries by the new sultan (also known as *cülus akçesi/cülus bahşişi*):

'Bakhshish, or largess, usually given to the soldiery, on the election of a new Emperor.'[33]

The word *bahşiş* derives from the Persian verb *bakhshidan*, "to bestow" or "to grant".[34] As the polar opposite of *peşkeş*, it is a gift from the superior to the subordinate. *Bahşiş*, as in the case of *peşkeş*, was given on several occasions, including enthronement, celebrations, religious days, military victories and in general for service performed or anticipated. *Bahşiş* is a commonly used word in modern Turkish for the ordinary tip (drink money) or gratuity.

The term *cülus* meant accession to the throne and was borrowed from the Arabic verb "to sit". *Akçe* (white/silver coin) was the standard monetary unit of the Ottoman Empire and remained so until the end of the seventeenth century.[35] The term used by Western sources was aspre or asper, from aspron in Greek, meaning "white".[36]

Bahşiş was not the regular payment of the janissaries (ulufe), which was distributed every three months. The elaborate mechanism of payment was explained in Kavânîn-i Yeniçeriyân (laws and regulations of the Janissary Corps), an anoymous manuscript written by a janissary in the 17th century. The accession fee amounted to a yearly salary of a janissary.

A passage from the History makes the distinction between the official payment and the gift:

> Each Janizary (and there are forty thousand) receives twenty dollars, and each of the fifteen thousand Spahi, twenty five. Sometimes also at the Sultan's pleasure their daily pay is increased

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[32] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* Book III, p. 219.

[33] Ibid. ann.4

[34] Bowen, H., 'Ba<u>kh</u>s<u>h</u>ī<u>sh</u>', in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, Eds. by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 01 June 2019.

[35] Akkaya, Tolga, *The Evolution Of Money In The Ottoman Empire, 1326-1922*, unpublished Master's Thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, 1999.

[36] Grierson, Philip, *Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the Whittemore Collection V: Michael VIII to Constantine XI 1258-1458*, Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1999, p. 24.

with an Asper, which however is seldom done, but when the Sultan wants to ingratiate himself with the army. [37]

The first accession fee was distributed by Bayezid I (Thunderbolt) upon his enthronement in Kosovo in 1389, but institutionalized by Mehmed II or Bayezid II. [38]

As Cantemir shrewdly observed, *bahşiş* was a 'gift not bestowed out of mere kindness but a customary gift, which cannot be reckoned alms.' [39]. The gift was offered by the new sultan upon his accession to the throne in the hope that the janissary corps would remain loyal to him during his reign. The anticipated counter gift, in other words, was allegiance.

How sustainable allegiance was, however, depended on certain conditions. First of all, the accession fee evolved quickly into a norm, while both parties started and kept breaching the contract. From the sultan's viewpoint, there was no limit to the janissaries' demands, mainly because the janissaries had a 'vested interest in changing sultans, since a new Sultan meant an accession bonus' as Mansel observed. [40]

At the same time the number of janissaries kept increasing, with Muslims joining the Corps in place of Christians. According to David Nicolle, the number of Janissaries in the fourteenth century was estimated around 1,000, increased to 6,000 in 1475, swelling to 113,400 in the eighteenth century. [41] There is disagreement over the exact size of the Corps because recruitment had become hereditary and the pay slips were freely sold in the market.

Bernard Lewis remarked that the Corps of Janissaries, 'once a select corps d'élite, had swollen in size beyond all reason by enrolling any riff-raff willing to pay a bribe', referring to the criminal elements in the composition of the Corps by the end of the eighteenth century. [42]

From the janissaries' angle, on the other hand, the contract was breached by the sultans. From 16th century onwards, exhaustion of the fighting capacity, increases in fronts supply costs, delays in regular

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[37] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* Book III, p. 219, ann.4.
[38] Özcan, Abdülkadir, 'Cülus', İstanbul, *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 8, 1993, pp. 110-113.
[39] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* Book IV, p. 351, ann.4.
[40] Mansel, Philip, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924*, Harmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1995, p. 222.
[41] Nicolle, David, Hook, Christa, *The Janissaries*, Elite series, London: Osprey, 1995.
[42] Lewis, Bernard, *Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East*, Chicago, Open Court Publishing, 2001, p. 215.

payments and debasement of the coin led to led to financial crises, sparking a series of janissary rebellions. [43]

The first Janissary revolt dates back to 1446 (in Adrianople) ousting the young Mehmet II and bringing back his father, Murad II. [44] Their demand for an increase in pay was accepted, 'setting a dangerous precedent that would trouble the Ottoman Sultanate for centuries to come'. [45]

This event marked the beginning of a vicious circle, materializing in a series of rebellions. Cantemir observed the causal nexus of the accesion gift cycle, underlining the seductive nature of bahşiş as a 'perpetual cause of sedition.' [46] From 1588 on, Janissary rebellions began to shake the Ottoman state. Between 1622 and 1807, Janissaries took active part in the ousting of sultans. [47] By the early nineteenth century, janissaries were perceived as a threat by the inhabitants of Istanbul and the Ottoman administration.

Some of the sultans even came close to transferring the capital to a safer location. Osman II (r. 1618-22), for instance, threatened to move the capital elsewhere in order to bridle the army. Mahmut II (r. 1808-38) threatened the janissaries that he would move out of Istanbul 'if they did not restrain their excess.' [48]

The corps was finally abolished by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826 in the so-called Auspicious Incident (in Turkish "Vaka-i Hayriye") in which 6,000 or more perished in the bombardment of their barracks and the ensuing executions. [49]

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[43] Serim, Nilgün, 'The Causes of the Financial Crisis that Began in the 16th Century and Continued until the Tanzimat Era in the Ottoman Empire', Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi, Vol: 10, no: 20, 2012, p. 189.

[44] Emecen, Feridun, 'Defter-i Köhne: Pirlepe-Kırçova Kesiminin En EskiTimar Defteri 1445-1455', Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies, XLIII, 2014, p. 345.

[45] Freely, John, *The Grand Turk: Sultan Mehmet II - Conqueror of Constantinople, 2009, Master of an Empire and Lord of Two Seas*, IB Tauris: London, 2009, p. 16.

[46] Cantemir, Dimitrie, *op.cit.,* Book IV, p. 453.

[47] Somel, Selçuk Akşin, *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, Lanham: Scarecrow Press" xxxiii, 2003.

[48] Kafadar, Cemal, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*, California: University of California Press, 1996, p. 149.

[49] For conflicting approaches to the decline of the janissary corps, see Kafadar, Cemal, 2007, 'Janissaries And Other Riffraff of Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels Without A Cause?' Int. J. Turkish Studies Vol. 13, Nos. 1&2, pp. 113-134 and Sunar, Mehmet Mert, 2009, 'When grocers, porters and other riff-raff become soldiers: Janissary Artisans and Laborers in the Nineteenth Century Istanbul and Edirne', Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi(17)/1, pp. 175-194.

Conclusions

The model of gift exchange Cantemir sketches in his History enables us to explore the practices of the Ottoman Empire from a different perspective. Though they were diametrically opposite in terms of the status of the giver, peşkeş and bahşiş exhibited a number of common features. Both were justified by custom or usage, both were regulated and were reciprocated. Both peşkeş and bahşiş were gifts that accompanied accession: the former complemented the accession of princes, while the latter complemented the sultan's enthronement. None of the gifts was a charitable donation: the ascending prince offered the gift in token of solidarity and the sultan offered the gift to the janissaries in anticipation of solidarity. The gifts were not only compulsory, but by the passage of time had to be exaggerated to such an extent that the gift cycles were no longer viable, creating vicious circles on their own.

The focal point in both of these relations was the Ottoman state. And finally, both practices developed into norms, where the failure to adhere led to serious consequences, including abdication, abandonment, denunciation, revolt and war.

Mauss had argued that gift giving was a central feature in constructing and maintaining social relationships. Cantemir's critical comments on both cycles, however, invite a number of interesting questions about the sustainability of the relationship: How and why do customary practices develop and change over time? Are gift cycles sustainable? What makes these customary practices so susceptible to degeneration?

Cantemir's progressive perspective on social relations provides fertile ground for the discussion of institutions, norms and practices between unequal social statuses, in particular allowing us to rethink the gift.

By identifying the unofficial forms of gift exchange of the Ottoman Empire, Cantemir predated studies of gift-giving in anthropology, social psychology, and sociology by two centuries, raising new questions not only about the institutions of the Ottoman empire, but also gift exchanges in the pre-modern age.

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1881 - PROCLAMATION OF THE ROMANIAN KINGDOM, THROUGH THE SPEECHES OF VASILE BOERESCU AND CAROL I

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Abstract: The year 1881, the year in which Romania was proclaimed Kingdom, represents one of the major landmarks in the process of development and modernization of the Romanian state. This historic moment was preceded by two major events: the union of Moldavia with Wallachia on 5-24 January 1859 and the declaration of state independence from 9-10 May 1877. The transformation of Romania into a kingdom was, in fact, one of the greatest '48 desire. In our study we will consider the integral analysis of Vasile Boerescu and Carol I's speeches at the proclamation of the kingdom, together with a small comparative study of the evolution of their discourses over time at key moments in the history of the Romanian state.

Keywords: King, Kingdom, independence, nationality, Romania, great powers.

Introduction

The year 1881, for the political, cultural and economic elite of Romania, represented the achievement of another objective within the country project imagined in 1848 and published in the programmatic documents of the revolutionary movement in the Romanian countries. After the union of the two Romanian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, bringing a foreign prince to its throne and gaining state independence by force of arms, the moment of proclamation of the kingdom came to close a first historical cycle in which the state completed

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its internal organization.[1] Of course, the project continued, but then, symbolically, the boyar elites in Romania, in synod with the sovereign, made that institutional reform, to express, in front of the whole world, the symbolic connection of the state to western cultural and civilization models.[2]

Declaring the kingdom was not an unexpected act. There was a tension in the political space due to the expectation of that act. Interesting was the moment when Mihail Sturdza, the former ruler of Moldavia, sent his congratulations to Prince Carol I before the proclamation of the kingdom was accomplished.[3] But when we looked at that moment of national history, it is important to specify that although it was a moment thought by the founding fathers of the state and the Romanian nation, putting it into practice was not easy. Internally, there was still a constant opposition to the king. The German origin and the fact that he was a member of the imperial dynasty provoked an attitude of rejection by the pro-French national elites. The inner troubles that preceded the proclamation of the kingdom were also found in the memories of Titu Maiorescu. Romania had begun, after 1878, to enter into the orbit of the Central Powers. The opposition was divided. Junimists would have wanted to take part in the government; instead, the Conservative Party refused them.[4] Ion Brătianu, from the liberals, wanted the government to invite the conservatives to show the whole world that the achievement of the kingdom was an action of both parties. The divided views and the lack of unity of the opposition forced the liberals to be the ones who implemented another point in the national project.[5]

Another aspect that we must bring to discussion was that the adoption of the kingdom represents the conclusion of another fascinating period in the history of the Romanian state; "The great liberal government". Between 1876 and 1888, the liberals were at the government of Romania. Throughout that period, the minister was I.C. Bratianu, except for the period April 10 - June 8, 1881, when the post of prime minister was

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[1] Sabin Drăgulin, *The History of Romanian Political Thought 1848-1948*, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

[2] Ibidem.

[3] Dumitru Suciu, *The monarchy and the formation of Great Romania 1866-1918*, Albatros Publishing House, București, 1997, p. 103.

[4] Apostol Stan, *Political power and democracy in Romania*, Albatros Publishing, București, 1995, p. 128.

[5] Titu Maiorescu, *Parliamentary speeches on the political development of Romania under the reign of Carol I*, vol. III, (1881-1888), Socecu&Comp. Publishing House, București, 1899.

assumed by his brother D. Bratianu. The "pause" in government was due precisely to the liberals' desire to co-opt the conservatives.[6]

At the same time, external work had to be carried out in order to make that decision acceptable.[7] The proclamation of the kingdom came only four years after gaining independence, by force of arms and sacrifice of blood. The attitude of the Romanian state was not passive, from the 5th to the 24th of January 1859, until the 10th of May 1881. Step by step, stage by stage, the state was built. But, as it had been seen in the Berlin Peace Treaty (1881), there were certain conditions imposed by the great powers. Perhaps the hardest, from a political point of view, was the granting of citizenship to the Jews who had immigrated to Romania since the 1960s, which caused a vehement reaction from the local elites. There are known speeches that, liberal leaders, or conservatives had spoken from the Parliament's tribune against those conditions.[8] But there were also economic conditions. Germany and Austria-Hungary, had invested in the Romanian economy, but some of them, especially those that looked at railway infrastructure, caused huge scandals that remained in historical memory nearly 150 years. The Romanian state, in the Strousberg affair, was forced by Germany to pay compensation to private individuals; otherwise that great European power would refuse to recognize internationally the independence, and later the Kingdom.[9]

Those were the domestic and international realities of 1881. However, the Kingdom was proclaimed.

In order to better understand the main ideas, concepts, values of the age, we present two speeches.

In order to express the values of that time, we have chosen to analyse two speeches: that of Vasile Boerescu, as representative of liberal modernizing elites and of sovereign Carol I.

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[6] Dan Carbarău, „Great Liberal Government: Romania's independence and the proclamation of the Kingdom", in *Polis*, nr. 2(8), 2015, pp. 91-105, (accesed 11.06.2019), http://revistapolis.ro/documente/revista/2015/Numarul_2(8)2015/Numarul_2(8)2015.pdf).

[7] Paraschiva Câncea, *Political life in Romania in the first decade of state independence 1878-1888*, Scientific publishing house , București, 1974, pp. 81-82.

[8] Sabin Drăgulin, Antoaneta Ancuța Brașoveanu, „State, modernity and anti-semitism in Ion C. Brătianu's political speeches from the second half of the nineteenth century", în *Cogito*, Vol. X, no. 4/December, 2018, pp. 17-28, http://cogito.ucdc.ro/COGITO%20nr.%204%20december%202018%20BTfinal.pdf (accesed 11.06.2019); Sabin Drăgulin, „The origins of Romanian racism. A History of Ideas", *Sfera Politicii*, 2012, pp. 37-50, http://revistasferapoliticii.ro/sfera/pdf/Sfera_168.pdf (accesed 11.06.2019).

[9] Keith Hitchins, *Romania 1866-1947*, Third Edition Revised and Added, translated by George G. Potra and Delia Răzdolescu, București, 2003, p. 63.

Speech Analysis:

Vasile Boerescu was a Romanian Wallachian boyar who was born in Bucharest in 1830 and died in Paris in 1883. Although he had a short life, Boerescu entered the political history of the country as a moderate liberal who fought for political rights of the Romanians being able to create their own state. In 1859 we found him a professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Bucharest, and in 1871 he became its rector.

The period in which he lived, tumultuous and full of events, had signed his destiny. In 1848, although he was a student, he participated in the revolution, being an active contributor of the Romanian *Pruncul*[10] newspaper, where the liberals of the age promoted their ideas. In 1857 he founded the *National*[11] newspaper, where the authors supported the unionist ideas, being elected in the same year as a deputy in the elective assembly in Wallachia. In 1859, Boerescu was among the most vocal MPs, succeeding in his speech to persuade other colleagues to designate Alexandru Ioan Cuza the only candidate for the leadership of the two Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia. And in the speech of January 24, 1859, we found the idea of nationality and patriotism in order to strengthen the national power, but respecting the rules imposed by the great European powers, which, hopefully, *will applaud the decision of the Romanians to do the act of union.*[12]

In 1866, he was a member of the delegation that represented Romania at the Peace Conference in Paris.

In 1877, on June 10-22, Boerescu held a speech on Romania's independence, where he advocated for defensive, not offensive, defence, non-mixing of Romanians in the interests of other peoples, emphasizing once again the uniqueness of the Romanians' nationality *as a peculiar and special people*[13], for the need to be understood and supported by the great European powers, powers that would see in Romania a neutral, distinguished state capable *of striking a balance between other nations of origin and with different interests, independence representing the strengthening of Romanian nationality, moderation, order, peace, progress.*[14]

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[10] The first uncensored newspaper in the history of the Romanian nation, founded on 12 June 1848 by C.A. Rosetti and Eric Winterhalder.

[11] A more cultural newspaper, publication of moderate liberals, printed at the National Printing House of Iosif Romanov.

[12] V. Boerescu, „Discourse on the union of the Principalities", in Vasile Boerescu, *Political Speeches (1859-1883)*, vol. I (1859-1873), Bucharest, Socec & Co Graphic Workshops, 1910, pp. 3-11.

[13] Idem, „Speech for Romania's Independence", in Vasile Boerescu, Ibidem, vol. II (1873-1883), Bucharest, Socec & Co Graphic Workshops, 1910, pp. 866-728.

[14] Ibidem, pp. 866-728.

The conclusion is that, in all three speeches exposed at key times, respectively, 1859, 1877 and 1881, the ideas about union, independence, the desire to transform the state from the principality to kingdom, promote the national ideas, express the duty to the descendants, the need ensuring the defence of the state, maintaining peace, continuing the modernization process of society and the state, integrating Romania in the field of international relations and giving the great European powers the support as a guarantor of the evolution of the Romanian state.

In fact, Boerescu would have a decisive presence at key moments, in the historical stages that the Romanian state was going through.

At the historical moment of Romania's transformation from the Principality into Kingdom, Boerescu (March 14, 1881) had the quality of foreign minister. The document is relevant because the found ideas show how the process of changing society took place in search of national identity, the form of social and political organization, and the promotion of the national ideal.

Due to the extent of the speech, we will only play those fragments, from which the main ideas broke.

"Your Government, uniting itself with this law project that you have taken the initiative, merely follows the impulses of its heart, as well as the impetus of its nation. What are the impulses of our heart, each of you feels it; those who have spoken to us have eloquently exposed them, and each of us, members of the government, as Romanians, can only have the same feelings.

Gentlemen, the act that is being done today is a great act that will occupy a significant place in our history. (....) But let us now see now, gentlemen, in what way would this act have abnormalities, or how could it cause some distrust of other states?

Abnormally nothing can contain this act; I can even add without pre-courageous preference, that the anomaly was the same which existed until today (applause) as we were before.

Yes, thanks to the bravery of its sons, thanks to the glorious battles they had on the fields of Bulgaria, their blood and its value were a rank and an honourable position among the civilized peoples of Europe.

But once Romania became independent by itself, and once this independence was recognized by all the powers of Europe, who thus appreciated that this new state deserves all the endeavour, which was its place, the rank we held in the hierarchy of the independent states of Europe?

Place or rank of Principality! But for what Principality? There are states in Europe of much more subordinate importance than Romania, some of which are much smaller than us, both in terms of size and

population and wealth, and yet those states are called Kingdoms, have a defined position, a proper hierarchy, admitted in the vocabulary of the European diplomacy label.

Our name of Principality, which we have had up to now, was it well defined and in accordance with the position and the value of our state? No, gentlemen, and that's why I said that what had been until now was an anomaly. (Prolonged applause)

But could that anomaly last indefinitely? Not. (…)

Remember, gentlemen, how the progress of our state has gradually been done. In 1859, we made the union of both Principalities, how many of us had the misfortune to contribute to that great work, to find ourselves on the political stage, when the union, that first phase of the new Romanian state was made, we can only be the happiest, when we see that today the work ends and is crowned. (applause)

Time is coming back as through the bravery of our sons on the battlefield, to see the independence of our state recognized by all foreign powers. By this independence, we define our position of state.

I repeat to you, that this position has been defined to us; for until the recognition of independence, Romania's position was indeed undefined. Were we a truly independent state? It was not well known. Were we really a vassal state? This was not known either. (…)

This name, this title, is that of the Kingdom and King. The nation whose representatives you are, made this solemn declaration, and the government can only be in the union and echo of the national will. (Applause) (…)

At us the meaning of the word Dominus is pure Latin: it derives from the Romans from the word dominus, and in Latin dominus means master, sovereign, later also emperor. That is why, in our old days, our lords were called Dominus, as D. Chitu observed rightly. When the modern terms began to appear, Dominus was often called Principe, a word that does not exist in our old language (…)

If today, taking a precise and well-defined name and title, which is a logical consequence of our recognition of independence, we also follow an impulse of our heart, this is a happy harmony that is supposed to be held by a nation, knew to unite the sense of the heart with the voice of reason. And when today we fulfil the most vivid and ardent desire of any Romanian, at the moment when I speak to you and when the Assembly does this great act, I am sure that the souls of the Plevna heroes are happily in the holy regions where they are. (Prolonged and repeated applause) Considering, however, not only that reason of diplomacy, I wonder: what change of name could give rise to a shadow of mistrust in Romania? (…)

The first consideration is, as I said, that the title of King of Romania is only a continuation of the same sovereignty. The King is more precisely, more precisely and better defined, what the Dominus of Romania was, vaguely and indefinitely. Neither the right nor the law is added, nor decreasing.

Another consideration is that our kingdom does not entail any difficulties that would result from changes in frontiers or land expansions.

Romania Kingdom continues to be in the same limits, with the same territory expansions, as in the past. (...)

So Romania Kingdom is nothing but Romania before: it has no other aspirations, no other program.

The aspirations like the Romanian Kingdom program are, as before, in the best relations with all the Powers, and to pursue the great course of civilized action. (Applause) (...)

I am sure, in any case, that the great European Powers will not give a bad interpretation to this great act of the Romanian people today. (Prolonged Applause)".15

Keywords that we found in this discourse are: kingdom, king, nationality, Romania, Europe.

Boerescu began his speech by pointing out that, as a Government representative, he supports the parliamentary initiative of proclaiming the Kingdom, a motion put forward by General Leca, the chairman of the Chamber, at the opening of the meeting on March 14, 1881. Using epanalepsis impulses as an emotional factor, *impulses his heart, as well as the impulse of his nation, the impulses of our heart,* the speaker supported the adherence to the new form of the proposed organization: *Your Government, uniting itself with this law project that you have taken the initiative proposes, the impulses of his heart, as well as the impulse of his nation. What are the impulses of our heart, each of you, gentlemen, feels it; those who have spoken to them have been eloquently exposed, and each of us, members of the government, as Romanians, can only have the same feeling.*

Then continued, using the antithesis: normal / abnormal, today / ahead, *but let's see now, gentlemen, what would this act have something abnormal...? Abnormally nothing can contain this act;... abnormal was the same until today (applause) as we used to be.* and the rhetorical question followed by an answer, a technique specific to the orator,

15 Idem, „Speech for the proclamation of the kingdom", in Vasile Boerescu, *Political speeches* (1859-1883), vol. II (1873-1883), Bucharest, Socec & Co Graphic Workshops, 1910, pp. 1249-1256.

explaining the necessity of adopting such an act, which supported the position of Romania in relation to the other states.

The Minister reminded of the debt of the descendants, of the Independence War in which the Romanian *sons / soldiers* shed *their blood on the fields of Bulgaria* in order to obtain *an honourable position among the civilized peoples of Europe.*

The rhetorical question followed by the answer again placed itself in the orator's argument: *But for what Principality?... Our name of Principality... was it well defined and in accordance with the position and the value of our state? No, gentlemen.* which specifies the necessity of Romania's recognition with the status of Kingdom, a form *admitted in the vocabulary of the European diplomacy label*, the Principality being not specific to even the states in Europe *of much more secondary importance than Romania, some of which are much smaller than us, both in terms of the extent, as well as that of the population and the wealth ranges.*

There was a brief trip into history, history at which of the orator actively participated, in order to show the stages that Romania had gone through to obtain the state itself; the evocation of the moment 1859, the union expounded with the help of the metaphor as *the first base of the new Romanian state*, where the orator played a crucial role, following his speech, by electing Alexandru Ioan Cuza as the ruler of the two Principalities, whose continuity is *today, when we see that the work ends and is crowned. (applause),* then evoking the War of Independence, *the bravery of our sons on the battlefield, to see the independence of our state recognized by all foreign powers.*

Antithesis *defined / undefined /confused, vassal / independent, then / today* was used to strengthen the political and social *position* to which the Romanian state aspired at that time, *the title of Kingdom and King.*

Then he proceeded with the etymology of the *Latin* word of *Lord/Dominus*, which in other states became *prince*, a word that did not exist *in our old language*, later transformed into King, *because this is imposed on Him by the nature of things, by the extent and value of our state, political and economic. (Applause)*, emphasizing once again the necessity of Romania's enrolment, also through the evolution of language, on the road of modernity with the other states, and because the very term Dominus is by its *vague and indeterminate* nature in antithesis with that of King that was *precise and exact.*

Moreover, he calmly affirmed that the status of Romania would not change either from the territorial or habitual point of view, *it will not become controversial, the Kingdom of Romania continues to be in the same limits, by changes of frontiers and territories. It continues the traditions, has no aspirations, no... harmful tendencies to others,... no*

other program, but just wanted *to follow the great path of the civilized nations.*

He then ended, in his quality of Foreign Minister, pointing out that that status of the Kingdom came as the need *to guarantee stability and order on the lower Danube* and with the hope that the powers of Europe would not look like as an affront the new status, but as *a guarantee*.

Specifically to the proclamation the term "referent" throughout the discourse was we, the orator identifying himself not only with the audience but with the desire of the whole Romanian people.

The second discourse of the analysis belongs to Carol I, the former Lord of Romania, and King, at that moment.

"When on May 10, 1881, the Presidents of the Chamber and the Senate handed the crowns, he uttered the following words:

Today's celebration ends so brilliantly for a period of 15 years, so rich in heavy struggles and great deeds. Romania has developed very carefully under the guise of the Constitutions and its laws. The unbridled work of the state troops, the bravery of its army, and my unwavering confidence in the power of the people, have finally accomplished the most vivid desire of all: today the kingdom was founded, a sure guarantee for the future.

So I receive this crown proudly, it is made of the metal of a mouth of fire, sprinkled with the blood of our heroes and sanctified by the church; I receive it as a symbol of Romania's independence and power. A dear jewel it will be the testimony of the sad and glorious times; it will remind future generations of the ancestors' bravery and the connection that has been between the prince and the people. And the most beautiful crown for the queen it will be, as for me, the trust and love of the people, to whom all our thoughts and our senses belong. In front of the flags who had fluttered on the battlefield, in front of these crowns symbols of the kingdom, and around whom the people were gathering as soldiers around these flags, in front of these offerings for which the people rushed to the capital, we unite in the expensive call of our hearts: Let our beloved Romania live, today crowned by its own means!"[16]

The keywords of this speech are: crowning, kingdom, people, crown, May 10th.

May 10, now called the King's Day in Romania, was a symbolic day, both for the Romanian state and for Carol I, the day when he became the ruler of Romania in 1866, and then, in 1877, to declare the absolute independence of Romania from the Ottoman Empire.

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[16] the speech of King Carol I, spoken on May 10, 1881, on the occasion of the coronation after a photograph taken at the National Archives of Romania, the Royal House Fund, File 4/1881, tab 3.

The King remembered, from the beginning of the speech, the 15 years he was the ruler of Romania, *so rich in heavy struggles and great deeds*, evoking the history and deeds that led to that moment, *his constitutions and laws. The unskilled work of statesmen, the bravery of his army, and my unwavering confidence in the power of the people.*

Using the metaphor, he described the royal crown cast from the pipe of an Ottoman cannon conquered at Plevna, *the metal of a mouth fire*, the metal being steel, a metal symbolizing the bravery of the soldiers, *brave in battles sprinkled with the blood of our heroes and sanctified by the church,* a symbol of the past which must not be forgotten, *the jewel will be the testimony of the sad but glorious times; will remind future generations of the ancestors' bravery and the connection that has been between the prince and the people.*

He also pointed out that *the most beautiful crown for the queen would be*, just as for him the confidence given by the Romanians, *the trust and love of the people to whom all our thoughts and senses belong.*

Carol concluded his wishes to the new state called Kingdom:

Let our beloved Romania live, today crowned by its own means!

The term referent was initially *I* that ultimately turned into *us*, the king becoming one with the people he leaded, his voice.

Similar to the 1877 speech, the sovereign emphasized the importance of May 10 and the years spent as Lord of Romania, keeping the tone of gratitude for the Romanian people who had chosen to be their king.

What was missing from the King's speech now, compared to 1877, was the mention of the great European powers, but that was probably because the greatness of the day had as main actor the Romanian people and the new status of Romania.

Instead of conclusions

The transition from Principality to the Kingdom of Romania did not bring with great changes. Political people of the time were those who had seen in the new form of organization a formula of stability and symbolic expression, especially in relation to the other European states. Romania's wish was to be accepted as a partner of the states which negotiated the destinies of the European peoples, of course, in the geopolitical area. From the two speeches it was clear that there was a communion of ideas between the liberal elites of the time and the King. This is important because it reveals a unity between the elites and the royal house as to the continuation of the political project of the 48'. That partnership, between the two fundamental components of the political power in Bucharest, allowed the continuation of the process of modernization, transforming the country into a political actor that should be taken into account at

international level when it wanted to maintain a geopolitical stability in the Balkans.

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ARE WE HEADING TOWARDS A SELF-IMPOSED IRON CURTAIN?

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Abstract: The measures adopted by the European Institutions with regard to the Central and Eastern European countries show inconsistencies or deviations from an assumed road. At the time of European integration, it was more likely that countries such as Poland, Hungary, Romania would attract institutionalized responses to the rule of law. Finally, the natural question is: are there incompatibilities between the European model of the capitalist democracy and the countries formerly ruled behind the Iron Curtain? Is the gap between "model adoption" and "model adaptation" so big that it separates us from the original model? In fact, what exactly in the history of these peoples, their national specificity or their concerns puts them in a situation of model departure?

Keywords: Eastern Europe, rule of law, model adoption, unpredictable future

Starting from the last nationalist, anti-European and illiberal configurations in the central and eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, and Romania, lately), we inherently reach to some questions referring to the predictability of the mutual European future in this area of the continent. Counterbalanced, in Western Europe, by Euro-skeptical and Euro-pessimistic, neo-nationalist governments or by street social movements, the central and eastern European convulsions seem to be a part of the general sight of an "Alive Europe", in an optimistic-superficial assessment, or a "Disintegrating Europe", in a pessimistic-ill-willed assessment. Caught in the Brexit equation, the European construction will still have to assess its own wounds and weaknesses, but not later than this year, when the European elections would have told their result, and the updated radiography could be laid on the bright panel to be read with objectivity. Could the predictions regarding the raise of the percentages of the Euro-skeptical and the nationalist movement be confirmed? Will the political main-stream lose as much of the confidence of the electorate so that it will no longer be able to ensure a clear majority, without an appeal

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to the new wave of anti-unionist parties? Will the European process and debate find enough vectors for the Europe of 2020, once a threshold in relation with which optimistic predictions and engagements were made? (see the Europe 2020 agenda). And, in the end, will the third decade of the third millennium ensure the necessary combustion of the most generous and successful continental program for peace and prosperity?

These would be, in a personal vision, the data and the probabilities regarding the Europe of 2019, laid on a single page. But, in this study, departing from another article of ours[1], we will seek to assess and, maybe, predict the role of the central and eastern European countries in this whole European concert that will play, one way or the other, its own symphony. And all we will have to do is to see the final production. Because here, at the end of the second decade of 2000s, the future compound of the EU seems to be more open to the new configurations than ever. But this is also due to a certain fact, namely that Europe has demonstrated that it can deliver wellbeing by integration, and now it is the moment to go on to another level.

Does an Iron Curtain still exist?
The decision to integrate the former communist countries in the EU was a natural decision, from an historical, point of view. It was also a necessary decision from an economical point of view, even if difficult, from an institutional point of view. The necessary precautions, pointed out by us in the article *The Multy-Speed Europe – a reality, solution and to discontent of some, a necessity[2],* the inherent suspicions of such a demarche, and even the obvious reticence of some of the European actors are proven to be more contemporary than in any other moment since 2004. 15 years have passed since the first wave of central and eastern accessions. And two initiatives in concerning the art. 7 of the TEU are activated regarding Hungary and Poland, and the discussion regarding Europe with two gears is only temporary suppressed, in the favor of finalizing the Brexit process and overtaking the "May 2019" moment with the European Parliament elections. Things don't seem to look very good,

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[1] *The European Model – Between embracement and adjustement (Central and Eastern European Shades)*, paper presented in the Conference "Diece 2019 – Disintegration and integration in east-central Europe", 5th edition, http://sites.euro.ubbcluj.ro/diece2019/index.php/programme/, accessed on 26.03.2019;

[2] *The Multy-Speed Europe – a reality, solution and to discontent of some, a necessity,* Papers from the Fifth International Scientific Conference of the European Studies Department, *United We Stand Strong,* 31 May – 1 June 2018, http://jeanmonnetexcellence.bg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Conference_2018_Proceedings_Final.pdf., accessed on 26.03.2019;

and the digressions of such countries as Poland, Hungary or Romania seem to configure the reticence of those who once were advocating for an extension of the terms of pre-accession in the case of the twelve, in the first decade of 2000s.

Starting from the realities in the field, for the two countries in the Visegrad group, to which Romania and the Czech Republic are added as showing democratic convulsions, either referring to the immigrants, or to the rule of law, we will seek to identify, as much as possible, an answer to the following question: *what is it that makes these countries encounter difficulties in following a road towards a democratic model – a functional model, with clear advantages?* Because in this way, we can now see the reality: when the Iron Curtain fell, they have started their path towards the democratic capitalism, considered to be a superior model comparing to the communism found in the central and eastern Europe countries for almost half century, the countries that have acceded in the first decade of the 2000s to the modern European construction visibly develop deviations or even renunciations to the assumed objective that is to establish and comply with the western model. *And the noticeable deviations* do not lie in the sustained efforts to attain route aims; they lie in the *renunciations or even contradictions towards the capitalist democratic principles.* Specifically, anti-justice measures or illiberal gestures are obviously intentional actions, assumed to be true, of course, but in a specific rhetoric.

Returning to our question, once with the answers, we will seek to identify the element that has deflected their apparently simple orientation; this element may be either a part of the national identities, or a part of the historical identities. It is not excluded for it to be even a part of the undertaken reform process. For it seems easy to assume and align with another model; but our attempt is not as easy, as we will observe, as long as none of these countries assume the renunciation of capitalism and even of democracy.

In fact, this is an aspect that is worth pointing out: none of these countries repudiates the capitalist economic system, not even Hungary, where we can see a tendency towards centralized capitalism[3]. Moreover, none repudiates democracy or its beneficial effects over the citizens. And still, all show mutual points in their separate evolution of deviation: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have adopted a negative rhetoric regarding the immigrants. "They say the mainly-Muslim refugees have no place in their homogeneous, predominantly Christian societies and cite

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[3] Paul Lendvai, *Ungaria lui Orban,* (*Orbáns Ungarn*), Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2017.

security concerns given deadly attacks by Islamist militants in Europe."[4] And this is a clear case of non-compliance with both minority rights and EU values and treaties. In turn, Poland, Hungary and Romania have made out of justice a target of reform which is questionable, at least, and in which the separation of powers in the state and the independence of justice are jeopardized. Here we cannot fail to signal the identity of concerns about the magistrates' status, almost identical in the case of each of the three countries" There are certainly similarities between the goals and rhetoric of Fidesz, the ruling party in Hungary since 2010, and PiS (Law and Justice), in power in Poland since 2015. Both appear to be following the same template: First, target the highest courts and the judiciary, then restrict the independence of the media and civil society, and finally transform the constitutional framework and electoral laws in ways that enshrine their hold on power."[5]

At a summative look, there are similarities in the illiberal configurations in the Central and Eastern European countries. Are they random, like the effort to modify the Status of Magistrates and their retirement age? And even if they were, what causes this tension between politics and justice so that the latter becomes a target?

The siege on the "rule of law"

The actions of the Romanian, Hungarian and Polish governments seem dangerous in terms of their own popular legitimacy. And this occurs due to the fact that between the governments of the aforementioned states and the populations represented by them, specifically, that part of the electorate that legitimized them, there is still a connection that is stronger than we would like to think. This connection is enough highlighted by Samuel Huntington. "Depending on the theory of the natural law, the governmental laws are legitimate to the same extent as they are in agreement with the "public philosophy". According to the democratic philosophy, they get their legitimacy from the point in which they embody the desire of the people."[6]

We therefore choose to explain the depth of the governmental gestures. We will do so by referring not to the immediate stage interests of

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[4] EU to sue Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic in top court over migration. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-easterners/eu-to-sue-poland-hungary-czech-republic-in-top-court-over-migration-idUKKBN1E02VB, accessed on 26.03.2019.

[5] A Tale of Two Illiberalisms: Why Is Poland Failing Where Hungary Succeeded?, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/08/poland-hungary-authoritarianism-fidesz-pis/, acceded on 26.03.2019.

[6] Huntington S.P., *Ordinea Politică a societăților în schimbare*, *(Political Order in Changing Societies),* Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 1999, p. 33.

the political decision makers, but to the electorate's motivation which legitimated such governments. And we do this by even going beyond the explanation that the ruling parties hadn't assumed such objectives as the remodeling of the relations between the power institutions against the justice. And to achieve this aim, we appeal to the Hungarian example, where FIDESZ wins for the third consecutive time, with a consistent percentage of elections, even if it has started its attack on the rule of law since its first mandate.

The similarities found in the three countries mentioned, Poland, Hungary and Romania, are all eloquently expressed in the resolutions that concern them and which draw attention to immediate dangers. And the name of these similarities rests in the concept of the "independence of justice". Starting from art. 7 of the TEU, the one that activates the action of the European institutions in the case of non-compliance with the article 2 of the same treaty, in every decision regarding these three countries, the concept of "independence of justice" rises in the registered dangers inventory, next to such terms as "subversion" or "threat".

Starting by making an effort to highlight the European decisions on the "threats to the EU values", we will offer the case of the independence of justice as similar for all of these three countries in the "rule of law" chapter.

In Poland's case, the content of the document refers directly to the aspect highlighted in chapter four, entitled "The threats to the independence of the Ordinary Judiciary". Therefore, the 114 paragraph clearly shows the deviations from the rules of the rule of law: "The law on the Supreme Court, the law on the National Council for the Judiciary, the law on Ordinary Courts Organisation and the law on the National School of Judiciary contain a number of provisions which raise grave concerns as regards the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers"[7]. All these elements form the source of the worries of the European institutions, related to "the adoption by the Polish Parliament of new legislation relating to the Polish judiciary which raises grave concerns as regards judicial independence and increases significantly the systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland"[8].

If in the case of Poland, the activation of article 7 of TEU is based on "the threats to the rule of law", according to art. 14 of the same treaty, in the case of Hungary, the inventory consists of ascertainments of deviations

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[7] Reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, Brussels, 20.12.2017 COM(2017) 835 final,

https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-835-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF, accessed on 26.03.2019;

[8] Idem;

in almost all the meanings of the "European values", as they are given in art. 2 of the TEU. But the "preoccupation" for the independence of justice and, therefore, for the rule of law, is also present, just as we have already suggested. The European Parliament, "States that the concerns of Parliament relate to the following issues: the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system; the independence of the judiciary and of other institutions and the rights of judges; corruption and conflicts of interest; privacy and data protection; freedom of expression; freedom of expression; academic freedom; freedom of religion; freedom of association; the right to equal treatment; the rights of persons belonging to minorities, including Roma and Jews, and protection against hateful statements against such minorities; the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; economic and social rights."[9]

In the annex of the same document we find the cases in which the independence of justice and other institutions lies in danger. This is the reason why we quote a paragraph that seems eloquent: "The president of the NJO also makes a recommendation to the President of Hungary to appoint and remove heads of courts, including presidents and vice-presidents of the Courts of Appeal."[10]

And in the end, by keeping the chronological order, the Resolution regarding the rule of law in Romania shows the same threats to the same rule of law. "The European Parliament, (...) Is deeply concerned at the redrafted legislation relating to the Romanian judicial and criminal legislation, regarding specifically its potential to structurally undermine the independence of the judicial system and the capacity to fight corruption effectively in Romania, as well as to weaken the rule of law".[11]

By further seeking for more similarities, this time only for finding more nuances, we can't not highlight the tendency of these three governments (Polish, Hungarian and Romanian) to retire the judges earlier. And this happens not because of the social care towards this social category, but due to the governors' desire to name other persons that are closer to the direct sphere of influence.

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[9] European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-0340+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, accessed on 26.03.2019;

[10] Idem, annex to the Resolution, alin. 12;

[11] European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2018 on the rule of law in Romania (2018/2844(RSP)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-0446+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN, accessed on 26.03.2019;

Coming back to the fatidic realities, we will close the circle proposed at the beginning of this subchapter by asking ourselves once more what exactly in the electorate's features can identify or re-identify governments whose actions are visibly removed from the concepts of "independency of justice", "rule of law", and, from here on, even from the concept of democracy as a social and governing model?

Behind the Iron Curtain of a New Era

Many reservations have been expressed with regard to the post-accession path of the 12 full-fledged countries in the EU in the last decade of the 2000s, moreover because many of the decision-makers thought that these countries were not yet ready for such a demarche. And today, after more that 10 years since the accession waves from 2004-2007, the EU institutions find themselves in the position to adopt resolutions and to activate art. 7 of the TEU for political configurations and governmental demarches that prove to be "a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2"[12].

Due to the fact that we have assumed the connexion between the peoples of the Central and East European countries, we will try to find a reason why these governments come to these configure these actions through these votes. At the beginning, we will refer to Dick Howard's opinion to understand why the "democracy", as a set of constitutional and social values, has lost its importance. In the world that came after 1989, the interest was purely economical, meaning that it not the same thing as the individual interest, which is understood as the modern form of the autonomy. (...) This field of *political freedom* is the lost one (or, maybe, willingly abandoned or replaced with some sort of safety considered to be more valuable) in the totalitarian political regimes, just as in the regimes whose politics is determined by the economical needs"[13].

Therefore, we have the first explanation for the situation that can be found in the central and eastern Europe: burdened by the immense economical difficulties, placed in societies in which the economical transition has brought them in absolute uncertainties, the citizens in this side of the continent are appealed to the daily existential decay, in which only the "personal interests" work, in the detriment of the general, social ones. Claude Karnoouh confirms: "It is clear that the peoples in the Easter

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[12] Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT, accessed on 26.03.2019.
[13] Howard Dick, *Stafia democrației (The Specter of Democracy)*, Curtea Veche Publishing House, București, 2008, p. 165.

Europe are sick of the political and ideological debates with which they were fed for years in order to accede to other substitutes, under the empire of need. Practically, almost nobody in the East will believe today in individual values that are different from the family solidarity, or in other public values different from merchandise and profit."[14]

By passing the democracy with its ethical, moral, social values on the second place in the detriment of the diurnal economical concerns, ordered most of the times by the inherent existential difficulties in the societies found in social and economical transitions. Seconded, however, by a renunciation to those social values that make a solid compound out of a society or nation that can prove solidarity. "The social capital is capacity by the confidence predominance, in a certain society or in some of its parts. Created and transmitted through the cultural mechanisms - religion, tradition, historical customs - the social chapter is thus differentiated by the other forms of human capital."[15] Therefore, that capital that is able to predispose the individuals to collaborate and to trust is almost (if not completely) lost: "The culture cannot be as easily changed. The past communist societies know that the communism has created a set of habits-the excessive dependence on the state, which has lead to the lack of the business enthusiasm, the incapacity to compromise and to cooperate within groups, companies or political parties, which have slowed the consolidation of the democracy and of the market economy."[16]

We are facing a vicious circle: the communism has destroyed essential social values that, afterwards, after the return to the democracy, would have been necessary to the quick insertion on the new road. And the slowness of the transition, encouraged by these realities, has contributed to the loss of the trust in the new social and economical form - the capitalist democracy. "Those societies that lack the efficient and stable governments also lack the mutual trust of their citizens, the public and national loyalty, as well as the organizational skills and abilities. It is often said that their political culture is marked by effective or latent suspicion, jealousy and hostility towards anyone who is not a member of the family, of the state or of the tribe"[17]. Here, it is enough to remember the famous words: "We will not sell our country!", from the post-communist Romania, words that are used in a manipulant way by the socialist governance of

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[14] Karnoouh, Claude, *Comunism / Postcomunist și modernitate târzie* (*Communism/Postcommunism and late modernity)*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2000, p. 21.

[15] Fukuyama Francis, *Încredere (Trust: The social virtues and ...)*, Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 17.

[16] Idem, pp. 25-26.

[17] Huntington, Idem, p. 34.

that time, in order to realise now how much this manipulation has delayed and prolonged the effort to make the transition to capitalism. And there it is, now it is proven that this exact prolongation owed to the lack of trust and other necessary social values is one of the causes of the highlighted dangerous phenomenon - the passing of the democracy in a shadow that allows the illiberal excesses of the governments in this side of Europe.

Conclusions

We rather not exclusively blame the governments of the central and eastern European countries for the deviations from the democratic rule of law model. And this choice is owed to the fact that we believe that mostly, the guilt is shared by these governments and their voters, as long as the national, euro-skeptical, illiberal options of the governing parties were highlighted even during the campaigns. Again, we offer the Hungarian situation as example, where FIDESZ wins the elections for the third time consecutively, although its political views is more and more obvious illiberal, nationalist and at least euro-skeptical.

We are more interested in the ingredient(s) used by these countries, and that lead to an environment that is more and more distanced from the European model. During this study, we have brought to light a certain passing of the democratic values on the second plan, pushed there by a predominance of the daily concerns of the populations, dictated by the need of the daily living. In this way, we have identified a possible cause of these deviations: the central and east European peoples are characterized by the social lack of trust and by the concern to ensure the daily existence, so that aspects such as "rule of law", "justice", and "the independency of the judiciary system" have become secondary concerns, in the best case.

We realize today that this is not the only reality that is guilty of the central and east-European tendencies. The references to the past struggling history of the last century of these peoples, as well as of the dawn of these nations also offer additional explanations. And not least, the study of the Lovinescu[18] concept of "spirit of race" plays a fundamental role in this equation.

No matter how we assess the current situation, at least one certainty comes to surface: behind the force of the New Iron Curtain, the young democracies in the eastern half of Europe develops consistent tensions related to the European model of liberal democracy. They can be error of route, but they can as well be incompatibilities with the model. And this would mean that we will have two Europes separated now not by a Curtain of Iron, but by a Curtain of unfulfilments.

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[18] Eugen Lovinescu, *Istoria civilizației române moderne, (The History of Modern Romanian Civilization),* Minerva Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997.

Final considerations

We must, however, take on, related to the situation of the new central and eastern European democracies, two realities about the relationship between the European model taken over and the national specific configurations in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Romania or even the Czech Republic.

The first of these realities is that none of these countries contests, and, to be more specific, none of them doubt the fact that only capitalism is the form of economic organization that can secure the future of their country. But the fact is that from here and up to the point where we ensure them the optimal conditions of development within a functional democracy, different nuances appear. And these exact nuances have activated the European signal alarms. A neglect of democratic values, a passage in the background following the pressures of the economic realities of everyday life. Hence, automatically, a certain suspicion of political and governmental activity that aims and succeeds in reconfiguring the model taken, depending on its own interests, and thus endangering democracy itself.

And this is our second assumption: As a result of these successive reconfigurations of the legal system, democracy itself is jeopardized, and hence, so are the economic growth and the capitalism itself. "A formal democracy, with free elections and independent media (...) is not enough to encourage economic growth. This is only possible if other conditions are met, especially if, in addition to the regular elections of governments, the rule of law is permanently ensured. If the rule of law is lacking, democracy, nominal in this case and not real, may prove to be bad, rather than to solve the many problems."[19] Here is where the great risks of putting the capitalist system in danger are.

In this way, we end our demonstrative effort, closing down the ideological circle, showing the danger of moving away from the model and confirming the European institutional efforts to trigger alarm signals - they are necessary and real for a common Europe of the future.

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[19] Kotodko, G.W., *Încotro se îndreaptă lumea. Economia politică a viitorului, (Where the world is heading. The political economy of the future),* Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2015, p. 133-134.

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LIBERALISM'S NEW MEDIUM: ENHANCING LIBERALISM'S ABILITY TO REALIZE ITS AIMS

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"The crisis of liberal order today is in part a problem of how to reorganize governance."[1]

Abstract: *Liberalism is a model for shaping political-economic/socio-cultural bodies into multi-level systems of cooperation that create social-economic progress. The principles of Liberalism promote cooperative partnerships and peaceful coexistence. However, the ideals of Liberalism prove difficult to realize even for the most outstanding models of democracy. This article analyzes the crisis of Liberalism's and explains the effectiveness of Liberalism's new medium for improving its ability to fulfil its aims. The new medium refers to a multiplexity of cross-sectoral, local-global, transnational connections which help to reframe issues in a way that delivers more desirable results. This article focuses on the issues of interethnic relations, migration, and the security challenges imposed by intrastate and cross-border social movements and networks.*

Keywords and phrases: *Idealism, intrastate and cross-border social movements, migration, cross-border communication networks, belonging (nationalism), otherness (migrants), legitimacy, strategic partnerships.*

Introduction

The crisis results in "The migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics and the relationship it creates among people, their governments, and international institutions."[2]

The term Liberalism/Idealism refers to the conviction that when certain principles are applied to interactions social agents are benefitted (not harmed) by cooperating. The principles of Liberalism promote multi-level cooperation in three specific ways: (1.) institutionalism – structuring systems by which normative principles are institutionalized in order to

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[1] Ikenberry, *The end of liberal international order?* 19.
[2] Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, 80.

facilitate cooperation, reduce conflict, and promote peace;[3] (2.) freedom of association – promoting free trade which results in increased economic interdependence and an interconnected value chain; and (3.) mutuality – human rights and creating more desirable forms of social activity by including norms and values. In other words, liberal processes promote social-economic progress and cooperation is the means for achieving this. This article explains a new medium by which Liberalism is more effective in achieving its aims. The new medium enhances Liberalism's effectiveness for conflict reduction and peacebuilding plus for increasing benefits for a larger number of multi-level stakeholders who participate in cooperative interactions within integrated networks.

Liberalism in principle is a viable social model for resolving problems related to diversity and the conflicting interests of social agents at the various levels of social interaction. Liberals argue that because of the very nature of nation-states they are confronted with the need to manage diversity, immigration, intrastate and cross-border social movements, and migrations – all of which effect their social, economic, and security conditions. The impact that Liberal approaches to intervention, progress, and development have on society result in the increased convergence and integration of the interests of social agents at multi-levels: e.g. regarding the need to manage diversity and interethnic tensions, the impact of environmental conditions on the society and its economy, and the fair use of natural resources. Consequently, there is increased recognition of the extent to which interdependence converges the interests of micro, meso, and macro level stakeholders. The fact of interdependence means that social agents are influenced by various factors at multi-levels that transcend borders and influence preferences: e.g. social agents are involved in interpersonal, social, cultural, economic, and political interactions that impact the prospect of satisfactory and beneficial outcomes at the various levels of social engagement. "Interdependency amplifies the need to understand and address interlinkages: e.g. that increase overlaps of use, rights, and ownership and increase interregional migration and interconnections between social groups in different regions."[4]

Liberalism is effective when society is planned so that individual human rights are guaranteed (i.e. the right of individuals to pursue what they believe is in their best interest). The concept states that the ability for individuals to experience what is in their best interest is maximized when

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[3] Keohane, and Nye, *Power and Interdependence,* 134; Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* 13.

[4] Brondizio, Ostrom, & Young, *Connectivity and the Governance of Multilevel Social-Ecological Systems*: The Role of Social Capital, 254.

they agree to interact in accordance with shared principles, cooperate to achieve shared goals, and agree to create the common good. Liberalism is based on the belief that the threat that individuals potentially pose to each other[5] is reduced when the members of society ensure each individual human rights. Liberalism is purported to create social solidarity, increase social flourishing and economic prosperity, increase liberty, reduce conflict, and promote peace even when there is extensive ethno-cultural diversity.

Liberal democracies are in principle outstanding models for reconciling the tensions between the majority population, immigrants, and migrants; for managing diversity effectively; for reducing interethnic conflict and violence; and for realizing the democratic peace. However, Liberalism is more impressive in theory than in practice. That is to say that matching theory with practice in order to gain the prescribed results proves difficult even for those countries that pride themselves in being the model of a liberal democracy and for those countries aspiring to be the best functioning liberal democracy in the world.[6] The fact is that liberal democracies are severely challenged in their effort to apply the principles of Liberalism in order to effectively manage contemporary diversity issues (e.g. in particular interethnic conflict and violence related to migrants plus the impact that migration and intrastate and cross-border social movements have on security).[7] Even though Liberalism is the preferred political philosophy for democracies the scope and complexity of the issues related to the disparity of interests of social agents at multi-levels and environmental and resource issues call for a critical analysis of Liberalism's inadequacies and the prospect of applying Liberalism's new medium toward enhancing its ability to meet its aims.

This article argues that Liberalism's new medium alters the established notion of intervention, conflict reduction, and peacebuilding by establishing a multiplexity of cross-sectoral, local-global, transnational connections that reframe issues in a way that delivers more desirable results. A review of the literature explaining the outcome of applying the new medium to social action indicates that it improves intra-state and interstate interactions, improves public-private relations and interactions, resolves the structure-agent dichotomy, democratizes power relations, and improves the efficiency of institutional operations. That is to say that a

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[5] Hobbes, *Leviathan,* 105.

[6] Chandler, *Empire in Denial,* 20-21 & 194; Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law, 338-345; Mahajan, Responding to Identity Conflicts: Multiculturalism and the Pursuit of Peaceful Co-Existence, 4-5.

[7] Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship,* 1-6.

preliminary exploratory investigation of the literature indicates that new forms of networked participatory social action are creating more desirable outcomes by generating effective forms of collaboration, collective action, and solidarity.[8]

Section two of the article is a critical analysis of the rise of Liberalism and an explanation of its current crisis. This section focuses on the issue of legitimacy. Section three explains the connection between the rise of Liberalism, increased migratory activity, and the security challenges imposed by intrastate and cross-border social movements. Section four explains the connection between the rise of Liberalism the environmental consequences of assumptions regarding Modernization and problems resulting from applying the established approach to development. This section also examines the connection between Liberal intervention(s), state-making, development, and the way authority/power is applied in Liberal interventions – thus the connection between applying the liberal peace agenda to interventions and the effectiveness of Liberalism in meeting its aims. Section five explains Liberalism's new medium, why it introduces a means to enhance Liberalism's effectiveness, and why it supersedes the liberal peace concept. The final section concludes the article by highlighting the factors that make Liberalism's new medium effective as a strategy for realizing the ideals of Liberalism. The concluding section also summarizes the article and explains its contribution to the literature on multi-level social action, on governance, multi-level networks, strategic partnerships, conflict reduction, and peacebuilding.

The Rise of the Liberal International Order

"The current challenge to the liberal order is as much, if not more, from within as from without."[9]

A "'legitimacy crisis' comprises a crisis of vision, of belonging, of leadership and of governance."[10]

"One of the great dramas of the last two hundred years has been the rise of liberal democracies to global dominance. Over the last two hundred years, democratic states have made efforts to build international order around open and rule-based relations among states – that is, they have engaged in liberal order building."[11] Liberalism emerged as a world system whose fundamental principles promote legitimate liberal order based on

[8] Shirky, *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations,* 49-52.

[9] Acharya, After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order, 1.

[10] Lango & Murray, *Europe's Legitimacy Crisis: From Causes to Solutions,* 3.

[11] Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order,* xi & 1.

complementary interactions between authority/legitimate power (i.e. the structure) and the civic body (social agents). Liberalism's ascendency was grounded upon establishing a triangular balance between legitimacy based on adherence to liberal normative principles, democratic/capitalist political-economic systems (e.g. economic development and the notion of progress based on increasing material capabilities and purchasing power – e.g. GDP), and various types of intervention aimed at promoting well-ordered states. The liberal international order was postulated as an open, multilateral, rule-based global system.[12]

This section of the article focuses on legitimacy as a basis for power, status, and stability. The section argues that Liberalism's current problem with legitimacy is related to the inadequacies of the liberal peace agenda: e.g. its strategy for intervening in order to establish liberal democracies; the claim that greater stability, freedom, and peace would follow economic liberalization; and the notion of progress based on the exploitation of natural resources.[13] In addition, addressing Liberalism's current legitimacy problem requires a critical re-evaluation of the liberal peace agenda; the reasons for its ineffectiveness; and its failure to include norms, principles, and values that are regarded as legitimate from a contextual socio-cultural perspective.[14] The areas in which the rise of Liberalism impacts social action are analyzed from the perspective of the struggles for power and conflict that occur in national and international political economy.[15]

Legitimacy is defined as social action that is compatible with "Rule[s], norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures" and acting in a way that is believed to be an appropriate form of conduct.[16] "Legitimacy, as I use it here, refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed."[17] People are most convinced of the legitimacy of a social system (and the authorities representing that system) if the values and normative prescriptions it advocates can be internalized. The sense of legitimacy (e.g. trust, confidence, validity) that individuals have in a social system provides them a greater feeling of security and satisfaction with their condition in life.

Legitimacy influences interactions at the multi-levels of social engagement by providing a normative basis for shaping and constraining

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[12] Ikenberry, The end of liberal international order? 8-16.

[13] Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the 21st Century.*

[14] Chandler, *The State-building dilemma: Good Governance or Democratic Government?* 70-78.

[15] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition,* 31-37 & 43-51.

[16] Zelditch, Theories of legitimacy, 33; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society,* 2.

[17] Hurd, *Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,* 379 & 381.

the actions of social agents. Thus, legitimacy is a form of power that induces others to comply because they are attracted by values, moral authority, and magnanimity.[18] The notion of legitimacy also provides a basis for ordering and structuring social action in a global arena that is otherwise considered anarchic thus is a significant factor in the endeavor to establish a liberal global order.[19] The foundational conceptualization of legitimacy asserts that it is the basis of social, economic, and political stability.[20] "Stability has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy."[21] Thus, the most stable social order is one that "Enjoys the prestige of legitimacy"[22] and it follows that a lack of legitimacy causes instability.[23] It is at the times when stability is threatened that there is the greatest need to articulate, reformulate, and reinstate the core principles of legitimacy.

"For liberals, the basis of legitimacy is consent, and when consent is strained (as in the Eurozone crisis) legitimacy suffers."[24] A lack of legitimacy – a trend toward instability – has the social psychological consequence of individuals experiencing a diminished sense of "Integral selfhood, the permanency of things, of the reliability of natural processes, the substantiality of natural processes, [and] of the substantiality of others."[25] This results in the person feeling ontological insecurity (i.e. the lack of any unquestionable self-validating certainties). The feeling of insecurity increases the need to securitize one's social space in order to protect the self from the impending threats.[26]

The sense of legitimacy (or lack of it) has a significant influence on how power and authority are viewed, thoughts about in-groups and out-groups, and how one perceives equality and inequality. Thus, various crises related to demographic changes, global social networks, and environmental and climate change are all reflections of the ongoing legitimacy crisis.[27] Consequently, they are influencing how one views 'the proverbial other'. In addition, a lack of legitimacy corresponds with an increase in reactionary intrastate and interstate social movements that add

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[18] Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, x & 6-11.

[19] Keohane & Nye 1977, *Power and Interdependence,* 19.

[20] Aristotle, *Politics,* 371-395.

[21] Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 1.

[22] Nye, Soft Power, 167; Weber, *Economy and Society,* 31 & 93-94.

[23] Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order,* 337-339.

[24] Sherr, *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*, 59.

[25] Laing, *The divided self,* 39.

[26] McSweeney, *Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations,* 152-158.

[27] Kelman, *Reflections on social and psychological processes of legitimization and delegitimization,* 54-55.

to security challenges.[28] According to the World Development Report there is a direct correlation between the deterioration of legitimacy and conflict, resistance movements, and violence.[29] "For this reason, we suggest that governance actors focus less on stability and more on legitimacy – because legitimacy induces stability for the right reasons."[30]

Liberalism, Belonging, and Otherness

"Societies are fundamentally about identity. They are about what enable a group of peoples to refer to themselves as 'we'... The defining modes of 'we', 'us' and 'them' are all challenged by the formation of new identities, and the movement of peoples carrying different identities."[31]

The rise of Liberalism was accompanied by two phenomena that shaped the nature of the global arena and of the societies in which there has been Liberal intervention. First, the emergence of the nation-state introduced the notion of "Belonging" in terms of politicized identity (e.g. being a part of a social group that defines itself in terms of local, regional, and/or national identity).[32] In other words, the rise of Liberalism and its consequential impact on the global arena can be described as, on the one hand, expansion (i.e. *looking out* or the expansion of the international liberal order) and, on the other hand, contraction (*looking in* or the nationalization of identity and a strong connection between the nationalization of identity and notions of social-inclusion). Secondly, the expansion of the liberal global order coincided with increased migratory movement (e.g. a migrant is a person who is impelled to look for better living conditions but consequently can be regarded as "the proverbial other").

Liberalism's crisis is prompting a rise in the notion of security as a socio-spatial practice – or what is referred to securitized identity. Securitized identity results from an intensified fear caused by threats imposed by various forms of social activity that heighten security concerns. Individuals have feel a heightened need to securitize their identity when they sense a disruption of "Sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom."[33] Securitization due to issues related to migration, the security challenges resulting from cross-border

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[28] Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution,* 153.

[29] World Bank, *World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development,* 7 & 86.

[30] Eickhoff and Müller, *Conflict Prevention and the Legitimacy of Governance Actors – Research Report,* 8.

[31] Buzan, *Societal security and European security*, 5-6.

[32] Delanty, *Inventing Europe Idea, Identity, Reality,* 6, 16, & 66.

[33] Wæver et al., *Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe,* 23.

social movements, and security endeavors to effectively manage terrorism are amongst the top concerns facing the USA, The EU, India, and parts of Southeast Asia.[34] Because migration and cross-border social movements are caused by and cause "Conflict, instability, environmental degradation, [and] threatens social cohesion, solidarity, and peace" they are also sparking the response of securitizing identity.[35]

Attempts to securitize are the outgrowth of an "Intersubjective established existential threat with saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."[36] The challenges to security – along with the feeling of their intensified relevance – is prompting new security discourses in social circles as well as in the scholarly arena. The established notion of security is based on how states protect their interests and safeguarded their citizens. The contemporary notion of security is unique in that it involves a broadening of the idea of security to include efforts to securitize social space in response to the threat that individuals feel in relationship to intrastate forces (e.g. terrorism, increased conflict with the ethnic other, resistance movements, and conflict due to sub-national groups seeking autonomy, and threats to existence due to environmental and climate issues).

Social actors "Have shown tremendous concern of late with issues of citizenship, im/migration, as well as community membership, inclusion/exclusion and social cohesion [sparking a trend toward] *Shrinking Citizenship Regimes.*"[37] Citizen regimes refer to institutionalized systems that promote the right to participation and the underlying norms and principles of Liberalism that define those rights. In fact, the massive number of immigrants, migrants, those exiled, and refugees sparked the coining of the term *outcaste*. To be an outcaste means not to be wanted, looked down upon or even rejected, excluded from normal privileges, and they are refused acceptance. The politics of who is included in the benefits of a society and who is excluded are generating controversy that continue to be the subject of heated debate. On the one side, "Are conservatives extolling tradition [and resisting] change."[38] On

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[34] Weaver et al. *Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe*; Niblett, Liberalism in Retreat: the end of a dream; Castles & Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World.*

[35] Widgren, *International Migration and Regional Stability,* 749; Hollifield et al., The Liberal Paradox: Immigrants, Markets and Rights in the United States, 68; Baubock, International migration and liberal democracies: the challenge of integration, 36.

[36] Buzan, *Rethinking Security after the Cold War,* 14.

[37] Dobrowolsky, *Security and Citizenship: Security,* Im/migration and Shrinking Citizenship Regimes, 632.

[38] Wallerstein, *World System Analysis,* 52.

the other side are those declaring that adherence to the principles of social inclusiveness, equal rights, and 'mutuality' is the basis for improving social conditions.

Although the inclusion and exclusion issues of a liberal democracy are frequently characterized as unique to each context a deeper analysis reveals a set of causes deeply rooted in the crisis of the liberalism.[39] "In a shared-power world, each of the individuals, groups and organizations affected by complex, intractable problems have only partial authority to act on them and lack the power to resolve them alone. Collective action is, therefore, essential, but it cannot happen without first connecting across differences."[40] That is to say that the solution to the crisis lies in strengthening systems of cooperative/ collaborative, multi-level, strategic partnerships.

Liberalism, Modernization, Progress, and Development

Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the rise of Liberalism (as a force driving internationalization) was motivated by the belief that modernization is a means of social and economic advancement for the people of undeveloped and developing countries. Assumptions about progress "And the liberal vision [we]re tied together by the idea that societies are involved in an ongoing process of modernization."[41] "This picture of a steady, persistent, and uniform improvement had all the parochialism of the eighteenth century. The advocates of *Progress* regarded their own period – which was in fact a low one measured by almost any standard except scientific thought and raw energy – as the natural peak of humanity's ascent to date."[42] Thus, liberal interventions were regarded as a type of tutoring by which the disadvantaged would learn about good government, how to develop a well-ordered society, and as a means of social-economic progress based on the Modernization Theory of development. The belief was that progress occurs by "Giving a commencement to industrial life [which will] raise [the uncivilized] out of a nation of savages."[43]

The vision of progress, liberty by means of freedom of association /exchange, and prosperity was inspired by Adam Smith's prescription for

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[39] Venugopal, *The global dimensions of conflict in Sri Lanka, 2-3;* Sisk, Migration, Multiculturalism, and Democracy, 2.

[40] Ospina & Foldy, *Building bridges from the margins: The work of leadership in social change organizations,* 292.

[41] Inkenberry, *Reflections on social and psychological processes of legitimization and delegitimization,* 65.

[42] Mumford, *Technics and Civilization,* 182.

[43] Mills, *Considerations on Representative Government. Essays on Politics and Society,* 394-395.

increasing *The Wealth of Nations*. However, in actuality it turned out to be tantamount to spreading a model of social-economic progress that was based on fusing the notion of "the good life" with that of modernizing.[44] In addition, the expansion of the liberal global order coincided with a world system where states endeavor to increase their material, economic, and military capabilities as the means of increasing power. Consequently, the rosy picture of progress based on increasing *The Wealth of Nations*, industrializing, and adopting a blend of capitalism and democracy was coupled with social movements (some of a revolutionary nature) contending with power forces seeking to expand their power, economic, and military influence.[45]

Social movements are sustained social actions that utilize a variety of public politics tactics.[46] Social movements are a form of social action made-up of networks of individuals and organized groups who share traits and concerns, and who pursue better social-economic and/or political conditions. This vast and complex phenomenon is prompted by three factors that trigger the movements: "The desire to be free from compulsion, the desire for economic security, and the desire to return to nature."[47] That is to say that people get involved in a social movement because of the felt dichotomy between social-economic reality and liberal ideals. Without resolving such dichotomies "The problem of the breakdown of civilization stares us in the face [and] one of the symptoms [is] social disintegration. The nature of the breakdown can be summed up [as] an 'Internal Proletariat', recalcitrant under the Dominant Minority within the disintegrating society, and an 'External Proletariat' who now violently resist incorporation."[48]

Thus, a study of the historical data reveals that the rise of global Liberalism corresponds with multi-level domestic and international social movements. The movements were sparked by social disruptions resulting from the impact of advances in industrial technology, large scale migratory movements of people, and new ways in which natural resources were used to achieve progress based on Modernity assumptions.[49] In addition to having a tremendous impact on urbanization, the movement of people, their thoughts about development and progress, and their ideas about a good or even better life notions about modernizing had enormous impact

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[44] Toynbee, *A Study of History,* 170.

[45] Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492-1992,* 4-6; Porta & Diani, *Social Movements,* 75-77.

[46] Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004,* 3 & 50.

[47] Mumford, *Technics and Civilization,* 297.

[48] Toynbee, *A Study of History,* 4 & 6.

[49] United Nations, *Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth, Population Studies No. 68,* 63 & 112.

on the way the global landscape took shape and, as well, on the environment. In sum, the data provides a historically documented account of why "A moribund civilization finally lose[s] its identity: [e.g.] an iconoclastic revolt on the part of its own external and internal proletariat in order that one or other of these insurgents may obtain a free field for bringing a new civilization to birth."[50]

Liberalism's new medium: a new means for realizing the Ideals of Liberalism

Coinciding with the apparent decline of a hegemonic liberal global order are new forms of multi-level networked social activity. Global social action is increasingly taking place amongst "Like-minded coalitions of governments and civil society…, the inclusion of NGOs in the governance structures of UN agencies, and various forms of multi-stakeholder, public-private, public policy networks."[51] The new forms of multi-level networked social (inter)action are prompted by increased recognition of the possibilities made available by advances in communication technology for establishing collaborative/cooperative strategic partnerships, for determining the normative principles that would operationalize the global norms shaping the interactions/transactions, for increasing legitimacy, neutralizing power relations, and improving the effectiveness of liberal interventions.

Agents engaged in global networks acknowledge the need to re-conceptualize global social action. This includes recognition of the need of a more comprehensive conceptualization of international relations inclusive of social action taking place at the micro, meso, and marco levels, an analysis of the influence of sub-state actors on interstate activity, and inclusion of a perspective on global progress that integrates social and economic value theory.[52] Strategic partnerships provide a platform for re-conceptualizing "The broader range of nonstate actors and their forays into the international arena and how a sense of collective identity can develop among groups of states."[53] However, the question this article focuses on is, how does Liberalism's new medium contribute to helping it be more effective in dealing with the migrant challenge, interethnic conflicts, and the security challenges imposed by intrastate and cross-border social movements?

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[50] Toynbee, *A Study of History,* 78.

[51] Ikenberry, *Is American Multilateralism in Decline?* 544.

[52] Wallerstein, *World System Analysis;* Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*; Kothari, *The Writings of Rajni Kothari;* Kothari, *Politics and the People: In Search of a Humane India*; Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law.

[53] Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism,* 22.

Liberalism advanced to the point of having a global impact because there are strong incentives for individuals and social groups to engage in cooperative interactions that create beneficial and satisfactory outcomes for stakeholders at the multi-levels of social, political, and economic interaction. In fact, without concerns that motivate behavior that transcend the special interests of social groups (both conflictual and cooperative social activity) social agents "Would have no rational incentive to engage in world politics at all and would simply devote their resources to an autarkic and isolated existence."[54] Thus, the most important advantage that social agents have by basing multi-causal interactions within the framework of Liberalism's new medium is the ability to establish shared systems of cooperative, strategic, and multi-level instrumental social action.

Thus, Liberalism's new medium rectifies the shortcomings connected with the liberal peace agenda, provides a model for improving structure-agent relations, and introduces a more progressive notion of the role of power in the social relations that occur at every level of social interaction.[55] The literature suggests that Liberalism's new medium contributes to resolving its crisis because of its ability to establish transnational cooperative political-economic networks within which individuals, groups, and institutionalized social agents participate in collaborative collective action.[56] Liberalism's new medium can be defined as globally networked public-private coalitions in which participants engage in Constructivist-type communication processes that generate the knowledge needed to address and resolve issues they are confronted with, that strengthen strategic partnerships, resolve the discrepancies of the liberal peace agenda, and promote sustainability (i.e. a more progressive approach to social-economic progress).

Preliminary research on implementing Liberalism's new medium as a strategy for conflict reduction and peace-building indicates that it contributes to enhancing security and to establishing an infrastructure for peace in six ways: (1.) it expands the state-centric emphasis on security regimes and the use of force to include a multi-track approach to diplomacy (2.) it establishes the social action networks that transform shared values and common goals into cooperative social action, (3.) it is a medium for networking with other Human Rights and advocacy NGO's, (4.) establishes the processes for creating cooperation between otherwise

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[54] Moravcsik, *The New Liberalism,* 234 & 235.

[55] Castells, *A Network Theory of Power, 777;* O'Toole, Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research Based Agendas in Public Administration, 445; Frederickson et al. *Public Administration Theory Primer,* 110.

[56] Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism,* 164.

opposing groups, (5.) it facilitates multi-level dialogue between various stakeholders, (6.) and it serves as an advocacy network for protecting citizens against violence.[57] Thus, Liberalism's new medium increases its effectiveness by expanding the notion of international relations to include multi-level strategic partnerships; it expands the security concept to include threats from intrastate forces; and increases legitimacy by means of including unique cultural worldviews and values, norms, and principles as factors when engaging particular socio-cultural contexts – thus including the notion that social reality is co-constituted in its conceptualizations of effective intervention.

Applying Liberalism's new medium to multi-level social interactions involves "Stimulating those processes that enable self-organization and that will lead to strengthening the resilience of the social institutions that manage internal and external stressors and shocks, and increasing social cohesion thus facilitating and stimulating the processes that enable self-organization to emerge."[58] This new approach to social action balances human welfare with the prior emphasis on market/economic Liberalism. It thus addresses and resolves several of the sources of the crisis in the liberal peace agenda: e.g. its prior emphasis on states and institutions, on reinforcing authority and security – which overlook the essential aspects of participatory governance, co-creating public value, and the social construction of reality (Chau 2009, 2). That is to say that the new medium – which is made possible by instituted cooperation facilitated by networked alliances – provides a new framework for conceptualizing interactions taking place between individual social actors and social actors within networks.[59]

Strategic partnerships, formed by means of networks, are having a revolutionary impact in that "On the one hand, they are blurring technological, economic, political, and cultural boundaries. On the other hand, [they] have created immense new moral spaces for exploring new communities of affinity."[60] In fact, networking introduces an entirely new model of how to exercise political authority; it introduces a model of governance based on collaborative partnerships and co-creating social reality; it is a model for reconciling the difference in the interests of powerful elite, political authorities, and the global civic body. Liberalism's new medium is a means of engaging in international political community

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[57] Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding*, 5.

[58] De Coning, *Adaptive Peacebuilding,* 304 & 307.

[59] Latour, *On actor-network theory.* A few clarifications plus more than a few complications, 370.

[60] Tehranian, *Global Communication and International Relations: Changing Paradigms and Policies,* 1.

building. The network approach achieves this by defining structures as emergent properties of persistent patterns of relations among agents and which can define, enable, and constrain those agents. "We know that multi-stakeholder approaches that include academics, policymakers and local communities give us the best chances for success, in everything from refugee integration and urban violence concerns to private sector contributions for early warning systems in conflict zones."[61]

Thus, Liberalism's new medium "Is making certain aspects of peacebuilding that seemed idealistic thirty years ago, like mobilizing social movements from the ground up, suddenly possible and tangible."[62] The new medium proves effective for reconciling the vast differences in interests in power, goals, values, and identity between stakeholders at multi-levels. Liberalism's new medium is effective for creating shared values, common goals, and an agreement to interact based on certain shared principles. Thus, it creates "The ability to work from a multi-group perspective – one that not only fully understands each group's needs, but also successfully bridges these needs and moves toward the goal of producing a greater good for everyone."[63] Liberalism's new medium can be described as integrated networks that establish an infrastructure for sustainable peace by promoting the participatory processes prescribed by Liberalism;[64] by implementing an interactive public value creation network as a new basis for multi-level social action;[65] and by safeguarding the cherished socio-cultural values of particular contexts – which reverses cultural erosion.

Conclusion

"'The medium is the message' because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action."[66]

"Contemporary liberalism remains a plural liberalism, a liberalism bolstered left and right by a 'cluster of values' including market 'opportunity'; 'good', or 'modern governance' leading to 'empowerment'; social and economic 'inclusion' and, especially, conservative 'security.'"[67]

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[61] Miklian & Hoelscher, *A Blueprint for Pro-Peace Innovation*, 2.

[62] Alliance for Peacebuilding, *Building Peace*, 3.

[63] APALC (Asian Pacific American Legal Center), *Crossing boundaries: An exploration of effective leadership development in communities,* 6.

[64] Castells, *Communication,* Power and Counter-power in the Network Society.

[65] Miller, *Convergence of Social Marketing and Public Administration: Democratizing Value Creation.*

[66] McLuhan, *Understanding Media: the extensions of man,* 9.

[67] Porter & Craig, The third way and the third world: poverty reduction and social inclusion in the rise of 'inclusive' liberalism, 338; Lippman, *Essays in Public Philosophy.*

In addition, the fundamental principles of Liberalism call for inclusiveness and tolerance of *The Proverbial Other*.[68] However, there are critical causal factors hindering the ability of Liberalism to realize its aims: e.g. scarcity and differentiation that make competition inevitable, conflict resulting from variations in the underlying pattern of interaction in pursuit of preferences for material and ideal welfare, and societal demands so conflictual that social actors are likely to consider coercion as an acceptable means to promote them.[69] This article stresses that the manifestation of these casual factors in contexts where Liberalism is intended to promote prosperity and reduce conflict has resulted in Liberalism's failure to create the prescribed outcome of the liberal peace. This highlights the fact that "Interventions are not easily comprehensible through the lens of the liberal peace theory, particularly the strong version which sees an automatic connection between the virtuous [domestic] culture on the 'inside' and an ethical [international intervention] on the 'outside.'"[70]

Liberalism's new medium is made possible by advances in communication media that provide resources needed for establishing networks that become fertile ground for global social movements. "These developments have facilitated issue networks that connect people of common interest in advancing a particular value and helps them to communicate and coordinate."[71] That is to say that agents at the various levels of social action are increasingly relying on social networks to promote their aims and pursue their aspirations. Thus Liberalism's new medium addresses and resolves the problem of seemingly incommensurate value pursuits.

The new medium enhances Liberalism's ability to realize its aims in that it "Create[s] new social tools [that] synchronize behaviors with people who are changing their behavior to synchronize with you."[72] Liberalism's new medium operationalizes norms, principles, and processes of governance that reconcile distinctive "comprehensive doctrines" at the local, regional, national, and international levels by means of the "networked overlapping consensus". The overlapping consensus promotes justice and rights by increasing the sense of mutuality (i.e. interconnected

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[68] Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration.*

[69] Moravcsik, *Liberalism International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment,* 161 & 162.

[70] Dunne, *Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,* 113.

[71] Swain, *Struggles Against the State,* 4.

[72] Shirky, *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations,* 49-51.

interests) that override conflicting, or even incommensurable, convictions.[73]

Although global relations do not match the characterization of "a global village" liberal international relations scholars believe that cooperation is possible when people "Conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions."[74] Networks are an innovative means by which individuals and social groups at multi-levels establish cross-sectoral and local-global (transnational) connections to manage security challenges, to form a concerted reaction to the environmental and climate challenges, and to better manage of benefits and problems of population movements that bring the people of the world into much closer and intense interaction.[75] The article's claim is based on the presupposition that "In our increasingly complex and interconnected world, networked based solutions of knowledge creation, dissemination, and the diffusion of best practices can enhance our capacity to define and address problems more effectively."[76]

A critical perspective and conceptualization of the new medium was introduced when the phrase *the medium is the message* was coined to mean that "The message of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs."[77] "The medium is a form of social organization" or the means by which communication is transformed *From Medium to Social Practice.*[78] Marshall McLuhan stressed that networks were creating **new** forms of social-formation, relations, interactions, social space, and structures which are simultaneously shrinking and expanding social identity. For McLuhan mass media are networks or multifaceted systems in which people interact to progress their personal, social, ideological, commercial, and political agendas.

This article emphasized that the medium provides a technological means by which Liberalism's legitimacy can be enhanced. That is to say that the article explains how the new medium – operating in the form of networked strategic partnerships that agents participate in to safeguard their national interests and co-create increased benefits – can also act to increase legitimacy, stability, and security. In this respect the medium is

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[73] Rawls, *Political Liberalism,* 133-172 & 385-396; Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe, 7.

[74] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* 13.

[75] Moore et al., *Creating public value in global wicked problems,* 621.

[76] Paar-Jakli, *Networked Governance and Transatlantic Relations: Building Bridges through science diplomacy,* 1.

[77] McLuhan, *Understanding Media: the extensions of man,* 8.

[78] Williams, *From Medium to Social Practice,* 159.

the message is rendered *networks are the new medium* by which to achieve the aims of Liberalism and realize its ideals.

The revolutionary impact of globally integrated, networks warrant a re-conceptualization of global power relations and the emancipatory power of multi-level strategic partnerships – in the theory, methodology, and practice of international relations.[79] As rising states continue to reshape the nature of the global order and its power-relations they do not simply confront an apparently declining hegemonic global order; "They face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced."[80] The state-focused global liberal order may be in decline, but another order is emerging. In the emerging global order agents at multi-levels are networked in associations that encourage and reward mutually beneficial *co-opetition*. "Traditional nation-states are now embedded in a new knowledge-based, globally hyperlinked, multi-level system in which a plurality of public and private actors have gradually woven strong meshes of functional interests that irreversibly link various levels of governance."[81]

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[79] Gaef, *Practicing post-liberal peacebuilding: local empowerment and emerging hybridity in Liberia,* 61-62.

[80] Ikenberry, *Why the Liberal Order will Survive*, 20.

[81] UN, *Global multi-level governance: European and East Asian leadership,* 4, 20 & 29.

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THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN THE EVOLUTION OF EX-SOVIET STATES

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Abstract: It has been almost three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the process of transition to democracy and to a new place in the new geopolitical context is still, to varying degrees, in pending or even reversed for many of the former soviet states. The region is afflicted by instability, week democracy, conflicts or even war, the situation posing great risks not only for the countries within but also for the entire European security system.

With this in mind, the article addresses the evolution of ex-soviet states by appealing to the concept of governance that with the multiplication of global challenges gain more and more relevance to the point of being considered the decisive element in modern states evolution. By applying case study and comparative research methods, the paper aims to tackle the following research questions: How governance performances reflected in the overall evolution of post-soviet states and influenced their geopolitical positioning? Was quality of governance the determining factor that led to their transition success or failure?

Keywords: ex-soviet states, governance, good governance, transition, geopolitical context.

Introduction

Governance have a prominent place on the international agenda and it is perceived as root cause of the majority of challenges we face today. Its prioritisation comes as a consequence of the complexity of global society characterized by increasing interdependence between actors, in which failed or poor governance in one state can reflect upon entire system.

"Good governance is an umbrella concept with an impact on all the domestic and external instruments any modern state uses in order to meet an increasing number of global challenges. We can say that in such a complex and uncertain context governance performance is what makes the difference; there lies the key that makes the difference between a functional and a failed state. Both the capability of drawing foreign funds, for instance, and resilience to security threats depend on good governance."[1] When "*it does not exist, peace, stability and prosperity are*

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[1] Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *Good Goovernance*, 2017,

in danger, when governance deteriorates and fails, the risks become existential."[2]

Taking the above into consideration, the article addresses the evolution of the ex-soviet states from the perspective of governance quality. The fact that after almost three decades from the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the region perpetuates instability, weak democracy, poor governance, conflict and no clear perspective on how to overcome this state of affairs, underlines the importance of more comprehensive and extensive researches on the topic.

By applying case study and comparative research methods, the paper aims to tackle the following research questions: How governance performances reflected in the overall evolution of post-soviet states and influenced their position in the geopolitical context? Was governance quality the determining factor that led to their transition success or failure?

The article will present in the first part the concept of governance from theoretical and institutional point of view, illustrating its meanings and components. The following two sections are allocated to the case studies that we will present in a comparative manner. As study case, we selected to analyse the evolution of the Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on one side and on the other of the Republic of Moldova. The first represent the single governance success story in the ex-soviet space and although their evolution was totally different, the similarities with Moldova were many-territory, population, ethnic structure, geopolitical situation, a troubled background and unsettled issues with Moscow. The comparison will address the transition period until 2004 when the Baltic states became EU and NATO members. The two annexes comprise the data extracted from the World Bank- Worldwide Governance Indicators and Freedom House-Democratic reforms in nations in transit, and compare the different scores obtained by the Baltic States and the Republic of Moldova during transition period. The last part of the paper, the conclusions, outlines the results of the research.

The concept of governance

The review of the theoretical references regarding the concept of governance emphasizes the fact that there is no single, exhaustive definition of governance, but rather a contextualization of its use. The term became very popular as it can be applied in vary spheres of public or private affairs. However, it can be noticed a consensus that the concept as

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https://www.nineoclock.ro/2017/04/19/strategikon-to-hold-good-governance-summit-in-romania/

[2] Harlan Ullman, *The Year of Challenging Choices*, Bucharest, Strategikon, 2017, p. 8.

it is utilized in contemporary society exceed the traditional synonymy with government, involving not only the government as an authority, but also the principles and aspects upon which it needs to focus.[3]

The end of the Cold War, the challenges of globalization, the multiplication of interdependences, the changes and the transfer of authority, the emergence of supranational organisations and so forth called for a re-examination of the relation between governance and government. Both imply a set of rules and objectives, but while referring to government, the concept suggests actions sustained by a formal authority, whose implementation can be assured through coercive measures, governance encompasses also those actions that are subject to common aims and not necessarily derived from formal responsibilities and rely on coercive power. Thus, James Rosenau explains that "*governance is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms.* Further, he argues that governance involves the *functions that have to be performed in any viable human system irrespective of whether the system has evolved organizations or institutions explicitly charged with performing them,*"[4] as coping with external challenges, prevent conflict, procure resources and so on.

Rhodes, when speaking about governance, emphasizes the volatility of boundaries between public and private sector, advocating that governance can be envisaged as a switch in the understanding of government, the new method through which societies are governed.[5]

Likewise, Kooiman underlines the interaction between the public and the private, feature that become also subject to a consensus over what governance implies. According to Kooiman governance refers to the patterns that emerge from the actions of social, political and administrative actors.[6] Thus, the order in the society is not imposed by a central authority and arises from the interactions and negotiations between the stakeholders, the responsibility being shared by public and private actors.[7]

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[3] James Rosenau, *Governance, order and change in world politics* in James Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 4.

[4] *Ibidem,* p. 3.

[5] Roderick Arthur William Rhodes, *The New Governance: Governing without Government*, Political Studies, no. 44, 1996, pp. 652-653.

[6] Jan Kooiman*, Social-Political Governance: Introduction* in Jan Kooiman, ed., *Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions*, London, Sage Publications, 1993, p. 2.

[7] Rhodes, *cited work*, p. 657.

Approaching the concept of governance through the relation between state and society, Peters and Pierre in *Governance, Politics, and the State* argue that "*although governance relates to changing relationships between state and society and a growing reliance on less coercive policy instruments, the state is still the centre of considerable political power.*"[8]

The vary perspectives on governance reflect also at institutional level.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) describes governance as "*the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.*"[9]

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines governance as "*the process by which decisions are made and implemented (or not implemented). Within government, governance is the process by which public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources.*"[10]

Similarly, the World Bank understand governance as "*the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development.*"[11]

From the European Union's point of view, governance "*concerns the state's ability to serve the citizens* and it *refers to the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society.*"[12]

As pointed, there is no universal definition for governance, but despite its wide meanings, the value of the concept emerges because in all approaches it relates to the "*very basic aspects of the functioning of any society and political and social systems. It can be described as a basic measure of stability and performance of a society and of* any *political/administrative system*",[13] as described by the European Commission.

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[8] Jon Pierre, Guy Peters, *Governance, Politics, and the State*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 12.

[9] United Nations Development Programme, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development: a UNDP Policy Document*, New York, 1997.

[10]Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Glossary of Statistical Terms*, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7236.

[11] World Bank, *Governance. The World Bank's Experience*, Washington, World Bank Publication, 1994.

[12] Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, *Governance and Development*, Brussels, 2003.

[13] Ibidem

What make the difference between good governance or a failed one? With the development of society, principle related to democracy, democratisation, rule of law, social cohesion and so on became more and more important and integrated in what we call good governance.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement defines good governance, which is considered to *be "a fundamental element of the Agreement"* and base for the internal and external policy of the parties, "*as the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption.*"[14]

The Handbook on promoting good governance developed by the European Commission puts forward a set of good practices related to good governance structured on its components: *support for democratisation, promotion and protection of human rights, reinforcement of the rule of law and the administration of justice, enhancement of the role of civil society and its capacity building, public administration reform, management of public finances and civil service reform, decentralisation and local government reform/capacity building.*[15]

UNDP approach to good governance considers the existence of the mechanism, institutions and processes through which the people can articulate their interests, exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations. From UNPD's point of view good governance is synonym to democratic governance[16] and its main attributes are: *participatory character, rule of law, transparency, capacity to respond, orientation toward consensus, equity, efficiency, responsibility and strategic vision.*[17]

United Nation's perspective on good governance was clearly stated by former Secretary General, Kofi Annan which advocated that it basically

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[14] European Commission, *The Cotonou Agreement. Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000. Revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005. Revised in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010 and multiannual financial framework 2014–20*, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014.

[15] European Commission*, Handbook on promoting good governance in EC development and co-operation*, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/handbook-promoting-good-governance-ec-development-and-co-operation_en

[16] United Nations Development Programme, *Why good governance makes for better development,*
http://www.undp. org/content/undp/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2011/05/20/why-good-governance-makes-for-better-development.html

[17] United Nations Development Programme, 1997, *cited work*

means *the respect for human rights and rule of law, strengthen of democracy and promotion of transparency and competence in public affairs.*[18]

For the World Bank, good governance indicates an efficient management for development.[19] International Development Association (IDA) identifies as the key components of good governance the followings: *good public management with accountable public institutions*; transparent policy making and implementation*; clarity, stability, and fairness in the rule of law; and openness to the participation of affected citizens in the design and implementation of policies and programs that impact them.*[20]

Furthermore, the World Bank has defined the global governance indicators which are *voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.*[21]

Thus, concluding, good governance encompasses the attributes that should define all actors of the international system, characterized more and more by interdependences, crisis, pressure on resources, asymmetric challenges, competition among great powers, and naturally failed governance represent the opposite.

Post-soviet evolution of the Baltic states

The independence achieved with the collapse of the Soviet Union was perceived in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, independent before World War II, as historic justice, since the three states, even within the USSR, struggled for self-determination and considered that they were under soviet occupation. Their stance was supported by western powers which condemned soviet actions and did not formal recognize their annexation to USSR. The next task, after independence, was to build a democratic system on western model and a functional market economy.[22]

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[18] ONU, Press Release SC/6502, *Report on Africa Introduced by Kofi Annan to Council; Full Debate on recommendations, actions to be held on 24 April*",

http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980416.SC6502.html

[19] World Bank, *Governance and Development*, World Bank Publication, Washington, 1992.

[20] International Development Association, *IDA12 Replenishment*,

http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/replenishments/ida12-replenishment

[21] Sorin Şandor, Simona Creţa, *Global Governance Indicators- Methodological Aspects,* Transylvanian Review of Administrative Studies, no. 2, 2014, pp. 117-118.

[22] European Parliament*, Resolution on the situation in Estonia Latvia and Lithuania*, 1983, https://eureconciliation.eu/related-european-parliament-public-hearings-statements-texts-adopted-and-press-releases/

As form of government, Lithuania is a semi-presidential republic, according to the Constitution adopted in 1992, but the presidential prerogatives do not differ much from those in Estonia and Latvia which chose the parliamentary republic. Like Lithuania, Estonia adopted the Constitution in 1992, and Latvia, in 1991, restored the old one from 1922. The first elections took place in 1992 in Estonia and Lithuania and in 1993 in Latvia and were evaluated as free and correct.

In Latvia and Lithuania, the first political ruling elites were present on the political scene even before the independence, having position from where they stood out against soviet regime. Estonia, though the victory of Mart Laar, whose name is connected to much of the reforms, rapidly implemented after independence, broke all ties with the past.

As the data in the annex illustrate, throughout the entire transition process, the three Baltic states obtained positive assessments regarding state building and good governance. The efforts to implement the reform and consolidate the democratic system were sustained and motivated in a great measure by the will to be accepted in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, perceived not only as a guarantee for security and economic development, but a natural choice based on common values.[23]

The option for the western democratic model was never questioned, but beyond the principle's communion, there is a consensus among experts that at the base of Baltics' choices was the historical memory and awareness of their sensible geopolitical position.[24] Thus, their strategic priorities were as follows: 1. to distance as much as possible from their soviet past and from Moscow, whose intentions were regarded with suspicion and fear of a new aggression[25] - practically through the Constitutions adopted after the independence, the Baltic states outlawed the alliances with post-soviet countries, with reference to the CIS,[26] and 2. accession to NATO and UE.

The lessons from the first period of independence demonstrated that neutrality is not a viable solution.[27] Although the finish model, recommended by many renowned specialists including Zbigniew Brzezinski which argued that given the similarities with Finland's

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[23] Andres Kasekamp, *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration- The north-east*, in Anders Wivel, Hans Mouritzen, eds., *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 137.

[24] Ibidem, p. 145.

[25] Ibidem, p. 133.

[26] Ramunas Vilpisauskas, *Baltic States Membership in the WEU and NATO: Links, Problems and Perspectives*, Final Raport, NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship, Vilnius University, 2000, https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/vilpisauskas.pdf

[27] Andres Kasekamp, *A History of the Baltic States*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, p. 193.

situation, their security concerns will be better addressed in a Scandinavian context than in NATO[28], seemed the most pragmatic alternative, the Baltic states were afraid to remain trapped in a grey area between Russia and the West. Therefore, NATO was considered the only option to assure their safety from Russia and, complementary, UE a generator of *soft security* from the standpoint of political solidarity and economic benefits.[29]

If the origin of their European and Euro-Atlantic choice is to a large extend connected to the geopolitical context, the efforts to implement it were subject to internal political will, and from this perspective the Baltic countries demonstrated consensus and continuity.

Despite, the changes in government and the political turbulences, western orientation of the countries, officially affirmed though the requests to join NATO, in 1994 and UE, in 1995, was never up for discussion. For example, no Baltic prime minister, in the transition period, succeeded to remain in office the entire mandate[30], the political arena was characterised by fragmentations, compromise alliances and week political parties. In addition, there were strong evidence illustrated by specialists focused on Baltic evolution, that linked the Baltic political elite to vary groups of interests from the business sector from the West or Russia- the case of the two major political parties in Latvia, the Latvian Way which won the first elections and the Democratic Party Saimnieks, winner in the election of 1995, the first allegedly supported by western economic circles and the other by eastern ones and by the Russian community[31] or the case of Lithuanian president Rolandas Paksas accused of favouring Russian businesses in exchange for campaign funds.[32]

Nevertheless, the political system in all three Baltic states has proven to be functional and anchored in the democratic principles- there were no political or social movements advocated for a non-democratic regime, all political forces regardless of their orientation assumed the democratic norms and the overall public attitude was profoundly pro-democracy.[33]

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[28] Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *NATO Enlargement: The Case of Romania*, Personal Report, 2007, p. 50,
http://ioanmirceapascu.ro/media/pdf/extinderea-nato-ioan-mircea-pascu.pdf

[29] Ramunas Vilpisauskas, *cited work*.

[30] Andres Kasekamp, 2010, cited work, p. 177.

[31] Marja Nissinen, *Latvia's Transition to a Market Economy. Political Determinants of Economic Reform Policy*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 1999, p. 203.

[32] Tõnis Saarts, *Political culture, participation and civil society in the Baltic States*, lecture, Institute of Political Science and Public Administration, Tallinn University, 2009, https://www.tlu.ee/opmat/ri/rit6006/civilsociety/3_2slaid.pdf

[33] Ibidem.

Concerning foreign policy, accession to western organisations was an objective followed with perseverance by all governments from Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius.

The coping with the external challenges posed especially by Russian efforts to influence the European and euro- Atlantic evolution of the Baltic states by using its leverages over them - withdrawal of Russian troops, administration of Russian strategic infrastructure in Estonia and Latvia, border treaties, the transit to Kaliningrad, economic links, the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia, topic addressed further, together with the fulfilment of the requirements related to accession demonstrate the efficient governance in the Baltic states during the transition.

In the case of EU integration, the Copenhagen Criteria encompasses the attributes of good governance- *stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.*[34]

In 1995, there were implemented the Association and Free Trade Agreements with all three states, without transit period for Estonia. Two years later, Estonia was the first of the Baltic states invited to begin the accession negations followed in 1999 by Latvia and Lithuania. The negotiations were completed with all tree states in 2002 and in 2004 they became EU members.

Estonia's advance was to a large extent due to the progress in implementing efficient economic reforms- Estonia was the first to leave the ruble zone, it introduces a series of policies to eliminate the tariff barriers to attract foreign investments, the privatisation process was evaluated as the most transparent, considering the business plans and the bidder capacity. Regarding privatisation, another point taking into discussion when analysing Estonia's evolution was the fact that the authorities have excluded Russian minority and avoided the offers coming from Russia.[35] In addition, the governments from Tallinn have greatly invested in the modernisation of the country through innovation and high tech.

In comparison with EU integration, NATO accession was not guided by rigid and fixed criteria, leaving room for great powers political calculations[36], but naturally, as the Washington Treaty affirmed, it required democratic principles, respect for human rights and rule of law.

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[34] European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency - Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993*, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf

[35] Tõnis Saarts, *cited work.*

[36] Ioan Mircea Pașcu, 2007, cited work, p. 51.

The most stressing and controversial issue concerning the governance quality regarded the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia, which at the moment of the collapse of the USSR represented approximatively 30% of the population.[37]

In order to prevent the Russian ethnics becoming a political force able to influence the direction of the countries, as it is argued by most experts, the authorities from Tallinn and Riga have adopted a very strict legislation on minority right that was considered not to be in compliance with the democratic standards and was harshly criticized by the international community. Concretely, it stipulated that citizenship, implicit the related rights- to vote, to occupy public positions, etc. will be granted only to those that had it before 1940 and their descendants, except those speaking the state's language. Thus, in Estonia and Latvia, around 30% of the populations became non-citizens.[38] Instead, Lithuania which had not a large Russian minority adopted an open policy regarding citizenship granting it to all residence.

The conditions in Estonia and Latvia were reflected also in the Freedom House reports that two years in a row 1992 and 1993 evaluated the two countries as partly free.[39] Moreover, OSCE deployed missions in both countries to monitor the developments.

Moscow accused Tallinn and Riga of discrimination and human rights violations and argue that the situation will degenerate in violent ethnic conflicts, thus affecting the European security landscape. This has never happened and the ethnic disputes did not evolve and no separatist movement emerged.

Under pressure from the international community and oblige to comply with western standards, Estonia and Latvia gradually loosed the specific legislation and in 2001 OSCE closed the two missions.

In managing the matters related to Russia or in dealing with the transition challenges the Baltic states have benefit from great support from western powers - for instance on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops, the U.S., where there was active a strong pro-Baltic lobby even during the Cold War[40], took the lead in negotiations, even conditioning

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[37] Kestutis Paulauskas, *The Baltics: from nation states to member states*, Occasional Paper, European Union, Institute for Security Studies, 2006,
https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/baltics-nation-states-member-states
[38] Ibidem.
[39] Gabriele Natalizia, *The Baltic and Caucasian States after the Transition. Democratization and State consolidation*, Italian Society of Political Studies, 2014, https://www.sisp. it/files/papers/2014/gabriele-natalizia-1785.pdf
[40] John Beyrle, *The Withdrawal of Russian Military Forces from the Baltic States*, Case Study, National Defence University, Washington, 1996,
www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441390.pdf

Washington financial aid for Moscow on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic territory. Another example comes from the European Community that included the Baltic countries in the PHARE programme designed for the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, not in the TACIS programme intended for the ex-soviet countries, thus signalling western approach towards the Baltics.[41]

In addition, the Nordic countries Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark interested in regional prosperity and stability and perceiving the Baltic states as part of the Nordic family assisted the Baltic states during the transition and advocated for their accession in western organisations.[42]

Nevertheless, the three countries have passed the test of good governance as without internal social and politic will and efforts it may have been impossible to pursue on the democratic path and integrate in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Post-soviet evolution of the Republic of Moldova

Unlike the Baltic states, the Republic of Moldova did not benefit from previous independent experience in the process of building the new democratic state, its territory being part of Romania and of USSR. It is important to mention when reviewing Moldova's past that the Transnistrian region was incorporated into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, by Stalin, after 1940.[43] Thus, Moldova was practically divided in two parts- the west, inhabited by ethnic Romanians and the east, inhabited by Russian speaking, Slavic population.[44] This maneuver, as leading experts in the field argue, served the soviet regime to advance the concept of Moldovenism, the existence of a Moldavian people, different from the Romanian one, whose culture and language are of Slavic origin.[45]

Furthermore, during its history, Moldova was subject to intense campaigns of russification, first after annexation to the Russian Empire and then within the Soviet Union. Although, all soviet republics experienced these policies, the russification process in Moldova is

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[41] Richard Mole, *The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union. Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 154.

[42] Andres Kasekamp, 2004, *cited work*, p. 145.

[43] Ruxandra Ivan, *From passionate discourse to parallel discourses. Relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, 1991-2006*, in Ruxandra Ivan, ed., *Principle directions in the study of international relations,* Iasi, European Institute, 2007, p. 270.

[44] Lucan Way, *Pluralism by Default in Moldova*, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 4, 2002, pp. 127-141.

[45] Ruxandra Ivan, *cited work.*

considered to be one of most extensive[46] and the fond on which it was implemented favored soviet objectives. In contrast with the Baltic states, Moldova was not characterized by a strong sentiment of national identity, lacked political capital and western type of political culture and tradition.[47]

As in all soviet republics, the national reborn comes with Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost. But, while in the Baltics, the period was characterized by a pre-start in democratic reforms and consolidation of links with the western world, in Moldova it was marked by identity conflicts, disputes among vary social and political movements that foreshadowed the deep divisions inside the society that will mark the future of independent Moldova.

The tensions between the main social and political forces in Moldova, on one side the ones advocating for rapprochement with Romania, for the Romanian language, common history and separation from USSR, and on the other the ones supporting the pro-Russian, pro-soviet stand and also the ones from the Gagauz minority[48], escalated in separatist movements that culminated with the self-proclaimed independence of Transnistria and Gagauzia, followed by the war in Transnistria between the separatist forces supported by Russia and the government ones. The war ended with the facto separation of Transnistria and the conflict became frozen. So, the immediate period after became independent coincide for Moldova with the escalation and permanentisation of the Transnistrian conflict.

Once proclaimed the independence of Moldova was recognized only by Romania, Georgia and Lithuania, the international recognition came later and only after Moscow established diplomatic relations with Chisinau.[49]

After independence, in Moldova did not emerge the political will to institutionalize and consolidate the new democracy since a new constitution was not adopted and there were not organized elections. The last Supreme Soviet was transformed in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and remained in power until 1994 when there were organized early elections as a result of a parliamentary blockage.[50]

The first elections were won by the Agrarian Party, mainly formed from former members in the soviet nomenklatura, center-oriented party, that promoted multiculturalism and a multilateral approach to foreign

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[46] George Ciorănescu, *Bessarabia: Disputed Land Between East and West*, Bucharest, Romanian Cultural Foundation Culturale, 1993, p. 197, apud Marten Beks, Olga Graur, *Cultural Politics in Moldova. Undermining the Transition?* Transitions, vol. XLV, no. 2, 2006, p. 27.

[47] Tõnis Saarts, *cited work.*

[48] Lucan Way, *cited work.*

[49] Iurie Leancă, *Evolution of foreign relations*, in *Transition: retrospective and perspective*, ADEPT, 2003, http://www.e-democracy.md

[50] Ruxandra Ivan, *cited work*, pp. 285-286.

policy.[51] Soon after was adopted the new Constitution that established the semi-presidential system and the official language Moldavian, not Romanian, crediting thus the concept of Moldovenism.

Unlike in the Baltic's case, since its independence Moldova had passed though different form of government, first a presidential system, then from 1994 a semi-presidential one, followed by a parliamentary one. During this period there were many attempts to switch from one government form to another but not as a result of popular will or for improving governance, but as a consequence of internal political rivalry or blockages in the government.[52]

There is no doubt that after the independence, in Moldova was established a democratic political-administrative system with all its institutions and norms, fact proven also by Moldova accession the Council of Europe, in 1995 in the same time with Latvia, but its good functioning, implicit good governance failed to be assured.

As the data in the annexes illustrate, while the Baltics received good scores regarding the democratic processes and the quality of governance, that were constantly improving, Moldova was evaluated at a much lower level and its scores fluctuated, frequently in a negative way.

In the same note, the evolution of electoral preferences reflects the failure of the post-soviet political class to capitalize on the country's new statute and to anchor it on the democratic path. The Agrarian Party was followed as number of votes by the pro-Russian Socialist Party, later at the election of 1998 the highest percent was obtained by the Communist Party which consolidate its position once Voronin became president, in 2001, and which dominated the political arena in Chisinau for almost a decade. Thus, arguably in Moldova, contrary to the Baltic states that concentrate their efforts to distance from the past, the tendency that manifested was to return to it and re-legitimize it under vary forms.

Drawing from existent works on Moldova's evolution we underline two internal factors that corroborated influenced and in the same time reflected the failure of governance: 1. lack of social and political consensus regarding the country's strategic orientation and 2. corruption. There are analyzes that take into consideration also the Transnistrian conflict when approaching good governance in Moldova, but in the same time many influential experts argue that the conflict in Transnistria is subject to *grand politics*, with Moscow having the upper hand and Chisinau not

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[51] Mihai Cernenco, Igor Boțan, *Evolution of pluripartism in Moldova*, ADEPT, 2009, http://www.e-democracy.md/

[52] Ibidem.

possessing the negotiations power and capabilities to extract concessions on this regard.[53]

From the beginning the political landscape in Moldova was divided into pro-western forces including the pro-Romania, pro-Russians and the ones that balanced between the two poles adopting a multilateral approach. As evidenced, unlike in the Baltic case, the Moldavian multi-party resulted as a consequence of the country's internal profound social division not as a natural consequence of democracy[54], with a consensus on the country general direction. The transition period for Moldova, contrary to the Baltic states that from the beginning adopted a policy of return to the West, was characterized by a continuous process of finding its place in the geopolitical context, subordinated to the vary forces that ruled the country.[55]

The newly elected Parliament ratify the CIS agreement and adopted a multilateral foreign policy. The foreign policy concept adopted in 1995 did not laid down a strategic orientation for the country. The European integration goal was introduced on the foreign policy agenda only by the government formed in 1998 by the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, the first pro-western government at Chisinau.

Later, the categorical victory of the communists at the elections of 2001 accompanied by promises of integration into the Custom Union and Russia-Belarus Union distance Moldova from the European perspective. Although the communist rhetoric was not entirely sustained by facts and the objective of European integration was mentioned in the government programme, the western project remained mainly at declarative level.

So, while in the Baltic states the pro-western option and the objective of accession to western organization was considered to be an engine for the democratic reforms, Moldova lacked the political consensus and continuity regarding the strategic orientation of the country.

Even though, the authorities from Chisinau adopted the reforms required to establish a functional market economy, the results were not those expected. The economic crises from the beginning of the 90' perpetuated and the economic decline became chronic. In 1995, the Economist presented Moldova as a model of reforms, later in 2000 the same newspaper wrote *Can Moldova get worse?"*[56]

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[53] Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Interviw at Radio Free Europe, *Transnistria as avanpost and problem...,* Strasbourg, 2012, https://www.europalibera.org/a/24780206.html

[54] Lucan Way, *cited work.*

[55] Vaceaslav Ungureanu, *The geopolitics of small state's security: the case of Moldova, Review of philosophy, sociology and political sciences,* n0.2, 2012, p. 127.

[56] Artur Radziwill, Oleg Petrushin, *Barriers to growth in Moldova*, in Gur Ofer, Richard W.T. Pomfret, eds, *Economic Prospects of the CIS: Sources of Long-Term Growth*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004, pp. 102-103.

One of the main causes that led to this situation it is considered to be corruption. So, the problem was not that Moldova did not adopt the reforms, but the way in which they were implemented. For instance, regarding the privatization process, the Court of Audit signaled countless cases of law violations. Also, according to the EBRD transition report of 1999, the efficiency of the privatization process was linked to the degree in which the state was captured by interest groups. In this note, the report included Moldova among the most captured states, with a score even higher than Russia, where the so-called oligarchy was at its apogee. The Baltic states were at the opposite side of the ranking. [57]

During the transition process the relations between Moldova, the West and Russia evolve different than those of the Baltic states. Moldova did not benefit from the same support and trust from Western powers. By examining Moldova's evolution in comparison with the Baltics' a series of potential motives are evidenced- the absence of previous statehood and connections with the West, the lack of internal consensus, the quality of governance, the issue of identity, the ethnic conflicts and so on.

Regarding the relations with Russia, on the agenda there were similar topics as in the Baltic case- the Russian minority, the presence of Russian troops, economic and energetic dependence, but as demonstrated above the outcomes were totally different.

How much impact had the Russian factor on the quality of governance in Moldova is very difficult to assess and it is not the aim of this article, but the effect that poor governance had on Moldova's post-soviet development is evident, as the country not only remained trapped in the grey area between the West and Russia, but continues to struggle with deep internal divisions, week institutions, corruption and poverty.

Conclusions

Even if, as illustrated, there were many similarities between the Baltic states and the Republic of Moldova, the profound divergence of post-soviet trajectory and development is self-evident. Whereas the first succeeded in transforming their political system and economy to the point of achieving the standards of EU and NATO membership, Moldova as the majority of ex-soviet states went back and forward in the democratization process, proving incapable to establish itself as a democratic, functional and stable states with a clear place in the geopolitical context. We consider that the overall transition successes or failures can be explained through the prism of governance and the comparison between the evolution of the countries

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[57] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1999, http://www.ebrd.com/transition-report.

in question reveal the determining character of governance quality and its impact on countries' internal and external conditions.

Having this in mind, we underline an important feature of governance that emerged from the research, respectively the consensus among the actors involved in the governance process. So, the higher is the level of consensual governance, the stable and rapid is the transition.

Further, within the context of increasing interdependence in the international system in conjunction with the escalation of competition among great powers, one state' weakens can become a great vulnerability for others actors and even for the entire system.

Thus, in this note, good governance represents more than an antidote for failed states and it can be advanced as a key component of regional and international security.

Another additional result of the research is that the specificity of the countries in questions influenced the governance performances, which cannot be analyzed out of context. As a newly independent state, Moldova by contrast with the Baltic countries, had to put into practice democratization and state building from scratch, on the top of facing civil war and separatist movements. Moreover, there is also the political culture and experiences that can greatly influence the resilience both in coping with the external challenges and overcoming the political, economic and social soviet legacy.

Likewise, there are the external factor that can influence governance outcomes. As in our cases, the relations with the West and Russia and their different approach to the Baltic states and the Republic of Moldova.

Thus, our findings open the door for new research questions. If this paper approaches the topic from inside to outside, emphasizing the role and impact that the quality of governance had on the states' positioning in the geopolitical context, it would be useful to examine the matter from outside to inside and see how the geopolitical circumstances influence the governance performances.

Annex 1

Evolution of governance in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova.

Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Evaluation scale from -2,5 la 2,5, with the highest values corresponding to better results.

Government Effectiveness

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9
Latvia	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6
Lithuania	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.8	0.7
Moldova	-0.2	-0.4	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7	-0.9

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7
Latvia	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.9	1.0	0.6
Lithuania	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.9	1.1	0.8
Moldova	0.0	0.4	-0.4	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2

Regulatory Quality

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3
Latvia	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.0
Lithuania	1.1	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.1
Moldova	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4

Rule of law

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
Latvia	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6
Lithuania	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6
Moldova	-0.1	0.0	-0.5	-0.6	-0.5	-0.3

Control of Corruption

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.0
Latvia	-0.2	0.2	-0.1	0.0	0.3	0.2
Lithuania	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4
Moldova	-0.4	-0.4	-0.7	-0.9	-0.8	-1.0

Voice and Accountability

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Latvia	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7
Lithuania	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Moldova	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.5	-0.5	-0.6

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators#

Annex 2

Evolution of democratic reforms in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova
Nations in transit
Evaluation scale: 1= the most democratic; 7= the less democratic

Democracy

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	2,25	2,13	2	2	1,92
Latvia	2,29	2,21	2,25	2,25	2,17
Lithuania	2,29	2,21	2,21	2,13	2,13
Moldova	4,25	4,29	4,50	4,71	4,88

Electoral Process

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,50
Latvia	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75
Lithuania	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75
Moldova	3,25	3,25	3,50	3,75	4

Civil Society

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	2,50	2,25	2	2	2
Latvia	2,25	2	2	2	2
Lithuania	2	1,75	1,50	1,50	1,50
Moldova	3,75	3,75	4	3,75	4

Press Independence

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,50
Latvia	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,50
Lithuania	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75	1,75
Moldova	4	4,25	4,50	4,75	5

Corruption

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	3,25	2,75	2,50	2,50	2,50
Latvia	3,50	3,50	3,75	3,50	3,50
Lithuania	3,75	3,75	3,75	3,50	3,50
Moldova	6	6	6,25	6,25	6,25

Governance

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	2,25	2,25	2,25	2,25	2,25
Latvia	2,50	2,25	2,25	2,25	2,25
Lithuania	2,50	2,50	2,50	2,50	2,50
Moldova	4,50	4,50	4,75	5,25	5,50

Source: Nations in Transit, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit

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WHY SHOULD CHINA KEEP THE LIBERAL ORDER?

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Abstract: China's rise is one of the most heated topics in today's international world. China's stubborn economic and military rise over the past three decades and also its regional and global behavior arises inquiries related to what sort of emerging power China is, and on the other hand, queries tied to China's willingness either to support the existing liberal international order but adding its own characteristics on it, or to overthrow it. Hereunder, the essay will be divided into four parts, such as- the first part concerns the introduction in the subject, the second part regards the exposure of the hegemonic stability theory. On the other hand, the third part is concerned with how China views/ supports the liberal order, while the fourth part is dedicated to the study case- 'Why should China keep the liberal order'?

Keywords: China, hegemonic clash, liberal order, power diffusion, the United States of America.

Introduction

Conference or the 1815 Vienna Congress, reflect at a less extent the hegemon's interests and to a great measure the results of the haggling process, where all parts were involved. An actor gets great power status when it is the wealthiest and best military equipped and trained against the rivals. The geography and the size of the population are relevant indicators of great power, too. However, over time, due to one of the several well-known internal or external issues, such as an aging population, domestic problems, aggressive neighbors, lack of international trust, then the hegemon's global influence will decrease, and a new challenger would arise.

Since ancient times, great powers have (re) shaped the international systems, these being built according to each (great) power needs. This idea is partially correct since the arrangements made after important events, such as the Yalta On the other hand, China's economic, diplomatic, cultural, products, technology footprint is everywhere around the world. These facts are also specific attributes of great powers. Other prerequisites of being a great power are related, as well, to the actor's capacity of being a good manager of global affairs.

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As an excellent way to understand China's behavior with respect to the world order that has been established prior to WW2, we have to define what does a "*world order*" means?. At first glance, it can be defined 'as a set of institutional rules or relations among international players"[1].

Moreover, a new order brings with it a new set of norms, such as particular institutions, laws, or standards. The real outcomes of world order can just be defined by admitting the amalgamation of the above elements—the institutional and economic order, the policies of state behavior the order determined, and also the blended inclinations of the inhabitants or of the group of states that constitute its 'elitist club'. Because the order once created mostly serves hegemon interests, then a rising power, dissatisfied by how the existing order works, may try to topple it[2].

Since adopting a more assertive posture, different scholars scrutinize wheater "China is ready to accommodate and fully integrate within the existing liberal order, or it is ready for a confrontation so that to overthrow it"[3]. However, why China would be driven to topple the existing order, considering the benefits it has been getting since the beginning of the '80s?. As with the citizens who believe, right or wrong, their government system is more suited and superior compared with others', a rising power, also, may propose, at least theoretically, a better-suited order than the already established one, that might serve better to its interests and position on the global stage.

Since Deng's opening policy, China has never been in confrontation with the USA. Moreover, China has chosen to confront the USA only using (non)institutional channels, such as: using its Veto power for blocking the USA resolutions in the UN's Security Council, investing more money and gaining more influence around the world, especially in the third world, creating new regional institutions, or having the upper hand in different regional or global organizations. So, because China is not interested in changing the core base of the liberal hegemony, so, the USA has never been interested in containing it[4]. In the same train of thoughts, '... the

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[1] Sørensen, G., 'What Kind of World Order?: The International System in the New Millennium', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 41, No. 4, p. 344;

[2] Pan, S.-Y., Lo, J.T.-Y. 'Re-conceptualizing China's rise as a global power: a neo-tributary perspective', 2015, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 1-25;

[3] G. John Ikenberry, Darren Lim "What China's institutional statecraft could mean for the international order", *Brookings Institution,* April 13, 2017, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/13/what-chinas-institutional-statecraft-could-mean-for-the-international-order/];

[4] Thomas J. Christensen, "Dimensions.Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia", *International Security,* Vol.30, No.1, p. 85, [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.81];

United States often competes more effectively for [...] influence by cooperating with China than it would be seeking to contain China's economic growth and diplomatic influence'[5]. Moreover, "the U.S. and China must work together to ensure global peace and prosperity"[6].

Moderately aggressive/ assertive U.S. defense policy in Asia Pacific region has facilitated a win-win regional effect by determining China to embrace some reassuring policies via its next-door-neighbors as a hurdle on a possible U.S. encirclement over it. As a result of the integration within the liberal order, China has enhanced its relationships with Southeast Asian nations, too. Mending the fences with its neighbors is due to the fact of its endeavors for growing its regional role, especially during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In 1997, Beijing performed a significant role in the making of ASEAN plus Three, a forum that addresses both financial and regional defense affairs.

The hegemonic stability theory's (HST) core basis

The United States of America and China are struggling for gaining or at least not losing, prestige on the international stage. China wants more prestige than ever, but it avoids, on every occasion, to take more responsibilities on global affairs, while the incumbent hegemon is engaged in a retrenchment process that scares its old and new allies, respectively.

The primary and most important claim of the hegemonic stability argument is that the diffusion of strength/power amongst states is the primary driver of nature of the international (economic) system[7]. Moreover, we assert that the *distribution of identity* plays an equally important role at the system level, too.

However, the hegemonic stability theory supposes the existence of an orderer. If there is an orderer, then there is no power vacuum, and the power is settled the most. The idea of the concentration of power in one place makes that orderer able to create a sort of global government. Because the order once created got the support of the actors which agreed its core base, then the given order becomes a *global common good*. The

[5] Ryan Hass, Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Responsible competition and the future of U.S.-China relations Seven critical questions for strategy", *Brookings,* February, 6, 2019, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/06/responsible-competition-and-the-future-of-u-s-china-relations/];

[6] Banning Garrett, Thomas Fingar, "The World Is Counting on the U.S. and China", *usnews,* Septeber, 18, 2013, [https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/18/the-us-and-china-must-work-together-to-ensure-global-peace-and-prospertity];

[7] Webb, Michael C., and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment." *Review of International Studies*, 1989, Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 183, [www.jstor.org/stable/20097178];

global public good can be defined as 'one the consumption of which by an individual, household, or firm does not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers.'[8]

The collective global good philosophy is divided into two layers, such as the *economic* and the *security* layer. The first one supposes that 'all actors can profit from the global collective goods solely in the presence of a hegemon. In the absence of it, they will not be able to get this common interest due to the fact of the institutional barriers to the provision of collective goods'; and the *security layer* expects that "states have no common reason in supporting the economic liberalization and stability', because there always will be an actor who will get a more relative gain in respect to others"[9].

At a time when hegemon declining is happening, the ruler is expecting to share the burdens of maintaining the existing order with those actors who adhered to and benefited from it. In other words, the ruler needs "a group of secondary actors which are essential for supporting the order; they single would neither be capable of establishing it or running it, but the ruler is finally also reliant on their collaboration"[10].

Moreover, this sort of order "includes a vision of order which is to some extent consensual, or, at least, rational insofar as countries do not see anything better as far they are concerned and therefore they share an interest in its preservation"[11]. As far as the free-riders are concerned, they, often, bypass the newfound responsibilities, what makes the ruler incredibly frustrated. However, since the *international (economic) order* is seen as a *collective good*, where all actors are gaining from it, regardless of their share of help, then why the orderer is getting frustrated?. Moreover, the hegemon is aware that it is the only actor in the system who can provide, not only security assurances but also economic security to others'. The free-riding behavior is not a welcoming attitude at the system level, but that is all the small and medium-sized actors can do. They will always do their best to achieve their national interest[12].

However, power diffusion approach asserts that accumulated power will dimish across an interval of time. So, *the diffusion of power* approach admits that the *power* is more diffused at the system level than it happens in the case of *power transition theory*, for instance. So, that's is the main

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[8] Kindleberger, C.P., "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides". *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No.2, p. 243. [doi:10.2307/2600355];

[9] Michael C. Webb, Stephen D. Krasner, *op.cit.*, p. 184;

[10] Stefano Guzzini, Iver B. Neumann, *The Difussion of Power in Global Governance. International Political Economy Meets Foucault,* 2012, Palgrave-Macmillan, p. 12;

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] Charles Kindleberger*, op.cit.,* pp. 247-250;

explanation for why the diffusion of power amongst nations is the principal driver of the nature of the global financial order[13].

Consequently, the deconcentration of power is viewed, by the *power transition scholars*, as a driver of war and balancing behavior, while the former theory predicts more *stability* and *peace[14]*. Alternatively said, the theory of power diffusion does not consider the rising powers as deeply unsatisfied as regards the existing order or hegemon's activity. The diffusion of power theory pays more attention over free-riders, or on rising powers that are not deeply involved in managing the order.

Moreover, the *diffusion of power theory* is suited as far our research is concerned because the rising power, China in our case, has no incentive to govern the system, or at least, to take responsibility for some parts of it.

China's attitude toward the existing order is a mix of *isolationism*, *full involvement*, and *free-riding behavior*. The *free-riding behavior* is referring to China's reluctance to take on some of the USA global burdens, while *full-involvement* refers to almost China's total integration in the Western free-market rules. Being disappointed by the free-riding conduct of its (almost) equal opponents and trying to stop own visible decline, the leader (the United States of America) will eventually reconsider or even quit some from its global duties, that is, we will be witness to an order where none actor is willing to manage the system. In other words, there will be order without an orderer. The trade war, initiated by the USA, can be considered a punitive answer to China's free-riding behavior.

Although there are not hawks and spoilers, the rising powers are still determined to topple the existing order. Why?. Because the most valuable dealing-coin in world affairs is gaining *prestige.* Besides this, *status* matters when economic or territorial conflicts or other anxieties over international norms occur[15]. In other terms, "China [may] seeks the top seat in the hierarchy of prestige, and the US will do everything in its power to maintain its pole position because the state with the greatest reputation for power gets to govern the region"[16].

On the other hand, growth peace plays an essential role in our case. The bigger the growth rate amongst the actors is, the higher the possibility of rapid diffusion of power is. Due to the fact of the diffusion of power is balanced at the system level, there won't be a balancing behavior inside it.

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[13] Michael C. Webb, Stephen D. Krasner, *op.cit.*, p. 183.

[14] Kim, W., Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo, *World Politics*, Vol. 45 No. 01, p. 172, [doi:10.2307/2010522].

[15] R.P. Dore, "The Prestige Factor in International Affairs", *International Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1 April 1975, p. 195, [https://doi.org/10.2307/2617232].

[16] Yuen Foong Khong, "Power as prestige in world politics", *International Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 1, 1 January 2019, pp. 119, [https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy245].

So, the core idea of power diffusion is related to the even distribution of power within the system, as we emphasized above.

Whether power diffusion theory is accurate, then China will try to elude its future global duties and commitments. In the short term, this sort of behavior will get more benefits to China, but in the long run, it will be destructive, at least, for China's economic development. Imagine a world where all significant powers would adopt a retrenchment policy. As we can see, this policy is the first step in raising custom taxes or adopting mercantilism strategies. If this finding is correct, then China will have to deal with two options- economic or social implosion. If China may face an economic implosion, then there won't be any "invisible hand." So, the legitimacy of the Communist Party would be under question.

China's vision of liberal order

Following the end of Mao's tenure, the US-China relations consisted of in China's recognition of the USA political, economic, and military supremacy in the Asia Pacific. At the time, China did not pay too much attention to the US supremacy in the Pacific, because Beijing was very committed to *keeping a low profile* while maintaining at high standards the *domestic economic development* rate[17].

Since the USA- Soviet Union rivalry got to an end, China has to accommodate itself to an unstable international order and discover its status within it. Following Xi taking office, China has adopted a new and more audacious foreign policy strategy, the so-called *striving for achievement*[18]. Moreover, China is looking for equal treatment at the international stage, pledging for a *new type of great power relations*[19]. In Cheng Li's words "*Embedded in the* "*New Type of Great Power Relations*" is a nation's hope for an international environment more conducive to its development"[20].

Considering the two strategies I mentioned above, it is expecting as China to take some of the hegemon's global burdens. China would act in

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[17] Son Daekwon, "Xi Jinping Thought Vs. Deng Xiaoping Theory", *The Diplomat,* October, 25, 2017, [https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/xi-jinping-thought-vs-deng-xiaoping-theory/].

[18] Xuetong Yan, "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2014, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 153–184,[https://academic.oup. com/cjip/article-abstract/7/2/153/438673].

[19] Jinghan Zeng, Shaun Breslin, "China's 'new type of Great Power relations': a G2 with Chinese characteristics?", *International Affairs,* 2016, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 773-794, [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2346.12656].

[20] Cheng Li, Lucy Xu, "Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the "New Type of Great Power Relations"", Brookings, December, 2014, [https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinese-enthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/].

this way only if the costs of the supposed burden do not exceed the gains or benefits.

However, what is China's view of liberalism? The first one is *politically*-related, and it describes, very often, how Western states run their societies, and the second one is *economically*-related, and it outlines ideas on the market economy.

Liberalism became the most potent and reliable global ideology at the beginning of the '90s, due to the USA final victory against the socialist camp. At the time, liberalism was seen as the highest way of governance. Even Fukuyama forecasted that "liberal democracy is the end point of humankind governing process"[21]. Moreover, today's shine of liberalism is fading in the West because the Western governments have not provided alternative economic solutions in the wake of the 2008 economic crises. The lack of non-western democracies' support of liberal values is closely related to the cause of the Western countries' decreasing economies.

In the same train of thoughts, liberalism is still facing many blows, such as Trump's isolationist and racist policies, the European democratic countries' populism, BREXIT, China's Uyghur people genocide, and so on. So, Can China become the most significant threat of liberal (order) democracy?. China may be considered a threat just because it is already launched an alternative vision to the liberal ideology, a strategy consisting of in helping others in developing their economy while conserving their independence"[22].

At the domestic level, the ideological guidance in China is in a total state of contradiction. The Marxist ideology (I) is the "Holy Bible", of every Chinese citizen. Thus, Marxism shapes domestic politics, but it has limited influence over foreign policy decisions. Marxism-Leninism is very prayed at the Chinese societal level, being described as "the latest achievement"[23], in the life of CCP and of Chinese people, respectively. On the contrary, China cannot use the Marxist ideology in its foreign policy because it is in stark contradiction with China's strategy of peaceful development and, also, with its non-aggressive international posture. In other words, the so-called class struggle cannot be harmonized with the idea of international cooperation.

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[21] Francis, Fukuyama, "The End of Story?", *The National Interest,* 1989, No. 16, p. 6.

[22] Liangyu, "Socialism with Chinese characteristics enters new era: Xi", *Xinhua,* October, 2017, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688475.htm].

[23] Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era", Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017, *Xinhua,*

[http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC _National_Congress.pdf].

On the other hand, the strategy of (II) *economic development* seems to be today's most, appealing" ideology for both the Chinese Government and ordinary people. Deng's *economic development* tenure represents the citizens' core social values base.

Even though (III) *traditionalism[24]* is seen as not being the official ideology in China, though, it is very appealing amongst Chinese citizen and political elites. It points out the idea of the importance of leadership in the decision-making process, improving China's international posture, or taking on more responsibilities in international affairs.

However, to what degree the three Chinese national ideologies will shape the current order?

Considering some of the leading scholars' findings "the fate of liberal ideology- the one that has emphasized the American's way of global governance, will be more affected by China as a dominant authority on the world stage, and also by the mode wherein the United States responds to China's increasing global weight''[25].

Due to the fact of the decaying state of liberalism, as a global acknowledge value, new ideologies are struggling now for gaining influence around the world. Perhaps, the future dominant ideology will come from that state that will be able to get more economic and political traction than today's amount of USA.

Because the power imbalances among China and the United States are getting short, Beijing's growth shall concurrently change the global arrangements from an US-rule to a multipolar system that will consist of two or more significant powers, such as China, the United States of America, India, Brazil, Russia, Germany. As significant, China's unstoppable rise and the idea it will rule and shape the world, has gained some support[26].

So far, China's economic growth seems to be the most consistent comparing the rising of others' great powers during the last five centuries. China's economic rise has consistency because of three characteristics,

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[24] Zi, Yang, "Xi Jinping and the Restoration of Traditionalism in China", *AsiaNews,* November, 07, 2017, [http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Xi-Jinping-and-the-Restoration-of-Traditionalism-in-China-41252.html].

[25] De Graaff, N., & Van Apeldoorn, B. "US–China relations and the liberal world order: contending elites, colliding visions?" *International Affairs*, 2018, Vol. 94, No. 1, p. 113, [DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix232].

[26] Martin Jacques, *When China rules the world: the end of the western world and the birth of a new global order*, 2009, Penguin Publisher.

such as- "a stable government, high quality of human capital, and cooperation with developed economies".[27]

Considering China's spectacular economic raising and political influence around the world, they can transform it into the expected provider of a new global ideology. Moreover, China, as a future possible provider of the global governance rules, must imbue its values with the Western's ones. Combining the two actors' values "could generate a new and competitive set of ideas that help to establish a stable international order"[28]. In other words, blending some of the Chinese core values, such as *benevolence*, *righteousness*, and *rites*, with the Western liberal values, like *equality*, *democracy*, and *freedom*, will create a genuinely win-win order[29].

On the other hand, to what extent a Chinese supposed global ideology may threaten the citizens' liberal values?. In Petter Haris's words "....whether or not its growing diplomatic clout will jeopardize the broader, rules-based ('liberal') international order that most Western countries are heavily invested in defending and extending", we can find out the fear degree of other's[30].

The current debates on China's threat level over the liberal order is often the product of the scholars' misinterpretation of China's foreign policy[31]. Contrary to these gloomy forecasts, China has been adopting and adapting to the liberal rules, and China's accession to the World Trade Organization can be an excellent example of its adapting efforts. China's most significant economic achievements have been possible only when 'China's economy has been integrated globally by relying on multilateral institutional frameworks, especially the WTO'[32].

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[27] Xingye Jin, David Daokui, Li Shuyu Wu, "How will China shape the world economy?", *China Economic Review*, Vol. 40, 2016, p. 272, [DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.006].

[28] Xuetong Yan, "Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International Normative Order?", 2018, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 10, [https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy001].

[29] Yan Xuetong explains, at lengths, more about the three above-mentioned Chinese values, and how they can be related to Western values. See "Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International Normative Order?" pp. 11-17.

[30] Peter Harris, "China in British Politics: Western Unexceptionalism in the Shadow of China's Rise", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2017, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 242, [https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pox009].

[31] Michael, Pillsbury, "Misunderstanding China", *Wall Street Journal*, Septeber, 17, 2014, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/misunderstanding-china-1410972607].

[32] Christopher, A. McNally, "Sino-Capitalism: China's Reemergence and the International Political Economy", 2012, *World Politics,* Vol. 64, No. 4, p. 750, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/41683132].

China has not acted as a spoiler at the international level, but rather as a free-rider. More or less, China's international behavior has shown us that it never tended to change the operating way of the system, but instead adapting, using a step by step framework, to its requirements. Perhaps, Schweller's and Xu's insight is right, that 'China seeks a gradual change of *Pax Americana* and not a direct challenge to it'[33]. Moreover, various studies have outlined how China has mostly integrated within the global system by linking itself by the current liberal establishments/ institutions, and also accommodating to the prevailing international standards and laws[34].

However, most notable pundits or scholars are expecting a severe clash between China and the USA, if the latter has any intentions to prolong the existence of the liberal order. As Hugh White stated, 'If America wants to perpetuate the old order, it will have to accept a very serious contest with China, and this is what some people now advocate'[35].

In some instances, we can argue that The People's Republic is already playing the leading role considering its political and economic leverage over the Third World countries. In the same train of thoughts, China can also be considered as being the leader of those actors that are unsatisfied by the current order. Consequently, the China- Africa Cooperation Agreement, BRICS, and even Shanghai Cooperation Organization, points out China's pole position on such specific issues. The three institutions are shaped on the common idea that the Western-led order always kept them (actors that are not considering themselves as being part of the Western-led order) at bay, and the latter never seem them as peer competitors.

The case of the American retrenchment may undermine the USA global engagement, and so its clout over the other international regimes it has supported, so far. Moreover, giving up to global engagement, the USA also may weaken the global economic policies that are still an American-focused affair.

However, every emerging or established (great) power wishes to pursue and settle its core interests. Moreover, to what degree the USA has

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[33] Randall Schweller, Xiaoyu Pu, "After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of U.S. decline", *International Security,* Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 53, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289688].

[34] Johnston, Iain, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014; See, also, Ann Kent, *Beyond compliance: China, international organizations, and global security*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

[35] Hugh White, Mary Kay Magistad, Zha Daojiong, "It Is Time for America to Consider Accommodation With China", *Foreign Policy,* June, 2015,

[https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/08/china-us-policy-rivalry-tension-great-powers-accommodation/].

outsmarted this conventional policy-wisdom?. Barry Posen sized this idea very well 'The USA has become so powerful so that it is not capable anymore of keeping in rein its ambitions", adopting a global-oriented policy instead, that is "resource-wasteful, futile, counterproductive and costly'[36].

The USA global-oriented policy has never been driven by security needs, contrary to conventional wisdom, rather than a domestic liberal ideology that has always been committed to creating a global rule-based order considering its image.

Moreover, even Donald Trump considers the American's external involvement as being against the USA interests. He argues that 'for many decades, we have enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military. We have defended other nations' borders while refusing to defend our own. Moreover, spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay. We have made other countries rich, while the wealth, strength and confidence of our country have dissipated over the horizon...... We have made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has disappeared over the horizon'[37].

The American case of offshore retrenchment is quite uncertain because ups and downs characterize Trump's foreign policy initiatives. While Trump is committed to preserving the American hegemony, he made the TPP redundant, pulled the USA out from the Paris Treaty, and also he sought to revise NAFTA Treaty, the "worst ever deal"[38]

Since Donald Trump has taken office, the United States of America has adopted a bilateral approach as a foreign policy tool, denouncing thus the multilateralism as not being in the American interest. As a very less number of pundits have got it so far, the USA is choosing the same foreign approach as China do it. Beijing has always chosen to bilaterally 'discuss' with its neighbors or with other institutions. This bilateral approach does not take into account a foreign policy perspective influenced by aims as the rule of law or obeying human rights, but instead, it works in favor of creating more economic relationships. In the same train of thoughts, this approach emphasizes the suspicious character concerning governments seen as obstructing or limiting American independence of action.

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[36] Barry Posen, *Restraint: a new foundation for US grand strategy*, 2015, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 24.

[37] 'Donald Trump's Inaugural Adress', January, 20, 2017,
[https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/].

[38] Jef Coxx, 'Tough-talking Trump scores what could be 'a real legacy piece' with new trade deal', *CNBC,* October, 2018, [https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/01/trump-scores-what-could-be-a-real-legacy-piece-with-new-trade-deal.html].

Moreover, even Donald Trump stated that 'the world is not a global community but an arena where nations, non-governmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantages'[39].

Why should China keep the liberal order?

The first argument is tied to both China's fitting in the last one hundred years' pattern of non-aggressive challengers and its international economic-collaborative behavior. China's political elites are aware of the fact that keeping a high-rate of economic increasing, by cooperating with others, is more important than spending money on the army. Massive investments in weapons technology require massive spendings. At a time when the war is obsolete, paying attention to increasing whatever sort of cooperation (or economic influence) around the globe would be more appropriate than the ideas we mentioned above.

Although, "Chinese history is replete with wars, and most of these wars have served one purpose: to create and/or preserve the unity of China", since the 1949s, China has been involved in small skirmishes with its neighbors[40]. It had a draw with the USA in the Korean War and small victories with Vietnam in 1979 and India in 1962. China still has a real gap considering its power projection capacities – in terms of the overseas military bases, aircraft carriers, submarines, – against those of the USA. If China has any real intentions to replace the existing international order, be it through violent or non-violent means, then it must spread an ideology that should earn the hearts and minds of the political elites and of the masses around the world that support the given ideology, too. China could do this during the Cold War when socialism was stronger than it is today. However, China's split with the Soviet Union made this an impossible task.

On the other hand, China's first step in gaining hegemony is to promote a strong ideology and institutions that could cover the interests of those who may support it, and not start a costly war. China must duplicate its ideology by emulating the core rules of its own social, political and economic institutions to the supporter states' core ideology. If this ideology is well-rooted in the domestic politics of these (client) states, then it will be transferred from generation to generation, and so on. We have to remember how the Great Britan had transferred its institutions and social rules to its colonies, and how the USA did with Japan, and Germany, and last but not least, how the seeds of the liberal hegemony were seeded in the

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[39] H.R. McMaster, Gary D. Cohn, 'America First Doesn't Mean America Alone', *Wall Street Journal*, May, 2017, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-america-alone-1496187426];

[40] Elleman, Bruce A., *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989.* New York: Routledge, 2001, p. X.

ex-Soviet states. On the other hand, China has limited revisionists aims, so far. Generally speaking, China is that sort of revisionist power who support the existing order, while it is driven to earn more prestige on the US's expense, a prestige that should be commensurate with its actual power.

Gaining international recognition or prestige means a better place at a negotiation table, emphasizing own posture as a decision (power) broker[41]. So, China has no intention to reform the core rules of the incumbent order but to make some changes as regards its posture at the international level, or to alter, to some extent, the way in which the rules are applied.

On the other hand, China adopted some of the excellent Western practices. For example, China was very prone, during the Cold War, to deal only with its neighbors, so sole at the bilateral level. Since the end of the Cold War, China is working as a very successful promoter of regional cooperation, being present in organizations like ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, APEC, BRICS, BRI, SCO, and so on. Only adopting a multilateral approach, China got more influence in regional affairs. Also, China uses Western institutions as vehicles of projecting its power into the future. For example, at the time when China was bargaining for its WTO accession, one of its ambassadors stated, 'We are aware that we have to play using your rules, but in ten years we will set the rules'[42].

Moreover, China seems to be entangled within the various institutional networks that are the core base of the existing order. Because China's substantial economic achievements underwent under the current order, it is unlikely as China to change it. Furthermore, China supports the existent order, while it condemns the supposed wrongdoings of it. China uses a brilliant non-direct confrontational strategy with the existing order. Using the so-called *salami slicing* strategy, such as creating alternative regional institutions, blocking the USA votes in the Security Council, condemning the USA military actions, China might crumble the very core base of *Pax America.* "So as long the United States' image remains tainted, China will have greater leverage in multilateral settings. It would be foolhardy, however, for Beijing to challenge directly the international order and the institutions favored by the Western world- and, indeed, such a challenge is unlikely"[43], stated Wang Jisi.

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[41] Tony Nash, Jay Heisler, "China's latest conquest: Middle East power broker", *CNBC,* June, 27, 2018,
[https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/28/chinas-latest-conquest-middle-east-power-broker---commentary.html].
[42] Fred Bergsten, "A Partnership of Equals How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge", *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 87, No.4, (July – August, 2008), p. 65.
[43] Wang Jisi, "China's search for stability with America", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5, 2005, p. 43.

The second argument is related to how deeply rooted the liberal order is?. The diffusion of power expects that the power should be concentrated around the hegemon. In other words, the USA-led order is deeply rooted in the strategy of spreading democracy. Consequently, the liberal order is highly supported by the masses and the democracies' around the world. Democratic countries' citizens consider their form of government is greater than others' is. So, that is why the liberal order is hard to overthrow. It has a solid base, even at times when more and more illiberal governments are occurring.

Moreover, even some of the Chinese elites are supporting the liberal order. According to a survey ran by Bentley B. Allan *at.all.,* 'elites in Japan, India, Brazil, and China identify positively with both liberalizing policies (openness and free trade) and statist or socialist identities'[44]. Moreover, 'while the masses in some of these countries reject neoliberalism, elites identify with liberal policies'[45].

Over the last one hundred years, the liberal order dealt with even great dangers than it faces today, such as Two World Wars, the Great Depression, Nazism, the Cold War, communism, terrorism. Replacing the liberal order does not only involve ousting the USA from the top position but instead of overthrowing institutions, agreements, treaties, redrawing borders that have been enacted so far. The USA might accept China as a peer competitor, only if China will not have any intention to spread its influence in the USA sphere of influence.

Trying to overthrow the liberal order makes China just not the unipole target but the target of the latter's allies, too. Considering the unipolar system in charge today, the diffusion of power is more balanced than in the bi or multipolar systems. So, the second-ranked states or even the emerging powers (which have not enough power to challenge the hegemon) have sufficient freedom of action. In other words, the balanced spreading of power makes the small actors less dependent and obedient in the face of hegemon's evil intention.

More importantly, if we discussed so far about the importance of *military* and *economic* spheres at times of power shifts, then we have to points out the relevance of *identity* among the great powers, too. Identity can be seen as a pillar of the current (liberal) order. If the identity of a given order(er) has a global-solid based, then there are fewer chances to be overthrown even if the ruler is declining. Moreover, the supporters of the current order would not find attractive or desirable the challenger's offer.

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[44] Allan, B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T., "The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects", I*nternational Organization*, Vol. 72, No. 4, p. 20, [https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000267].

[45] *Ibidem.,* p. 24.

The rising challenger, often, lays behind the hegemon, as in the Sino-American power competition, regarding – relative power, power projection capabilities, military expenditures, soft power and so on. China's lack of soft power makes China unable to attracting strong partners into a counterbalancing coalition.

Moreover, there is a broad gap between China's authoritarian system identity and the liberal order's identity. What kind of scholar would expect as China to be fully integrated within a system that put under question, not only the Communist Party ideological ground, but also China's elites political future? Because of this incompatibility, China can never get full membership in the liberal order.

The third suggestion is linked with the open character of the liberal order. China is already a part of and benefits from this Western-led order. China's sticking to the liberal values got it more benefits than ever, so far. If at the start of the economic reforms in the 1980s "only 0.8% of China's teenagers got a postsecondary education diploma, then the figure grew up from 3.3% in the 1990s to 20.6% in 2010"[46]. As a consequence, China's government proceeded to build more education facilities, doubling the number of them – from 1022 in 1998 to 2263 in 2008[47]. Also, China's Index for Human Capital per person is getting better since the liberal economic reforms were adopted. For instance, if the index was 1.11 in the 1950s (1 being the worse and 2,6 the best), then in the 1990s was 1,85, and in 2016 was 2,43[48]. Taking *World Data* figures into account, China took out of poverty more than 700 million people[49]. Thus, if the Chinese poverty figure was 17,1% in 2010, then in 2017 was 3,1%[50].

Another instance is related to China as a slow developer economy. Since the 1980s, China began its economic development only using free-market rules, more than its East Asian neighbors did.

Moreover, China's GDP increasing commenced in an era of liberal globalization. At the time of the 1980s, China allowed foreign investments in its main sectors, like manufacturing and retail. However, today, China is

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[46] Yu Xie, Chunni Zhang, Qing Lai, "China's rise as a major contributor to science and technology", *Institute for Social Rsearch and Department of Sociology,* May 6, 2014, [https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/111/26/9437.full.pdf].

[47] *Ibidem.*

[48] "Index of Human Capital per Person for China (HCIYISCNA066NRUG)", [https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HCIYISCNA066NRUG].

[49] Tan Weiping, "China's Approach to Reduce Poverty: Taking Targeted Measures to Lift People out of Povert", *International Poverty Reduction Center in China*, 2018, p. 3,[https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/05/31.pdf].

[50] "World Development Indicators" [https://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspxsource=2&type=metadata&series=SI.POV.NAHC].

playing a mixed game in the global economy: they obey the rules of the liberal order, and they also involve the state-controlled actors to get what they want from this liberal order, respectively. As importantly, the Chinese way of capitalism – the Sino-capitalism – which relies more on state intervention in the economy or has different institutional arrangements comparing with the American capitalism, does not have the same global support as liberalism, yet. More important, since Donald Trump has taken the presidential chair of the White House, the USA seems to refuse to be the only power who support the burden of providing security or financial aid to the world. Several years ago, the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a valuable insight regarding the existing order: "no nation can meet the world's challenges alone... too many players are competing for influence... we will use our power to convene our to connect countries around the world and sound foreign policies strategies to create partnerships aimed at solving problems"[51]. In other words, Hillary Clinton was proposing a "multi-partner world",[52] and not to a "multi-polar world." In the same train of thoughts, even J. Ikenberry suggests[53] that 'China is fully embedded in this liberal order'.

Consequently, for the sake of peace, and to avoid John Mearsheimer's gloomy predictions[54] about China's rise, the USA has to do its best to successfully incorporate China into the order that it created more than 70 years ago. The USA should not stop China in assuming a more central role in the international system, as it is done with Russia or Germany after the WWI, because the "*dragon*" will push harder and harder to get what it wants, so the US position in the international system might be undermined.

The fourth suggestion is linked with the state of the liberal order that is more loose than tight. The best examples are Germany, which was able to integrate itself into both the global economy and world politics; China,

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[51] Discurs "Hillary Clinton - A Multi-Partner World",
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zepam4lxtTw].
[52] Glenn, Kessler, 'Secretary of State Clinton Says U.S. Must Partner With an Great Number of Actors', *Washington Post,* 2009, July, 16,
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
dyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071503163.html??noredirect=on].
[53] Ikenberry, G. John, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, 2008, Vol. 87, No. 1, January–February, pp. 24, 36, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west];
Ikenberry, G. John., 'The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and the Western Order', *apud* Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, 2008, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
[54] Zbigniew Brzezinki, John J. Mearsheimer, ''Clash of the Titans'', *Foreign Policy,* October, 2009, [https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/clash-of-the-titans/]; John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2001, New York: W.W. Norton, p. 4.

after years of domestic turmoil, had decided to open its economy to the global markets; after it was destroyed by the US, Japan became stronger connected, economic and political, with the outside world. Not to say about the post-Soviet states, most of them being integrated into NATO or the European Union. This kind of order will hold as long as a powerful democratic actor will be at the top of international order. Indeed, because of the numerous domestic upheavals, and populist parties, corrupt rulers, the democracies around the world seem to be weak and less committed to backing the liberal order. However, these illiberal manifestations might be temporary. The liberal order has accepted systems that are almost incompatible with its core base like the Sino-capitalism is. That is the main answer wherefore the liberal order is loose.

The liberal order is the subject of a lot of rules and institutions, so it can never be driven by a single actor, that is, it is a multi-layered/multi-hierarchical global organization. This order creates incentives and rewards to every actor, while an imperial order would emphasize more a hegemon-centric approach.

The fifth argument is tied to the way in which the existing order works. This one has created powerful tools of global cohesion and governance, like NATO, the European Union, the IMF, OSCE, the World Bank. China needs the liberal order more than everybody else because only using the open markets it will be able to pursue the great dream of national rejuvenation. The liberal order, through its institutions, has worked more in China's interest rather than against it.

The sixth idea is geopolitically related. The People's Republic of China operates in a more dangerous geopolitical region with stronger neighbors than the USA's had at the time of its rising. The USA, in comparison with China, became a great power in a more security-stable realm, without any other peer competitor in the Western hemisphere. Ikenberry points out very well the Asian-geopolitical background. He argues that "the emerging order in East Asia is more multipolar and shaped by the balance of power impulses..... With the rise of China, the United States is no longer the only major great power in the region'[55].

For the sake of peace, the best key scenario in the Western Pacific regarding the future regional order would be one related to a peaceful co-existence. Imbuing Chinese values with the liberal ones would be, at the very most, in the interest of the small players.

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[55] John Ikenberry, "From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia"*, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 42.
[http://wws.princeton.edu/system/files/research/documents/Ikenberry_From%20 Hegemony%20to%20the%20Balance%20of%20Power.pdf].

Whatever it does, the USA cannot contain China's rise. Contrary, the USA must prevent the Asia Pacific region from becoming only a Chinese sphere of influence. Coordinating the Western Pacific is not only a one person job. Instead, it is a "multi-actor" work. Moreover, competition without cooperation is none of their best interest, and even Ikenberry admits that "...American efforts to contain China and China's efforts to push the United States out of the region will both be self-defeating strategies"[56].

The seventh argument is tied to what type of rising power China is? Is it one driven by interests like ousting institutions, or the ordering rules of the existing order, or it has more interests in gaining influence in the South China Sea and keeping economic growth? We consider the second being the best option for China's ideals. Considering China's international behavior so far, it either obeyed the ordering rules, or has tried to add its version to the international structure, such as the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure and Investments Bank, the Development Bank, or the internationalization of the Yuan.

The last but not least argument is consisting only of questions, such as- Is China ready to build a new kind of security alliances, and, also, to provide security to its partners?. In other terms, will China be able to create a NATO Asian model?. On the other hand, is China ready to offer an economical alternative to the world? Moreover, will China be able to create an alternative global institutional framework

Final remarks

Replacing the incumbent order might mean a devastating war for the incumbent hegemon and for the rising power, too. Although the liberal order is in high contrast with China's authoritarian system, we state that is in China's interest to keep the liberal order, as much as this order satisfy its development requests. On the other hand, the liberal (economic) order it is more open to inside changes, and it may offer a joint authority, mutual economic benefits, strong cooperation, than a hegemonic-centric order could does. However, establishing a Sino-centric order would curtail China's entries to the future markets. Perhaps China is ready to offer a different economic order to the world, but it is not ready to provide an alternative institutional order.

In a nutshell, the changing of the existing order would not produce any benefits for China. Beijing must be focused more on a proper integration in the existing order because according to history, the authoritarian states usually lose the competition with their democratic contenders.

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[56] *Ididem,* p. 44.

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THE POLITICISATION OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract: There are various studies that have shown that the military must not involve in the political process of any country. However, there are limited studies on the influence of military on democratic consolidation in post transitional states in Africa. Therefore, this study seeks to answer this research question: Does a politicised military have effect on the Nigeria's quest for democratic consolidation? This study is situated within the corporate grievance model. Besides, secondary data include relevant books, journals, and other published documents related to the study area while content analysis was used to analyse the data collected. This study revealed that politicised Nigerian military has it root in Nigeria's colonial period emanating from regional divisions of the various nationalist movements and regionalized political elite, thereby making it difficult to have a common consensus on national issues and maintain democratic consolidation in the country till date. This study further revealed that politicisation of the Nigerian military has encouraged mutual suspicion and triggered various agitations across the country and affect the country's quest for democratic consolidation. This study recommends that Federal Government of Nigeria under current democratic dispensation should adhere to the federal character principle in all promotions, selections and appointments in the country to ally mutual suspicion.

Keywords: Military, Democratic consolidation, Politics, Transitional states, Performance-legitimacy, Civil-Military relations

Introduction

The military as a professional organisation is relatively new but the act of warfare is as old as recorded human history. Therefore, emergence of modern military dates back to the middle ages when European nations began to mobilise military formations with standing armed forces. By the nineteenth century the armed forces had already become a specialised organization with a distinctive leadership style independent of other segment of the human society. Moreover, the emergence of colonialism

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provided the avenue for the adoption of a uniform military model cross the world. However, only Puerto Rico had no stand by military as the United States provided security for it defence. Therefore, the adoption of a uniform stand by armed forces almost makes the world to have a global outlook as a state institution.[1]

Nevertheless, in Africa the formation of the military is one of the oldest in military histories of the world. For instance, the North Africa especially along the Mediterranean region was an integral part of the history of the military during the classical antiquity. Also, East part of Africa was not left out as the region had long history of various states formation that fought with many world powers. Besides, African military engaged in several wars of European conquest and Africa resistance to colonial invasion during the nineteenth century. Also, African military equally participated in the world wars and the early violent struggles for independence in Africa in the 1950's and 1960 as well in the 1980's.

All over the world today, direct military intervention in politics has become a rare phenomenon except in some countries in Africa, Latin America and some part of Asia where there is likelihood. Since World War II in 1945 except in France in 1958 that witnessed successful military coup that brought the fourth republic to an end and in 1961 also when it witnessed unsuccessful military coup, while in Portugal in 1974 and in Spain in 1981. There was also unsuccessful coup in 1971, in Poland in 1981 and in Russia in 1991[2] the rate of military coup has declined greatly outside Africa.

Over the years significant number of countries in Africa at one point in time have witnessed direct military intervention in its democratic process such as Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali and host of others. Moreover, the emergence of authoritarian rule that has decreased in Africa dates back to the end of the cold war in the late 1980's. Moreover, transition to democratic rule as well as present efforts at consolidating democracy in the African continent have been heating political speed bumps as democratic rules in the continent are faced with the likelihood of authoritarian reversal. This is because the military have played significant role in governance in Africa since the 1960's usually a negative one for that matter[3].

One country in Africa that it military has made significant achievement at the international scene is the Nigerian military. In terms of

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[1] Heywood A., *Politics Third edition New York: Palgrave Macmillan* pp. 402-404, 2007.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Jega, M.A., *Democracy, good Governance and development in Nigeria Ibadan:* Spectrum Books Limited pp. 77-94, 2007.

origin, the Nigerian military owe it origin to 1st June 1863 when Lt John Glover of the Royal Navy raised a force of 18 men to escort him through the land to Lagos after a ship wreaks at Jebba in 1886. This small forced was later transformed into what was called the "Hausa Constabury" because they were predominantly from the Hausa tribe[4]. Between 1891 and 1892, Ralph Moore formed the "Oil Rivers irregulars" which was later renamed "the Niger Coast Constabulary". These local forces were used to maintain law and order[5]. Later on, this force joined part of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) when it was established in 1900 by Colonel F.D. Lugard on the directives of the British government[6].

Furthermore, the visit of the Queen of England to Nigeria in 1956 led to the renaming of the Northern and Southern Regiments of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) as the Queen's own Nigeria Regiment, such that by 1960, when Nigeria became an independent state the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) was transformed into the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA) and subsequently when Nigeria became a republic the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA) was changed to the Nigerian Army. In addition, after the northern and southern detachments were merged to form the Nigerian Marine Department and later on in 1914 it was renamed Nigerian Navy Force on the 1st June 1956. Consequently, by 1964 the Nigerian Air force was established by an act of parliament. Today, the armed forces of Nigeria consist of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air force.

On the whole, the direct involvement of the Nigerian military in politics began during the first republic when some officers and men of the military through one of the bloodiest coup in the history of the country ousted democratically elected leaders of the country under the leadership of late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on the 15th January 1966. Since, then the country has witnessed over three decades of military rule since her independent in 1960. Today, one of the greatest impediments to Nigeria's efforts at democratic consolidation has been the impact of military rule on governance. It is against this background this study seeks to answer the research question: Does a politicised military have effect on Nigeria's quest for democratic consolidation?

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[4] Leadership Sunday Newspaper June 13, 2010, p. 64.

[5] Olorungbemi, S.T., The Impact of Military Coup D'état on Political Development in Nigeria, *International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 6, No. 10;* October 2015, pp. 194-202.

[6] Leadership Sunday Newspaper June 13, 2010 p. 64.

Theoretical framework

In various literatures on military studies, scholars have developed a number of theories/ models to explain the motivations of military interventions in politics especially in transitional and post-transitional states in the developing world. One of such theories was developed by Barany Zoltan who developed a theory of how the military infrastructure in Eastern European states has affected the nature of democratic transitions in that region. Barany asserts that states whose military infrastructure was professionalised (pre-transition) were more likely to consolidate their democracies than the states whose military infrastructure was not professionalised (pre-transition). This according to Barany was the case in Poland and Hungary. Similarly, Barany further state that in states where the military is politicised (pre-transition) was more likely to have turbulent transition. This according to Barany was the case in Romania[7].

Another theory that is of great interest to us in this study is the corporate grievance model developed by Thompson William. Thompson asserts that the military as an institution of the state usually develop self-interested motives in bringing a democratic rule to an end[8]. He further posits that if the civilian government of the day fails to provide adequate funding for the military or when it funding is impeded especially during recession, when the government will attempt to cut down it spending in order to get out of recession through other austerity measures, the military may stage a coup to bring a democratic rule to an end[9].

Tusalem buttressed Thompson assertions that when the financial interest of the military is undermined, the survival of democracy in transitional states like in Nigeria, Gabon, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Mali amongst others will always be at stake. Tusalem further posits that transitional states like Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali and host of others that allow for the large percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to be used in funding the military, the military will restrained it direct involvement in politics and thus, the democratic space that is needed for democratic consolidation will be provided[10]. It is against this

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[7] Barany Z., *Democratic consolidation and the military: The Eastern European experience.* Comparative politics 30(1): 21-43, 1997.

[8] Thompson, W., *Corporate coup-maker grievances and type of regime targets. Comparative political studies* 12(4): 485-496; 1980.

[9] Thompson, W., *The grievances of military coup-makers.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage publications, 1973.

[10] Tusalem, F.R., *Bringing the military back in: The politicisation of the military and its effect on democratic consolidation.* International Political Science Review 2014 Vol. 35 (4) 482-501.

background that we shall adopt the corporate grievance model as our theoretical framework for this study because of it suitability for our study.

Literature Review: Politicisation of the Military and Democratic Consolidation

There are numerous empirical studies that have shown that the military must not be involved in the political process of any country, if it democracy must survive such as Linz and Stephen 1996[11]; Tusalem 2014[12]; Crouch 1997[13]; Hunter 1992[14]; 1994[15]; Huntington 1991[16]; Hutchful 1998[17]; Adeshina 1999[18]; Adejumobi and Momoh 1995[19]; Aguda 1991[20]; Agbese 1990[21]; Agbese and Kieh 1992[22]; Jega 1994[23]; Jemibewon 1998[24]; Ihonvbere 1998[25]; Momoh and Adejumobi 1999[26]; Zeleza 1995[27]. All these

[11] Linz, J., & Stephen, *A. Problems of democratic transitions and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and post-communist Europe.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

[12] Ibid: 11.

[13] Crunch H., *Civil-military relations in South-East Asia: Regional challenges.* In Diamond, L., Plattner, M., Chu, Y., & Tien, H., *Consolidating the third wave democracies.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

[14] Hunter, W., *Back to the barrack? The military in post-authoritarian Brazil.* PhD. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, USA. 1992.

[15] Hunter, W., *Contradictions of civilian control: Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s.* The Third world Quarterly 15(4): 633-653. 1994.

[16] Huntington, S.P., *The third wave: Democratisation in the late twentieth century Norman:* University of Oklahoma press, 1991.

[17] Hutchful, E., *Military Issues in the transition to democracy in Hutchful,* E., & Bathily, A. (eds.) The military and militarism in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA book series, 1998 P: 599-617.

[18] Adeshina, A.R., *Military in politics: Comprehensive strategies for ending military rule in Africa.* Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1999.

[19] Adejumobi, S. and Momoh, A. (eds.), *The political economy of Nigeria under military rule: 1984-1993.* Harare: SAPES Books, 1995.

[20] Aguda, A., "The military and constitutionalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience" in Shivji, I. (ed.) State and constitutionalism. Harare: SAPES Books, 1991.

[21] Agbese, PO., *The impending demise of Nigeria's Forthcoming Third Republic,* in Africa Today, 37(3), 1990.

[22] Agbese, P.O. & Kieh, G.K., *Military disengagement from African politics: The Nigerian experience in Afrika Spectrum*, 27 1992.

[23] Jega, M.A., *Nigerian academics under military rule. Stockholm: Department of Political science,* University of Stockholm, 1994.

[24] Jemibewon, D.M., *Military, law and society: Reflections of a General.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd 1998.

[25] Ihonvbere, J., *The military and Nigerian society: The Abacha Coup and the crisis of democratisation in Nigeria in Hutchful,* E., & Bathily, A. (eds.), *The military and militarism in Africa.* Dakar: CODESRIA book series, 1998 P: 503-539.

[26] Momoh, A. & Adejumobi, S., *The Nigerian military and the crisis of democratic transition. A study in the monopoly of power Lagos:* Civil Liberties Organisation, 1999.

studies have shown with evidences from various countries across the world on the negative impact of the military on political processes.

O'Donnell argued in his studies that any attempt made to define the process of democratic consolidation in transitional states will amount to exercise in futility[28]. However, Morlino have argues that there are clear attributes that a state can exhibit if it must consolidate it democracy by involving the civil society organisations in developing a lasting democratic values and principles[29]. Schedler posits that in many transition states often experience the failure of democracy when they fail to have performance-legitimacy. He further argues that the military in most cases will seek to threaten to intervene in the politics or displaced the government through coup[30]. Similarly, Tusalem have argued that such tendencies often lead to political uncertainty which more often than not erode democratic gains[31].

Besides, transitional states especially in Africa where the government lacks performance-legitimacy, the military often directly end such democratic regime. The implication of this is that there will be a reversal in the democratic reforms. This has been the case in Nigeria under General Sani Abacha's regime and in Peru under Fujimori. In some cases, the military may completely rig the election and openly support civilian leaders that has similar ideological disposition with the military. This was also the case in Madagascar and Paraguay.

The challenge of performance-legitimacy by most democratic states in Africa has been one of the reasons for recurrent military interventions in most states in the continent. Tusalem have argued that transitional states with performance-legitimacy challenges may experience endless cases of direct military interventions in it political process with massive support from the civilian politicians who are loyal to the military[32]. In Nigeria, during the 1983 general elections it was alleged that the Presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) Alhaji Shehu Shagari told the Nigerian voters that is either they vote for the NPN or the military will intervene in the political process of the country. Though, the general elections were marred with irregularities, but by December 31, 1983 the

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[27] Zeleza, P.T., "Bullies in uniform: Military misrule in Nigeria" in *Africa Development* Vol. XX, No.4, 1995.

[28] O'Donnell G., *Illusions about consolidation.* Journal of Democracy 7(2):34-51.

[29] Morlino, L., *Democracy between consolidation and crisis: Parties, groups, and citizens in Southern Europe.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[30] Schedler, A., *What is democratic consolidation?* Journal of Democracy 9(1):91-107. 1998.

[31] Tusalem, F.R., *Bringing the military back in: The politicisation of the military and its effect on democratic consolidation.* International Political Science Review 2014 Vol. 35 (4) 482-501.

[32] Ibid.

NPN led government was toppled in a palace coup by Major General Muhammadu Buhari.

Bunce in his study have shown that there is correlation between the role of institutions, civil culture, ethnic heterogeneity, political economy, and the type of transition, in the stability of democracies. He further argues that there are very few studies in comparative democratisation that have examined the role of the military as an institution on democratic outcomes[33]. Similarly, Tusalem have buttressed the above assertion by Bunce that there is a systematic lack of empirical studies that examine the effect of the military on democratic consolidation[34]. Stephen corroborates Tusalem assertion that studies in democratisation studies has been state-centric, but has led to a complete "neglect of the military as a central topic of empirical research"[35]. From the available and relevant literature reviewed, we discovered that no study have been conducted on the effect of the politicisation of the Nigerian military on democratic consolidation in Nigeria. It is against this background this study seeks to make significant contributions to this research endeavour.

The politicisation of the Military and its effect on Democratic consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

There are various classifications of military interventions in politics in academic literature. This interventions range from influence, blackmail and displacement or "supplantment"; and the reasons for military interventions ranges from national interest, the corporate interest of the military, internal political crisis and external factors among others. However, the programme of the military regime takes revolutionary, reactionary or reformist approach.

Given the historical antecedents of modern military in Western European states, the military under current democratic dispensation in Nigeria is supposed to be a highly professional institution that is highly disciplined and entrusted with the monopoly use of force. Also, the Nigerian military is expected to be an institution of the state that is expected to carry out its constitutionally defined roles and responsibilities as entrenched in section 217 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended 2011) which states that:

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[33] Bounce, V., *Comparative democratisation: Big and bounded generalization.* Comparative Political Studies 33(6/7): 703-734.

[34] Tusalem, F.R., *Bringing the military back in: The politicisation of the military and its effect on democratic consolidation.* International Political Science Review 2014 Vol. 35 (4) 482-501.

[35] Stephan, A., *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press p. 9.

"There shall be an armed forces for the federation which shall consist of the Army, the Navy, the Air force and such other branches of the armed forces of the federation as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly" Section 217(2) states that: "The federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of (a) defending Nigeria from external aggression; (b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its border from violation on land, sea or air; (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore law and order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and (d) performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly"[36].

From the forgoing provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As amended 2011) the Nigerian military is expected to be apolitical institution that is totally subjected to the control of the civilian or democratic control and take directives as spelt out in section 217 (2) of the Nigerian 1999 constitution cited above. A critical analysis of these provisions depicts clearly that unlike in the past when the main political role of the military in any states was essentially the use of force to win war. Today, there is paradigm shift in the operations of the military, such that the Nigerian military have a well-articulated peace and war time roles and responsibilities added to their primary roles and responsibilities due to increasing changes in the country. Recently, the political roles of the Nigerian military has been expanded to address current complex challenges facing the country such as engaging in peace-keeping operations, humanitarian operations arising from banditry in Zamfara state; communal and ethno-religious conflict in states like Plateau, Kaduna, and Nassarawa state amongst others and natural disaster like flooding.

It is pertinent to note that the Nigerian military is usually called upon to assist in the maintenance of internal security, and in the maintenance of law and order. As a result of this role, the Nigerian military has become an important stockholder in promoting societal good and wellbeing of Nigerians. Today, the Nigerian military as an institution of the state has now moved from its traditional roles that are restrictive to wining wars to a broader and more modern role of engaging in joint components for war,

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[36] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Lagos: Federal Government Press (As amended 2011).

internal stabilisation and peace building. Therefore, it can be said that while the primary responsibility of the Nigerian military is to win war. It secondary responsibility is to support civilian authority in providing humanitarian assistance and support peace building operations.

However, the politicisation of the Nigerian military can be traced to the colonial era. The British government in her desire to weaken and divide the various nationalist movements politicised regional and ethnic divisions especially among the three dominant ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani of the north, Ibo of the Southeast and the Yoruba of the South west. This division has left Nigeria with regionalized political elite till date, thereby making it difficult to have a common consensus on national issues and maintain democratic consolidation in the country. The implication of the regionalisation of the Nigerian politics had negative effect on the Nigerian military that led to the January 15, 1966 coup that set the pace for further division of the military alone ethno-religious divide. Over the years, rather than the Nigerian military been an instrument of national cohesion based on past experiences from the civil war of 1967-1970. It has in some situation arguably strengthened the division which is evident in it polarisation in terms of appointments and promotion which have hitherto being lopsided.

A critical assessment of the influence of the Nigerian military on Nigeria's political process around the 1970's shows that there was increased spending on the military such that by the 1980's, the country's defence budget had almost double the annual budget allocated to the health, education and other social services. Moreover, large percentage of the annual budget was spent on the procurement of modern military hardware, personal costs and building of new barracks as well as rehabilitation of existing barracks across the country[37]. Consequently, the Nigerian military have manipulated and perpetuated the division of the country alone ethno-religious divide beyond what it was in the 1970s. For instance, the mobilisation of ethnic and religious identities under General Ibrahim Badamasi Babagida and General Sani Abacha's regime to legitimise their objectives in power further worsened the situation[38].

A close assessment of the Nigerian military in its quest to bring sanity to the country or to heal the divisions and defend the state, their interventions in political process have not been rewarding as the same "sin" they accused the ruling elite to have committed, they are directly or

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[37] Jega, M.A., *Democracy, good Governance and development in Nigeria Ibadan:* Spectrum Books Limited p. 77-94.

[38] Jega, A.M., *Towards sustainable Democracy in Nigeria, paper presented at the workshop organised for members of the Kano State House of Assemble,* June 22-23, 2000.

indirectly guilty of it. For instance, Jega rightly observed that the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election by the General Babagida's regime and the self-succession agenda of the General Sani Abacha's regime show the extent ethnicity and religious sentiment as well as corruption that characterised their regime[39]. For instance, during the General Abacha's regime, there had been a lot of division in the military mainly along ethnic lines and this got to the point that even pro-democratic groups struggles was divided between those in support of continued military rule or those against it[40].

The Nigerian military since the return of the country to democratic have been politicised and have become politically active. Besides, the Nigerian military have shown that it has been politicised in terms of their superimposed way of legitimatising their power over Nigerian and constituted civilian authorities and institutions in the country. The influence of the Nigerian military in politics especially in contention with civilian authority differs to a large extend from the role they use to play during the colonial era[41]. The Nigerian military may likely intervene in Nigerian political process, if the existing institutions and ruling elites lack the legitimacy to govern and when it discovers that staging a coup is going to be successful as we have seen in some African countries like Niger, Mali and Central African Republic in recent years. But direct military intervention can be avoided if Nigeria established a stable democratic culture. This is because authoritarian rule strive under a repressive environment which it has provided the desired platform for it intervention in many states in Africa in the past including Nigeria.

Though, the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, embarked on the demilitarisation of the military to ensure that the military was placed under civil authority in 1999 by sweeping purge of officers who have political tendencies or deemed political by virtue of their past political appointment or postings and contracting of the retraining of officers for professionalism in the US.-based Military Professional Resources Initiative (MPRI). But much was desired in achieving full demilitarisation of the military as envisioned in the Accra principle on demilitarisation[42]. The Accra principle on demilitarisation emphasis such transformational measures in civil-military relations, as submission to civilian authority of military institution anchored on the re-orientation of the entire military architecture. Besides, the Accra principle on

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[39] Ibid.

[40] https://ynaija.com/ynaija-editorial-politicization-nigerian-army-now-complete/

[41] Ibid 34.

[42] The Guardian Editorial 17 February 2015 "The Nigerian Military and Politics" www.guardian.ng>editorial>t...

demilitarisation further emphasises institutional reforms such as depoliticisation, distance from police missions and cross-cutting civil engagement which minimises military exclusivity and upgrading of military collateral roles and responsibilities to core professional tasks[43].

Also, the unpreparedness of the military to provide security for the movement of sensitive electoral material, protect staff of the Independent National Electoral Commission and to pre-empt situations that may degenerate into violence led to the postponement of the 2015 general elections from February 14 and 28 to March 28 and April 11 2015 general elections in Nigeria have also demonstrated the influence of the military in Nigeria's political process. This shows the level of influence the military has in the conduct of elections in Nigeria under current democratic dispensation.

Today, the politicisation of the Nigerian military has increased the ambition of some military officers such that after retiring from active service will venture into politics. Again, under current democratic dispensation the military is divided alone ethno-religious line such that the loyalty of most officers and men of the military is divided with many having their loyalty questioned or be in doubt. This was evident in their support for the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti state in which the military was used in the conduct of election and the outcome was what was popularly known as the "Ekiti gate"[44].

Again, the influence of the Nigerian army in the 2019 general elections especially in Rivers states further shows the influence of the military in the conduct of elections in Nigeria. This is because the military was used by the ruling party to intimidate the electorates which eventually led to wide voters' apathy in the state. It also shows that without the use of the military it may be if not impossible for the government to conduct peaceful elections. Moreover, the use of the military has engendered a debate among election stakeholders on whether it is the primary or statutory role of the military to provide security during elections and whether the aura of the impartiality as one of the institution of the state that unite the country is being eroded based on its past antecedents in electoral issues.

However, Justice Ibrahim Buba of the Federal High Court in Lagos, Nigeria gave a ruling on March 23, 2015 prohibiting the use of the Nigerian military in the conduct of elections in the country. Similarly, subsisting judgement of the Court of Appeal on February 15, 2015 held that the President has no power under the 1999 Constitution (As amended) to

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[43] Ibid: 43.

[44] Momoh, Z., *Development partners and Nigeria's electoral processes: An assessment of United Nations Development Programme Interventions (2010-2015) Frankfurt,* Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing 2017.

deploy the Nigerian military in the conduct of elections. Contrary, to these rulings the federal government under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari violated these rulings during the conduct of the 2019 general elections. Moreover, the position of the was perceived by the opposition parties especially the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) who warned the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Tukur Buratai from interfering in the 2019 general elections[45].

However, wide spread corruption has further worsen the politicisation of the Nigerian military as it has even infected the military. For instance, International Crisis Group in it 2016 report assert that:

> *"... Legislators often manipulate the appropriation process at the National Assembly to serve private business interests rather than benefit the armed forces. Dubious procurement practices, fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at the national security adviser's office, the defence ministry and armed services headquarters often mean funds are diverted to private or non-military purposes; arms, ammunition and other equipment are sometimes substandard and not always delivered. Inadequate funding, corrupt procurement and poor maintenance result in serious equipment and logistics deficits"[46].*

The implication of the above assertion is that there is sort of conspiracy between the top hierarchy of the Nigerian military and some legislative members in the National Assembly especially those in charge of the committee on defence to embezzle funds that are budgeted for the procurement of arms and ammunitions. This further explains why the Nigerian military's desires for political power have been increasing under current democratic dispensation and the urge to influence their annual budgets through illegitimate means is also on the increase.

The politicisation of the Nigerian military in the past has a negative consequence on current political process in Nigeria. This is because, Nigerians now live with the real or imagined fear that coup is a possible outcome of any political crisis that may emerged in the future. For instance, the former Security Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan, Col. Sambo Dasuki admitted that past administrations in Nigeria

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[45] Dirisu Yakubu "Don't politicise our military, PDP warns Buratai online Vanguard Newspaper accessed from www.vanguardngr.com February 20, 2019.

[46] International Crisis Group, Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform Crisis Group Africa Report N°237, 6 June 2016 p. i.

"wariness of the coup-prone army made them reluctant to upgrade its weaponry". Moreover, past years of strategic military under-funding came back to haunt the country when the Nigerian military fighting the Boko Haram complained that they were under-equipped to fight the insurgents[47].

In addition, another effect of the politicisation of the Nigerian military on democratic consolidation of the country has been witnessed during the first tenure of President Muhammadu Buhari. The current trend and tendencies of reversals to the era before the return of the country to democratic rule in which the military was over-politicised has become serious concern to many Nigerians. Today, the challenge facing the Nigerian military centred on how to ensure it subordination to civil authority; how to restore it corporate integrity that has been destroyed; how it cohesion and professionalism as well as achieving social legitimacy from Nigerians through cordial civil-military relationships, and ensuring that it retains its integrity.

It is important to note also that the post 2015 era of the involvement of the military in Nigeria's political process further shows how it has ascribed role to itself in the Nigerian electoral process especially when the Nigerian Defence Headquarters was exchanging words with former President Olusegun Obasanjo over the certificate saga of General Muhammadu Buhari[48]. Also, the appointment of military officers into key positions under President Buhari's administration (2015-2019) has further shown how the politicisation of the Nigerian military is haunting the country today. For instance, the Senator Victor Umeh representing Anambra-Central senatorial district[49] during the plenary entitled, "Urgent Need to Appoint a Representative of the South-East into the National Defence Council and National Security Council" alleged lop-sidedness in the appointment of service chiefs by president Muhammadu Buhari (2015-2019) contrary to section 153 (1) (g) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which states that the NDC shall comprise the president as the chairman, the vice-president as the chairman, the minister of defence, chief of defence staff, chief of army staff, chief of naval staff, chief of air staff and such other members as the president may appoint. While section 218 (2) empowered the president to appoint service and security chiefs. Section 217 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution states that the composition of the

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[47] BBC News "How fist coup still haunts Nigeria 50 years on" January 15, 2016. www.bbc.com>news>w...

[48] The Guardian Editorial 17 February 2015 "The Nigerian Military and Politics" www.guardian.ng>editorial>t...

[49] Senator Victor Umeh was elected under the platform of the All Progress Grand Alliance (APGA) into the Nigerian Senate.

armed forces must reflect the federal character of the country. The provision of this section, was emphasised by section 14 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. Under this section the NDC and the NSC were constitutionally empowered to advise the president on matters relating to the defence of the sovereign and territorial integrity of Nigeria, and on matters relating to public security as well as security agencies and organisations[50].

A critical assessment of the President Muhammadu Buhari's appointments into the National Defence Council and National Security Council (2015-2019) shows how the south-eastern states were excluded from membership of the National Defence Council and National Security Council rather his appointment were mainly from Nigerians mostly from the Northern parts of the country contravenes the federal character principle contained in Act No. 34 of 1996[51] and section 14 (3) of the 1999 constitution which states that the composition of the Government of Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote National unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or nay of its agencies[52].

Furthermore, the implication of this is that the appointment of Nigerians mostly from the north may not have better ideas about the security situation in the Southeast region. Secondly, it re-awakes mutual suspicion amongst Nigerians, thereby taking the country back to the 1966 era. Also, there is a mutual fear between Nigerians from the north and the southern part of the country which in turn have affected the political stability and the nation's quest for democratic consolidation of country especially after the 2015 general elections which have triggered the current agitation in the Southeast by Independent People of the Biafra (IPOB) and possible re-emergence of dormant groups like Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) amongst others which had taken up arms against the Nigerian state.

On the whole, the continuous politicisation of the Nigerian military will have damaging consequences on the democratic consolidation of the

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[50] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Lagos: Federal Government Press (As amended 2011).

[51] Baiyewu, L., "Buhari's alleged lopsided security appointments split southern, northern Senators" The Punch Newspaper October 24, 2o18. www.punchng.com

[52] Ibid: 51.

country as we have seen today. This has in turn affected the political and socio-economic relationships in Nigeria. It is pertinent to states that politicisation of the military may lead to further military intervention in Nigerian political process if the government of the day does not reverse this ugly trend.

Conclusion

From the above study, we discovered that the politicisation of the Nigerian military has had a negative impact on Nigeria's quest for democratic consolidation as it has further deepen mutual suspicion amongst Nigerian especially between Nigerians from the Northern and Southern parts of the country. Though, the foundation for this mutual suspicion was laid by the British government during the process of colonization which divided Nigerian nationalists' movement along ethnic and regional line. This division eventually lead to the first military coup of January 15, 1966. Since, then the seed of mutual suspicion have been sown among Nigerians especially between the Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly from the northern part of the country and the Ibo's who are predominantly from the south-eastern part of the country. Moreover, the politicisation of the Nigerian military was further deepened by General Ibrahim Babagida and General Sani Abacha regime. However, when the country returned to democratic rule on May 29, 1999 President Olusegun Obasanjo administration made considerable efforts at demilitarisation of the Nigerian military that arguably have yielded little or no result. But the deployment of the military in the conduct of elections in Nigeria under current fourth republic has open up a new phase in the politicisation of the Nigerian military. Moreover, under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration (2015-2019) the politicisation of the military was further worsened based on his appointments into the National Defence Council and National Security Council. This has reawakened mutual suspicion amongst Nigerians especially between Nigerians from the north and south-east part of the country.

Recommendations

Firstly, the Federal Government of Nigeria under current democratic dispensation should adhere to the principle of the federal character as enshrined in the 1999 constitution in all appointments, selections and promotions in order to ally mutual suspicion among Nigerians.

Secondly, the Federal Government of Nigeria under current democratic dispensation should embark on reforms that are targeted at demilitarising and depoliticised of the Nigerian populace as well as the officers and men of the military through rigorous civil education.

Thirdly, the Ministry of Defence should organise workshops and provide platforms for dialogue that will promote reforms that will strengthen civil-military relations.

Also, the Federal Government of Nigeria under current democratic dispensation should redirect and rearrange its budget priorities in a way that will reduce annual budget to the military so as to channel substance part of its budget to critical sector like education, health and other social services that will galvanise economic growth and development.

Moreover, the Federal Government of Nigeria should strengthen, through a stronger mandate and better resourcing, the capacity of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to investigate and report violations by military units and personnel.

Furthermore, the Federal Government of Nigeria in collaboration with other stakeholders in the defence industry should implement comprehensive defence sector reform that will involve the identification of security challenges; a new defence and security policy and structure to address them.

Lastly, the Federal Government of Nigeria under current democratic dispensation should reform the Nigerian military through various programmes that will give the military a reorientation on their constitutional defined roles under the current 1999 constitution (as amended 2011).

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ECONOMIC SECURITY, STATUS NAGOTIATION AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AS CORRELATES IN EXPLANING THE POLITICS OF CONVERSION TO ISLAM IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHEASTERN REGIONS OF NIGERIA

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Abstract: Nigeria is multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual in character and geographically divided in half by its two most dominant religions Islam and Christianity. Prior to the British conquest, the Northern part of the country had been under Islamic rule since 1804; the British colonial encounter stopped further push by Islamic forces beyond their original boundary. European contact and British rule brought Christianity to the Southern parts of the coutry. The relationship between the Moslems and Christians in the North has never been smooth, thus separation of Christian southerners from Northern Moslems was encouraged by the British colonial authorities and this gave rise to Sabon Gari meaning visitor's quarters. As colonialism unraveled, the regional leadership in the North, began to use economic empowerment, political appointments and other forms of privileges to lure non-Muslims in the region to convert to Islam. Many non-Moslems desirous of getting employment and surviving economically began to convert to Islam. In Southeastern Nigeria, where the Igbo speaking group is the dominant group, the Northern Igboland areas because of their proximity to the North as boundary zones, have had contact with Muslim traders from the North, and people there have been lured to convert to Islam. This subtle approach to conversion to Islam worked where there was no feasibility for a holy war-Jihad. The paper intends to examine the factors of economic security, status negotiation and political opportunity as correlates explaining conversion to Islam in Northern region and parts of Igboland Southeastern Nigeria.

Keywords: Economic, status, opportunity, conversion, Islam, Northern, Southeast, Nigeria.

Introduction

Events in Africa have been shaped significantly by forces external to the continent than ones within it. From ancient times for instance, North Africa had played host to series of external invaders who ruled and

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dominated that part of continent for centuries, planting their cultures, religions, traditions, science, art and politics etc in the region. With the passage of time, other parts of Africa began to witness external pressures from North Africa through the Sahara desert and the Europeans through the coastlines. These forces, especially the Europeans, orchestrated the Trans-Atlantic slave trade in the 15th century[1], which despoiled and denuded black Africa of its human resources, thus retarding its progress and growth. In the same vein, the two most dominant and pervasive religions in Africa today are of Middle Eastern origin-Christianity and Islam; both of which had their first contacts with North African societies with the later spreading through Arab and North African merchants via the Sahara desert to states of central Sudan and the forest belt. Interestingly, Christianity on its own, did not move beyond North Africa and the horn of Africa from the time it encountered societies there to other parts of Africa, Nubia and Kush are testimonies of the religion and its influence in the Horn[2], but it did not filter into Africa South of the Sahara not until the 14th and 15th centuries, through European merchants/traders, colonizers and missionaries.

Islam as a religion had its roots of origin in Arabia and through series of conquests, it over ran societies of Arabia and beyond. In an age where the sword, spears, and arrows determined the fate of many, those who had mastery and skills of warfare, ruled. The spread of Islam was not by conviction but by compulsion where there was no willingness to submit to Allah. That was how Muhammad and those who came after him, built an Arab empire couched in the religion of Islam. ''The strategic position of Egypt, lying close to Syria and al-Hijaz, and the richness of its soil which made the land the granary of Constantinople and a door to the rest of the North African corridor-cast the covetous Arab eyes towards it early''[3]. The fall of Egypt opened the road for the penetration of Islam in that region and by the time of the Umayyad Caliphate, (661-750 AD), which was imperial, dynastic and dominated by Arab military aristocracy, the fortunes of Islam bloomed in not only Arabia, but in Maghreb (North Africa), parts of Europe, central Asia and Indian sub-continent.[4]

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[1] For a detailed discussion on the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade and the African Diaspora, see Ofonagoro Walter Ibekwe, 'The African Presence in North America", *Tarik,* Vol. 20, (1980), 56-78.

[2] See Basil Davidson, *Africa in History*, (London: Paladin Books, 1884), 120-129.

[3] Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present*, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 160.

[4] John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, (Maryland Massachusetts, 1987), 61.

Islam was not only a religion, but also a way of life, and that accounted for the zest with which the founder pursued the ensconcing of the ethos of the religion in the political, social, cultural, philosophical, economic and administrative spheres of the societies it ruled. It embodied both the spiritual and political contents of life and created a culture in which the central command and control mechanism was Arabic. With the full conquest and consolidation of Arab Islamic rulership in North Africa and the Maghreb, the next phase of Islamic expansion in Africa took a southward movement. To understand and appreciate the fate of Islam in West Africa and the response of the people to it, it is germane to have a look at the geographical and historical environment the southward movement had to contend with. The region is a vast stretch from the Atlantic coast of Senegambia In the West to the Chad basin in the East and from the Guinea coast in the South to the shrub lands of the Sahel and Sahara in the North. This vast region is further divided into two geographical units; namely, the Savanna belt of the Sudan and the forest belt of the Guinea coast.[5] Activities in the Sudan belt are affected by the Sahara desert which is largely uninhabited by people because of its climate and vegetation and the general incondusive atmosphere in the area. The inhabitants of the Sudan were generally traders, herders/pastoralists, craftsmen, and engaged in long-distance trade across the Sahara and North Africa. The main people of the Sudan are the Serer, Tukulor, Fulbe, and Wolof of Senegambia, the Soninke, Bambara, and Malinke of the Niger axis, the Mossi, Gurma, Songhay of the Niger bend, the Hausa, Nupe, Kanuri, Jukun, etc of Northern Nigeria. The famed ancient Ghana Empire that flourished in the Sudan, was founded by the Soninke people, while the Malinke people founded old Mali Empire; the Berber group, Moors and Tuaregs, inhabited the Northern fringes of the Sudan.[6]

The Guinea zone of the Sudan has forest vegetation as a result of its closeness to the sea which makes it receive rain-bearing south-west winds.[7] In this area, the main groups that live here are the Temne, Mende and the Bassa of Sierra Leone and Liberia; the Baule of Ivory Coast, the Akan (Asante and Fante) of Ghana, the Youruba, Edo and Igbo of Southern

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[5] Ikenga R.A. Ozigboh, ''African Responses to Christianity and Islam: The Case of West Africa'', in I.T.K. Egonu, (ed.), *Readings in African Humanities: African Perspectives in World Cultures*, (Owerri: Vivians and Vivians Publishers, 1988), 357.

[6] Ikenga R.A. Ozigboh, ''Africa Response to Christianity and Islam: The Case of West Africa'', 358.

[7] Akin Mabogunje, ''The Land and Peoples of West Africa'', in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, (eds.), *History of West Africa, (London: Longman*, 1971), 1-30.

Nigeria. There are many other groups within the zone with distinct ethnic identity. Their main occupation are farming and fishing as well as coastal and inland trade. The European contact with the zone in the 15th century produced the trans-Atlantic slave trade which the inhabitants partook in.[8] Islam had penetrated the Sudan and into West Africa through the activities of the Islamized Sanhaja Berbers, who inhabited the Western Sahara. They acted as guides in the trans-Saharan trade between North Africa and the Sudan, and with time, these Muslim traders began to build settlements in the commercial centres as well as the termini of the trade routes. It has been posited by scholars that Islam had penetrated old Ghana before the 1076 Almoravid attack that sacked the empire. The ruler of Mali Mansa Musa (1312-1337 AD) was a Muslim and had undergone pilgrimage to the Holy land of Mecca with lots of fanfare. Even the successor state of Songhay had Islam as its religion and the ruler Muhammad Ture, set Islam on a glorious ride across Western and Central Sudan, and in the urban centres of the empire a circle of literate elite emerged leading to the flocking of foreign Islamic scholars, and the Sankore Mosque in Timbucktu, became a great centre of Islamic learning.[9] One major difference to be noted in the case of Islam in Western Sudan is that it was not spread by conquest neither was it spread by the Arabs; but by Berber merchants, and there was no movement of North African conquest until the Almoravids raids and incursions of the 11th century and the Moroccan invasion of Songhay in 1591. Neither of these incursions may be thought to have done much to help Islam.[10] Yet Islam spread gradually and persistently in the Sudan, west ward of Lake Chad. Kanem Bornu empire is another example of Islamic revivalism in the Sudan. Here it has been observed by scholars that some of the Umayyad supporters fleeing Abbasid vengeance took shelter in Kanem Bornu.[11] The rulers embraced Islam early and promoted Islamic scholarship. One of their greatest rulers, Mai Idris Alooma, was said to have traveled to Mecca on a pilgrimage in a grand style. The Lake Chad basin saw the influx of Islamic scholars and Ulama from diverse background from the 13th century. From the 18th to the 19th century, series of Sultanates began to emerge through holy war-Jihad in Western Sudan. Here the Dan Fodio Jihad in Hausaland overthrew the Habe ruling dynasty and enthroned a Fulani aristocratic Islamic Sultanate

[8] J.E. Inikori, (ed.), *Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies*, (London: Longman, 1982).

[9] Ikenga R.A. Ozigboh, ''Africa Response to Christianity and Islam: The Case of West Africa'', 362-363.

[10] Basil Davidson, *Africa in History*, (London: Paladin Books, 1984), 138.

[11] J.S. Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), 114-115.

in 1804. With this it became clear that Islam had come to stay and even become the guiding principle of state craft. The point raised earlier is important-that Islam did not spread in Western Sudan through Arab conquest or by the Arabs, it was through a gradual process of personal conviction and surrender rather than through conquest. It was only from late 17th century that wars of conquest were fought by indigenous Muslim preachers in an attempt to impose Islam on the people and create personal political dynasties like that of Uthman Dan Fodio in Sokoto,Nigeria.

The paper will now look at the rise of Islam in Nigeria, the forces that sparked off Islamic revivalism in Huasaland and how eventually an Islamicate was established. It will look at the factors that necessitated conversion to the new faith by non-Muslim indigenous groups, and how these factors were structured. It will take a step further to look at conversion to Islam among the forest belt group; here the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria will be placed in focus.

The emergence and rise of Islam in Northern Nigeria

The story of Islam in Nigeria is not unconnected with the general story of Islam in Western Sudan. The role and place of Moslem merchants is in perspective when the story of Islam is told in Nigeria. It has been observed that Muslim traders and missionaries from Mali brought Islam to Kano and katsina, which formed the core of Hausaland at the time, and these two Hausa states were the first recipients of the new religion.[12] These Soninke and Mande conveyors of the new religion, particularly their Dyula distance traders, carried Islam to Hausaland.[13] From kano and Katsina, Islam spread slowly to other parts of Hausa Bakwai-Gobir, Zazzau, Kano, Daura, and Garun Gabas.[14] The geographical position of Hausaland made it easy for the influx of people from diverse backgrounds thus, it was not difficult for migrant Islamic teachers to find shelter in Hausa states. The Hausa states recipients of Islam, were conscious of their mutual relationships, especially their common traditions of origin through the Bayajidda mythology, that made the Habe states a homogenous enclave.[15] In both Bornu and Hausaland, Islam for a very long time, remained the

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[12] C.C. Ifemesia, ''The States of Western Sudan'', in J.F.A Ajayi and I. Espie, (eds.), *A Thousand Years of West African History*, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1965), 74.

[13] P.B. Clark, *West Africa and Islam*, (London: University of London Press, 1982), 61.

[14] See M.G Smith, ''The Kano Chronicles as History'', in Bawuro M. Barkindo, (ed.), *Studies in the History of kano,* (Ibadan: Heinemann Books, 1983).

[15] Ikenga R.A. Ozigboh, *An Introduction to the Religion of Islam,* (Nsukka: Department of History, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 1988), 176.

religion of the elite, foreign traders, ruling class and urban dwellers, who patronized the religion side-by-side their traditional religions and gods. For many years after the reception of Islam many Habe notables and their followers were lukewarm to the tenets of Islam. It was this hypocritical attitude of the Habe rulers of Hausaland over the religion that drew the criticism and eventual onslaught of the Fulani warrior preacher Uthman Dan Fodio, as we shall see later.

With the growing population of the *Ulama* class, learning, teaching and preaching could be carried to the various communities in Hausaland by the itinerant scholars and preachers. Consequently the Muslim population continued to grow as many people began to accept Islam even if only nominally to start with. Islam was becoming associated with the masses with the consequence that by the end of the 18th century in Katsina, the majority of the population had identified themselves as Muslims.[16] Another disadvantage the numerous teaching and learning groups had was that it was not long before preachers who were vocal in their criticisms of the un-Islamic customs and practices of the elite and rulers, which had been unchallenged before. This exposure made the pious amongst the brotherhood see the existing un-Islamic practices as stagnation and retardation in the progress of Islam. The Habe rulers had continued to levy obnoxious taxation like the *Jangali* tax or the cattle tax, and other forms of taxes that went contrary to the teachings of Islam; they were also not practicing *Zakat* as enjoined by the prophet. The Muslims in Hausaland felt really frustrated. The conflict between old Hausa aristocracy and the underprivileged Muslim class soon came to a head in Gobir. The population of Fulani migrants into Hausa states had been on the increase since the 14th century, and this greatly enhanced Islamic learning.[17] The Fulani had spread from their original homeland in the Futa Jallon and Futa Toro of the Senegambia, to other parts of Western Sudan. As a group, they have been inclined to Islamic learning and scholarship and it was their presence in Hausaland that strengthened Islam. In 1786, Uthman Dan Fodio launched a religious campaign which he hoped would revive the faith of flagging Muslims and bring new converts into the fold. The king on Gobir feared that if it was not checked it would lead to a political revolution, and he quickly published decrees designed to curtail the reformers. Matters came to a head when Yunfa, the son of Nafata king of Gobir and former pupil of Uthman dan Fodio, came to the throne. The

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[16] S.A. Balogun, "History of Islam Up to 1800", in *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, (ed.), Obaro Ikime, (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria Limited, 1980), 222.

[17] H.A.S. Johnson, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 6.

final episode that set the Jihad rolling was when Uthman released some Fulani slaves whom Yunfa had kept for sale, most of them being Muslims; for Uthman, Muslims should not be enslaved according to the Koran which he was following. This effrontery made Yunfa to seek punishment for Uthman and the later escaped from Gobir to Gudu with his followers on 24 January, 1804. This flight became the Dan Fodio *Hijra,* flight from a pagan city marking the beginning of a Jihad. From Gudu, a Jihad was declared against Gobir by Dan Fodio and his followers.[18]

The Jihad was a call for Fulani uprising as the Cattle Fulani, enraged and embittered by the *Jangali* tax on their cattle were the bulwark of the Jihad as well as the town Fulani who were scattered all over Hausaland easily identified with the struggle to wrestle power from the Hausa habe rulers and nobility. The Qadiriyya brotherhood that Dan Fodio presided over, with their chains of communities all over Hausaland, did the mobilization and their fellow Fulani members, rallied behind the banner. Looking at the nature of the Jihad and what came after it, one could readily see political opportunism, economic greed and status uplifting for a particular group. Mainly all the flag bearers of the Jihad were Fulani, and Dan Fodio's close associates. Between 1804 and 1809, the entire Hausaland was thrown into strife and bloodletting culminating in the overthrow of the old order and the enthronement of Fulani hegemony over the Hausa majority. This development had religious, political, social, economic, educational, linguistic and legal consequences for not only Hausaland, but also for Nigeria.[19] In 1804 the Jihad began, Zamfara fell to the Jihadists, Zaria in 1805, Katsina in 1807, Daura and Gobir in 1808 and Kano in 1809. The Fulani leaders of the Jihad whom Dan Fodio gave the flag, and who executed the Jihad in their respective areas, became emirs and the new lord over the conquered people. Emirates emerged to displace the Habe statusquo and Uthman Dan Fodio became the Caliph, and Sokoto built by him in 1809 became the Caliphate seat of government from where the surrounding emirates took order.

Not all the groups in Hausaland were conquered and converted to Islam. This became a challenge to the new administration in Hausaland. There continued to be resistance and skirmishes between the forces of the Caliph and recalcitrant tribes in the North East of Hausaland and North Central. What really underscored the Uthman Dan Fodio's Jihad as an ethnic movement with more political and economic ambition than

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[18] A.E. Afigbo, ''West Africa'', in *Essays in African History 19th and 20th Centuries,* (ed.), J.C. Anene, (Ibadan: Onibonoje Publishers, 1977), 66-67.

[19] D.M. Last, 'Reforms in West Africa: The Jihad Movements of the 19th century'', in J.F.A. Ajayi, and Michael Crowder, (eds.), *History of West Africa*, Vol. II, (London: Longman, 1972), 1-27.

religious was the repeated attacks launched against Bornu, already an Islamic state under the Shehus before Uthman's Jihad. The claims that they wanted to purify Islam in Kanem Bornu, looked misleading. How could they levy war against a fellow Muslim state and one long established before the arrival of Uthman Dan Fodio? This exemplifies the under currents behind the Jihad as a Fulani motivated violence to conquer and take control of their host and their lands. The Fulani expansion and wars were halted by Bornu to the East, and finally by the British colonizers who before 1900, had showed up in Hausaland, subjugating the Sultanate and its Emirates and deposing and installing new ones malleable and subservient to their wishes. Thus, conversion which had begun during the wars of conquest and consolidation, continued during British colonial rule and after. We now examine the patterns of conversion in the North and how it looked like as well as in non-Moslem areas of the Southeast, beyond the pale of Islam.

Understanding the nature and patterns of conversion to Islam in the North

The Jihad in Hausaland was a little less than a century before the arrival of the British, and expeditions to put down uprisings and to punish recalcitrant tribes who had not given up on their pagan religion were still on. The British dismantled the over-bearing powers of the Caliph and subjugated the aristocracy created by the Jihad under British authority. One fact that must be expressed regarding Nigeria is that there are over 450 different ethnic groups and languages in Nigeria, and many of these groups are found in Northern Nigeria. This also made it difficult for the entire North to come under the full control of the Jihadist Islamic forces of Uthman Dan Fodio and those who came after him. The larger feeling till today amongst the Fulani remains that the British stopped their conquest of Nigeria as a whole. After the Jihad, it was compulsory for non-Muslims in all the conquered territories that turned into emirates, to convert to the new faith. Conversion attracted favours and prevented persecution and limitation in the social circles of the society; for non-Muslims they were tagged *karfirs, Nyamiri*, like infidels and not permitted to enjoy privileges reserved for Muslims. Though there had been informal missionary expeditions to the North from the time of the Niger Expeditions of 1841 and 1854, which went up to Nupe and the Niger axis, Lokoja and Nasarawa. But down the century, Christian missionary activities to the upper North was not easy like in kano, where the missionary team of Bishop Tugwell was ordered to leave within three days by the Emir for

having failed to inform him that they were coming.[20] The British colonizers saw the sensitivity of the religious situation there and decided to aid them in sustaining their faith and preserving their culture against any intruding one from other Nigerians. It has been observed that within the colonial social strata, Islamic political structures dominated the colonial hierarchy as Muslims were accorded better social status and political roles.[21] This was a deliberate colonial policy to ensure that the entrenched political and social order of the Fulani, in place before the arrival of the British there was maintained so that they the British would continue to enjoy their loyalty.

The first mechanism used in achieving this was that the British prevented Christian Missionaries from proselytizing in the North and from converting people to Christianity. The administration required any Christian Missionary coming into the Northern areas, to secure permission from the Emir, and in a mater solely concerned with religion, the government does not feel justified in compelling a Muslim ruler to accede, but for the government intervention, he would refuse.[22] The British policy helped in preserving the Muslim North in its Islamic 'purity' by discouraging the penetration of Christian missionaries and limiting western education and not allowing northern leaders representation by themselves in the central Nigerian legislative Council during the periods 1923-1947. The policy also minimized contacts between the northern peoples and their more sophisticated southerners temporarily resident in the north. All these aspects of British policy in Northern Nigeriq, tended to perpetuate the individuality and separateness of the North.[23] The idea of seclusion was encouraged by the British to support the Muslims in their bid to keep away non-Muslims from within them. The *Sabon Gari* quarters thus developed at the margins of each Northern emirate for the settlement of non-Muslims and foreigners from other parts of Nigeria.[24] The practice of discouraging Christian Missionaries also continued not until much later that their activities were tolerated in some areas, not within the Caliphate.

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[20] G.T.O., Gbadamosi and J.F. Ade Ajayi, ''Islam and Christianity in Nigeria'', in *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, (ed.), Obaro Ikime, (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd, 1980), 350-351.

[21] M.S. Abdulkadir, ''Islam in the Non-Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria'', *Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJOURELS)*, Vol. No. 1, (2011), 12.

[22] Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, (London: Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 1976), 358.

[23] J.S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 322.

[24] G.O. Olusanya, 'The Sabon Gari System in the Northern States of Nigeria'', *Nigeria Magazine*, No. 94, (Sept. 19670, 242-244.

In the course of time, after the 1946 Constitution introduced regionalism in Nigeria and created regional government structures where powers devolved to the regions in specified areas, regional parliament was created in the three regions of Nigeria, the Northern region, the Western region and the Eastern region. The Northern regional Premier quickly introduced a policy aimed at achieving conversion from the rear. This policy was called Northernization policy of the 1950s and 1960s.[25] The policy targeted the Southerners resident in the North who were Christians, to remove them from the public services of the region and to ensure that they were not economically viable as to threaten the political class of the ruling Northern Peoples' Congress. On the face value, an unsuspecting person would think that the policy was actually what it was called- to remove Southern Nigerians (mainly Christians) from the public service of the region, but it was indeed much more than that. It was a springboard for the conversion agenda of the Premier of the region- Alhaji Ahmadu Bello. The policy was designed to deliberately marginalize, isolate and dehumanize Southern non-Muslims in the region while also eliminating their presence in the public services of the North on the one hand and on the other, to create fear within the ranks of non-Muslims in there, and lure as many as are not resolute, to convert to Islam. Even non-Muslim Northerners were not given juicy employment in the regional government, and where there was a job vacancy or offer and the choice for the job was between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, the former was taken regardless of whether he or she qualified for the job or not. No land allocations or loans for agriculture were available for such persons; same went for non-party members (here Northern Peoples' Congress).

The Fulani claim superiority over all other groups as the putative custodian of the Islamic religion and spirituality in Nigeria. They espouse suspicion in any relationship between a Muslim and a non-Muslim and try as much as possible not to come too close to the later; even their religious leaders enjoined the body of the faithful to loath *Karfirs* or infidels and never allow them rule over them. Conversion from Islam to Christianity was barred on the pain of death but conversion to Islam was a glorious thing in the sight of Allah. The minority ethnic groups in the region felt alienated by the activities of the proselytes of the new political and religious order that had narrowed their chances and possibilities of upward mobility in the governmental and public sectors of the region. The major tool of the conversion campaign in the North during the colonial

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[25] Olawale Albert, ''Federalism, Inter-Ethnic Conflicts and the Northernization Policy of the 1950s and 1960s'', in *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*, (eds.), Kunle Amuwo, Adigun Agbaje, Rotimi Suberu, and Georges Herault, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2000), 50-63.

period and after independence in 1960 was economic. The ruling party had the resources and the leader of the party and Premier of the region, had singled himself out as a champion of Islam and this had brought accolades for him from Muslim leaders in North Africa, Middle East and Pakistan. He travelled extensively and received titles from these Muslin countries as well as money for the deepening and propagation of Islam in Nigeria.[26] With huge sums of money in USD, flowing from the Arab world, the Sardauna, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, began to lure the minority non-Muslims in the Middle Belt and other parts of the north who were not Muslims to embrace Islam and receive economic benefits; thus the compelling force in conversion was money-economic opportunity and privileges.[27]

With the money received from the Islamic world for the propagation of Ismal in Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello furnelled huge sums into his religious conversion project, so those who converted were given money, juicy political portfolios as well as contracts in the regional government. The minorities in the Middle Belt who could not be conquered during the Islamic revolution of Uthman Dan Fodio were the main target of the conversion campaign. The conversion project looked for leading political and community leaders whom they lured first into the Northern Peoples' Congress the ruling political party of the region. One of the leading figures in Jaba area of the Middle Belt, who was a Christian before his conversion and promotion to the new title of *Wakilin Jaba*, a title alien to his people, spoke openly of the benefits of converting to Islam. He said that he declared for the ruling party the Northern Peoples' Congress in the name of Allah and this raised his dignity and those of his people.[28] For the periods the Premier would travel across the region for his conversion campaigns, all the expense would be drawn from the coffers of the regional government in cash and in materials as the new converts were also given textile clothes from the regions textile factories.[29] Many people from the minority areas in the region, originally non-Muslims, became endangered by this policy and began to join the ruling party for fear of balkanization while others with little faith, embraced Islam to be able to earn a living by gaining employment in the civil service, get recruited into the military, police and other security agencies of the region. It was a smear campaign sort of, full of blackmail and vendetta; and this caused a whole lot of disaffection between groups in the region. For example, between 1954 and

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[26] Matthew Hassan Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1993), 21.

[27] See Murray Last ''Some Economic Aspects of Conversion to Islam in Hausaland'', in N. Levitzion, (ed.), *Conversion to Islam*, (New York, 1979)

[28] Northern House of Assembly Debates, 9th March, (1963).

[29] See *Nigerian Citizen*, 27 March, 1965.

1958, a total of 2, 148 Southerners were dismissed from the Northern Public service[30], they were asked to seek employment in the South where they belong. The leader of the NPC and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello, did not hide his intentions he said that Northernization policy was intended to make ''Northerners gain control of everything in this country''.[31] Northernization was simply a mere euphemism for conversion campaign, and it was not long before this became obvious.

One other aspect of the conversion to Islam in the region pertained to the issue of one's status in the society. Islam does not recognize the superiority of other faiths over it. For the Muslims, non-Muslims are forbidden from ruling them. This was the scenario that seriously vitiated the worth and personality of a non-Muslim in the region during the critical periods before and immediately after Nigeria's independence. In political functions, they take precedence over others, in social gatherings, they would be recognized before others and prayers were said using the Koran and in Arabic. There was limitation to places non-Muslims could enter and non-Muslim marrying a Muslim was a *Haram* (sin), and so forbidden. The social exclusion created by the Premier, Ahmadu Bello, pushed many people into taking the course of conversion to shore up their identity and improve their social contacts and visibility. The Premier, to humiliate non-Muslims and their chiefs in public gatherings, would refuse to shake hands with them.[32] The Tiv were discriminated against and almost persecuted by the Fulani ruling oligarchy in the region because they put up stiff resistance to attempts at conquest and Islamisation, and resented the campaigns of conversion as a result of its negative backlash on communal relations in the region.[33] To frustrate them the more, the ruling Northern Peoples' Congress, made sure that non-Tiv were appointed as District Heads in some cases, loyalists of the party were appointed to carry out the biddings of the Premier of the region. They frustrated the Tiv people because of their opposition to the Fulani oligarchy government in the region and their rejection of Islamic push in Central Nigeria. In response to the Tiv resistance, the ruling party on trump up allegations, would close markets and use the Native Authority police to harass the natives, thereby causing severe economic strain on the people.[34] In Kogi area where Igala, Okene and other groups are found, the rate of conversion from the early

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[30] See *The Daily Service*, (August, 5, 1958).

[31] HNC Debates, 1928, Col. 36.

[32] Mattew Hassan Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, 23.

[33] Justine Tseayo, *Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the Tiv*, (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1975), 157.

[34] Anifowose, Remi, *Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience,* (New York: Nok Publishers International, 1982), 142.

1950s and 1960s was high as a result of the discrimination in the social and political spheres of the region. Many converted and joined the ruling party to be able to secure jobs and appointments in the regional government dominated by the ruling Fulani and Hausa elites. That is why today among the tribes in Central Nigeria, the Igala, Igbirra and Okene groups constitute the largest Muslim population in that zone. The converts used that medium to negotiate status vis-a-vis their relationship with Hausa/Fulani ruling oligarchy. Looking at the picture of the North during and after independence and the roles of the local leadership championed by the Fulani aristocrats, one can argue that for them, religious conversion was an expression of political loyalty and a path to social advancement for the converts in the emerging political space. Conversion has continued in a more brazen and dehumanizing manners today on parts of Northern Nigeria. The Boko Haram terrorist group, whose activities are anti western and who condemn everything emanating from Western education, as *Haram* (sin), have continued to wage war against Christians in Northeast of Nigeria. Initially in 2008 when the group emerged with its anti-Christian and anti-Western rhetoric, the elites of the region saw it as a platform for political struggle with the rest of Nigeria. Now it has become a monster ravaging the entire Northeastern landscape of Nigeria. They have attacked and destroyed many churches, schools, markets, health centres and have turned to kidnapping of school children from Christian areas and forcefully converting them to Islam before they are released from captivity. The group has continued to wage a holy war against the Nigerian state since 2012.

Conversion from Christianity to Islam in the Northern region of Nigeria has not been wholly voluntary. As we noted here, the regional government under the Premier Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, as a scion of the Fulani oligarchy, took it as an official business and used state power to advance his Islamization agenda. The feeling of the Fulani elite regarding the state of Islam in the region has been one that recognized the need for the forces of Islam to overrun not only the entire North, but the whole Nigeria. Even after the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, the Muslim leaders there have not ceased to make open threats to the Christians who live in their midst. This accounts for recurrent religious riots in that region unleashed by Muslims against Christians. Abductions of Christian under-aged girls and forcefully converting them to Islam before marrying them, is one of the abuses going on there. In an incident, one Easter Ororu, from Delta state, South-South Nigeria, a Christian, was kidnapped from her home in the South and taken to Kano state in the North by a man the age of her father. She was kept in solitary confinement where her abductor abused her sexually till she became pregnant before she could be found.

That case triggered sharp criticism from Christians and the human rights community in Nigeria, unfortunately the culprit was not punished to the tune of the offence he committed. Using all sorts of means, economic, political and material, the Muslim leaders and their political backers have continued to lure non-Muslims to convert to Islam. The terrorist group Boko Haram, made waves on 14 April 2014, when they stormed a secondary school in Borno Northeast of Nigeria, and abducted 276 school girls mainly Christians. The abduction shocked the world as these little school mostly Christian girls were converted to Islam forcefully and married off as sex slaves to Jihadi fighters. Ever since that date, more than half of them still remain in captivity. In February 19, 2018, over a hundred and ten Dapchi school girls were abducted from their school in Yobe state Northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram terrorists. The girls in March were released except one Leah Sharibu, who refused to convert to Islam. The 15 year old is still with her captors till date.[35] Forceful conversion has become a tool for Islamic terrorists in Nigeria, and the government has been incapable of fighting them to stand-still. It is evident from the colonial through to the post-colonial periods that if there were willful conversions to Islam by non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria, it was highly minimal. Conversion had been earned through the use of intimidation, economic and political tools and those who converted did so as a result of their peculiar stations in life and the attendant economic, social and political benefits they derived from the process.

4. Understanding the motivating factors for conversion to Islam in Southeastern part of Nigeria

Southeastern Nigeria is a distinct area in Nigeria, in terms of culture, religion history and geography. The area did not come under any form of external political authority from the earliest times till colonial rule. It was only the British that conquered the group and incorporated them into what we have today as Nigeria. They were largely traditionalists not until the colonial period when Christian Missionaries encountered them and made progress with them in their everyday lives in the new faith. The group bordering them as neighbours to the north is not strictly full Muslim society, notwithstanding that Muslims are found in them. The Igbo have been largely egalitarian as a people and never existed under any form of centralized political system, but rather operated the village assembly where every ones opinion and voice counted. Of all the Nigeria groups, the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria are the most adaptable to situations and are found across the length and breadth of Nigeria, where they settle and carry

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[35] www.bbc.com/news/world.africa, accessed March 25, 2019.

on their vocations. Their resistance to British colonial rule made the British resent them and did not encourage their lead in Nigeria, unlike what they did to the Fulani group in the North. After the Independence of Nigeria, the Igbo fought a secessionist war that lasted for thirty months with the rest of Nigeria, the war ended in 1970, with the Igbo wounded, killed, battered and impoverished. It was after the war that many things out of ordinary began to happen in Igboland. The story of conversion to Islam is not too far a phenomenon in the mainly Northern Igbo areas, and came as a result of the fact that the area in question is a border zone connecting the Igbo and groups in central Nigeria. Few personages in Nsukka area of Northern Igboland and Afikpo areas had converted to Islam during the colonial period, and probably were instrumental in luring their kinsmen into the new faith. Be that as it may, the number when placed against the other faiths in the area is on the minimal scale.

Certain factors would need to be considered regarding the Northern Igbo communities as necessitating the choices people over there made and have continued to make. The geographical location of Northern Igboland, places that area as a sort of buffer zone between mainland Igbo and groups in central Nigeria. As a far-off area with rugged terrain, Christianity did not penetrate the area simultaneously as it did in other Igbo communities towards the sea and inland. Thus, the area has over the ages been exposed to interaction with diverse non-Igbo groups connected to Central Nigeria. The area has had people from diverse backgrounds settle amongst them especially traders dealing on palm oil, palm cannel, bread fruits, shear butter and other traditional articles of trade. The exact time at which the first covert to Islam from that area, converted to Islam may not be certain. It has been observed that early in the 1940s or thereabout, that a few persons from that Enugu-Ezike, Orba, and Obollo Afor areas may have converted to Islam. The early converts did so in their own volition and may have genuinely converted to Islam. Thus genuine spiritual quest and conviction that Islam is the appropriate way to God and the desire to integrate within the established Muslim financial and political networks[36]could further explain conversion. The main challenge the Igbo generally faced that changed a whole lot of things about them was the Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967-1970. It was the defeat in that war that exposed the weaknesses of the Igbo. During the war, Northern Igboland was occupied by enemy forces, there were forceful marriages by the Muslim soldiers, who converted these women and carried them back to the North. This constituted another angle of conversion. The Igbo were emasculated

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[36] Egodi Uchendu, 'Being Igbo and Muslim: The Igbo of South-eastern Nigeria and Conversions to Islam 1930s to Recent Times'', *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 51, No. 1, (2010), 67.

by the loss of all they had labored to acquire and in the aftermath of that war, no matter what amount of money any Igbo person had, weather the Nigerian currency or the Biafra currency, the victorious federal government paid only £20. Thus the hardship faced by the Igbo after the war, may have impelled some ambitious elements to convert to Islam for the material benefits and opportunities, not for genuine quest for higher spirituality. As noted earlier, the proportion of Igbo Muslims is certainly on the negligible scale, though some scholars have posited certain figures as at 1990, they argued, Igboland had a population of Muslims in the reach of ten thousand.[37] This assertion is very doubtful and needs to be further investigated. The Northern Igbo converts benefitted in many ways, their children were given scholarships to study up to university level. Most converts enjoyed economic benefits through contract awards too.

The truth about Islam in Igboland is that it is not Islam from the heart. The Muslims in the area drink alcohol, practice their traditions and do things that are un-Islamic. Conversion for those who did, was for economic, social, and political benefits and not indeed for true spirituality and piety. Most converts had economic challenges from the encounters with them[38] and this compelled them to embrace Islam as the only way they could achieve their desired financial and economic ends. For the small group of converts in Nsukka area financial support continues to flow from patrons of Islam in the North. In the 1980s, in Izombe Imo State, a certain Eze Nwauwa of Izombe started luring the gullible members of his community into converting to Islam. He built the first mosque in Izombe and set out on a radical Islamic conversion drive that became violent. He was known to have far-reaching contacts with Muslims and the clerics in the North who bank-rolled his mission in his community. Izombe went up in flames as a result of clashes between his supporters and those resisting the violence that had been unleashed upon them. The Izombe episode was the first of its kind in Igboland and signaled an impending Jihad by an overzealous convert to justify the material and financial support he received from outside. That movement was crushed by the people of Izombe and the violence seized.[39] There seem not to be any voluntary conversion to Islam without material and economic undertone to it. In the areas that the Hausa communities are located across Igbland, Nsukka, Afikpo and Abakaliki areas, Awka, Orba and Onitsha areas in Anambra

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[37] Akoshile M., and Umunna I. ''Igbo Muslim'', Their Trials and Triumphs, in Citizen, No. 4, (1993), 10-19.

[38] Ngwu Odinaka, (Now Ahmed Ngwu) trader, age 62, interviewed at Enugu Ezike on 22 March 2017.

[39] Izuchukwu Uzondu, *65 years, from Izombe,* trader, interviewed at No. 35 Douglas Road Owerri Imo state on February 17, 2019.

state, Lokpanta and Okigwe areas of Abia and Imo state, Owerri and Aba, Muslim traders have been known to interact with poor and indigent members of the communities, and in most cases marry those who fall prey to their antics. It is a bit pervasive in Lokpanta area and these girls usually come from poor and illiterate background.[40] Poverty and the need for material and economic survival are the deciding factors that occasion inter-ethnic marriage between Igbo girls and Hausa settlers in the area. Recently in 2016, some Igbo converts to Islam were given millions of naira by some politicians in the North, who see that as an encouragement for the spread of Islam in the densely Christian area of Igboland. By and large, conversion to Islam in Igboland has been a pretentious exercise designed to deceive the on-looker; the cardinal force behind it is the attendant material and economic benefits. Considering the level and impact of Christianity in the Southeast and the level of development the area has withnessed since the end of colonial rule, not even minding the set back of the Nigerian Civil War on the region, Islam does not have any real prospect of flourishing in the area. Few people have managed to convert to islam, but the number is insignifican Essentailly what one finds in the area are camouflage not real Muslims, who converted to Islam and use it as a tool for survival in their businesses and daily broader social interactions beyond the veil of Igboland.

Conclusion

Islam as a religion is mainly associated with people from the Northern region of Nigeria and some southern Yoruba people, who as a result of their proximity to the North were exposed early in time to the religion of Islam; that notwithstanding, the majority of Yoruba people profess Christianity and traditional religion as their religion. The author noted that the spread of Islam to the minorities in the Northern region occurred through subtle but deliberate denial of opportunities in the society since conquest could not bring these groups into the fold. In the same vein the Northernization project of the Northern Regional government was used as a medium to frustrate and put fear into the minorities in the region who were originally not Muslims, thereby making them to convert to Islam. Over time, through subtle approaches and frustrating dispositions of the political leadership there, many among the groups there became Muslims. Notwithsatanding the coercive approach, large populations in the area remained defiant and have continued to resist Islam in the region especially in Central Nigeria. In Igboland Southeast of Nigeria, Islam has never been the acceptable religion since the earliest times. Amidst the

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[40] Ndubisi Okiche, 58, cattle dealer, interviewed at Okigwe Imo state, on 26 March, 2019.

group, fortune seekers and opportunists, who intent on surviving at all cost, have submitted to the faith to avert poverty and deprivation. The findings revealed that those who claim to be Muslims are not true Muslims and that material and economic deprivations have been the persuading force in their conversion to Islam. Rarely would one find a devout Muslim amongst the people of the Southeast. The concentration of Muslims are found mainly in the Northern Igbo communities in Nsukka and Afikpo areas; in all other places, converts are few and with a purpose-to ake out a living from the patrons of the faith in the North and beyond. It has been established that what propels conversion to Islam for those who did, was the challenges of life and the need to survive economically and materially. A crude sense of opportunism has shaped the attitude of the converts in the area. These converts are psudo-Muslims as they do not practice in full the tenets of the religion and people know this. By and large, the prospects of Islam seem not to have chance in the region notwithstanding the level of deprivation and hunger for materialism afflicting the society here. Islam from all intents and purposes does not make any attraction for millions of the inhabitants; rather only the desperate few have converted to Islam. The society has been conscious of the development in the islmic world and that is also contributing to the near zero tolerance for conversion in many parts of Igboland.

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THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY APPROACH IN CITIES: AN EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL MEASURES IN BRUSSELS

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Abstract: As they are facing multiple economic, environemental and social challenges, European cities tend to embrace the much-debated circular economy model, due to its holistic and systemic approach. Belgium has already integrated circular principles in its governmental plans and continues the transition to a circular economy in its production and consumption chains. This paper analyzes the case of Brussels as a future circular city, with special focus on the programmes already implemented at a municipal level and their evolution in the last years.

Keywords: circular economy, Brussels, circular city, circular construction, value chain, economic model.

Introduction

The Brussels-Capital Region has a dense and dynamic population, with a local productive economy in which public and service sectors are the most active ones[1]. However, there are a couple of problems that impede the sustainable development of the Belgian capital. Brussels' economy also depends on imports of raw materials and products, consumption levels get higher and higher, the impact of various industries on the environment is significant, unemployment rates are quite high and waste is not 100% recovered. All these issues, among others, call for smart action and measures in order to address them in an efficient manner. Circular economy is one possible solution to Brussels' economic and environmental problems. This new economic model would promote local production, create new jobs, optimize the use of regional resources, avoid imports and transportation of products, improve the air quality, encourage responsible consumption, recover waste from all sectors and mitigate the impact on the environment.

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[1] Zeller, Vanessa et al., 2018, *Integration of Waste supply and Use Data into Regional Footprints: Case Study on the Generation and Use of Waste from Consumption and Production Activities in Brussels.* Copenhagen, Procedia CIRP volume 69, p. 101.

Background

The circular food value chain has already started to take shape in Brussels, with a couple of measures already implemented in the system. One example is the Good Food Strategy adopted in 2015 by the Government of Brussels and aims at creating a more sustainable food system with less food waste and negative externalities, more local production and higher quality products[2]. The food chain is an important part of the transition to the circular economy, as food waste is a big burden for the society, while it could be better managed in order to be recovered and turned into energy or fertilizers. The Good Food strategy includes several goals to be attained by 2035, for instance to produce 30% of Brussels' fruits and vegetables at a local level, at the same time creating new job opportunities[3]. Thus, both local farmers and local production would benefit from this strategy, contributing at the same time at the creation of a more circular and sustainable agricultural system. Other targets are set to be met by 2020, for example food waste is planned to be reduced by 30%, unsold food will be collected and recovered, while access to products will be facilitated[4]. New jobs could result from the collection and recovery of food waste and unsold food.

Circular Economy Programmes

In 2016, the Belgian government adopted the Regional Programme for a Circular Economy in the Brussels-Capital Region for the 2016-2020 period. BE Circular focuses on innovation and valorization of local resources. The programme won the Regional Innovation Award in 2016 and the Eurocities Innovation Award in 2017[5].

The Regional Programme proposed by the government has three main goals and comprises 111 measures that reached a budget of €12,839,500 in 2016[6]. The aim is to link economic development to environmental ambitions, create job opportunities and promote local production[7].

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[2] Eco-innovation Observatory and EU Commission, 2017, *Eco-innovation in Belgium, EIO Country Profile 2016-2017*, p. 26.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ellen MacArthur Foundation, *Case study- Brussels:Regional Programme for a Circular Economy. Circular economy in cities*, 2019, p. 1.

[6] Bruxelles Environnement, *Regional Programme for a Circular Economy 2016-2020. Mobilizing resources and minimizing the treasures lost: for a innovative regional economy*. Brussels, 2016, p. 3.

[7] Ibid.

Be Circular plans to address challenges in several industries, such as the construction and building sectors, retail, food, logistics, waste and resources[8].

A brief description of the programme's measures is presented in Table 1[9].

Measure	Description
Create a platform which tackles technical and administrative barriers	The platform would identify the factors that are favorable for the circular economy transition and would propose solutions for issues that may be encountered in this process.
Launch a call for proposals worth €1 million	The call for projects is directed to circular economy in companies, focusing on new circular economic models and reuse of materials.
Set up a circular economy fund	The fund would finance companies which implement circular economy models and principles in their businesses. In 2016, the fund had a €500,000 value.
Create a platform for the coordination of support in circular economy projects	The platform would optimize an effective and systematic support for circular projects.
Associate new economic models	The new circular economy models should be associated with social economy models.
Initiate research projects	Support would be offered to innovative projects in the field of circular economy and to collaborative research projects.
Focus on ecological contractual clauses	Ecological and ethical clauses would be included in the public contracts.
Perform studies on the professions created by the circular economy	These studies will assess the new jobs generated by circular economy and the skills that will be needed in the future.
Organize contests between schools and universities	These contests will give the opportunity for the development of new circular economy ideas in the design industry. Winners will be awarded scholarships and support for the execution of their projects.
Create circularity in the construction	Special attention will be given to the life

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sector	cycle extension of buildings through renovations and maintenance, as well as to the smart use of ressources, for example reusing construction materials.
Elaborate a plan for reuse and repair activities	Focus on activities such as the reuse of textiles, waste resulted from household appliances, electronic equipment and construction.
Launch 50 innovative projects which apply circular economy principles on small businesses and big brands	Such businesses would deal with: bulk products, shops which sell products without packaging, waste reduction, upcyling of used materials, short chain production and reuse.
Set up 10 development centres as part of the territorial approach	These centres will facilitate the performance of integrated activities in neighbourhoods.
Organize a steering committee for a better cooperation between institutions	The commitee will be in charge of monitoring the governmental programme, making sure that information is transmitted efficiently, and will plan the evalution of the progress after 18 months.

Evolution

The programme proved to have positive outcomes at a social and economic level up to present. Financing is an integral part of the Be Circular programme.

Figures show that around 139 projects received €8.3 million in funding, several partnerships were created between the public and private sector, support and training was given to circular economy initiatives of more than 220 enterprises and around 1.400 people were educated in this field[10].

A number of academic, training and policy instruments were implemented as part of Be Circular. Modull and Bric are two tools for the training of professionals and workers in the circular construction and building[11]. The construction sector can become circular only through combining technical measures with educational ones. The Free University of Brussels set up a Chair of Circular Economy and Urban Metabolism which aims at fostering collaboration between academics, specialists and public authorities who should work together for the common goal of

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[10] Ellen MacArthur Foundation, *Case study- Brussels:Regional Programme for a Circular Economy. Circular economy in cities*, 2019, p. 1.
[11] http://www.circulareconomy.brussels/category/secteurs/construction-durable/, accessed 5 May, 2019.

reaching a circular metabolism[12]. Different fields will be engaged, as interdisciplinarity is a core concept of the circular economy paradigm. Workshops are organized under the Circular Regulation Deal with the participation of private and public economic stakeholders who assess the barriers to a successful circular economy and propose solutions[13].

A progress report was published in 2018, assessing the evolution of the government's programme and the impact indicators 18 months after its launching. The interim report for the PREC programme shows that the average rate of the measures' implementation is 45%[14]. Figure 1 shows the number of companies per sector that were offered support in their circular economy projects in 2016-2017.


222 companies supported in 2016 - 2017

109 — Construction
33 — Food
24 — Textiles
21 — 3R
11 — Services
10 — Energy
7 — Logistics
3 — Design
1 — Environment
1 — Water
1 — Teaching
1 — Cosmetics

Fig.1: Companies and sectors supported in their circular economy projects[15]

Out of the planned 111 measures, only 14 were not initiated at the time of the evaluation, more than 20% of the measures were 100% implemented, while many of them are recurring[16]. The assessment found that 49 new collaborations were created during the period mentioned[17]. A circular economy barometer performed between May and July 2017 among companies which are already interested in circular economy in Brussels shows that 87% of them believe that circular economy is an opportunity for the future, 89% of them have already implemented a circular economy action, while 50% of them claim that they were not able

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[12] www.circularmetabolism.com, accessed 5 May, 2019.

[13] Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2019, *Case study- Brussels:Regional Programme for a Circular Economy. Circular economy in cities*, p. 3.

[14] Bruxelles Environnement et al., 2018*, Regional programme for circular economy: Mid-term evaluation, PREC Interim Report 2016-2017*, p. 5.

[15] Ibid., p. 9.

[16] Ibid., p. 5.

[17] Ibid., p. 6.

to finance a circular economy project, but other reasons reffer to lack of time and skills[18].

Conclusions

We have assessed the circular economy initiatives in Brussels and their progress throughout the years. The government's programme incorporated 111 measures, of which almost hald of them were successfully implemented as interim reports show. As we have seen, special attention was given to creating circularity in the construction sector, teaching and training for a better understanding of the circular principles, financing innovative projects, developing scientific research in the field and fostering local agriculture. A key aspect of the whole process consists of partnerships between the public and private sectors. Moreover, collaboration between different industries and fields of research has proved to be benefic for the development of circular economy practices. However, despite the numerous initiatives and good practices adopted, Brussels still has a long journey ahead towards the goal of becoming a circular city.

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[18] Ibid., p. 8

DEVELOPING RURAL AREAS IN ROMANIA WITH THE HELP OF CULTURAL TOURISM

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Abstract: In Europe cultural tourism is strongly supported by the European institutions. The development of this touristic segment is obviously favoured by the cultural wealth, history and architecture of European countries. In cultural tourism, the niche represented by rural tourism is beginning to be on high search among visitors amateurs of art, crafts, customs, gastronomy, and, in general, traditional lifestyle. Romania is a country that has been blessed with splendid landscapes and an extremely diversified relief. The Romanian people gave rise to a valuable traditional culture that can be fully exploited with the help of cultural tourism for the sustainable development of rural areas.

Keywords: Development, Romania, Rural Areas, Cultural Tourism, Traditional Arts and Crafts.

Cultural Tourism in the European Union

Since the 1960s, the Council of Europe has become interested in stimulating community awareness of the strengths of European culture and fought for their inclusion in the leisure culture. Thus, the Council of Europe has begun to realize the importance of cultural tourism and the notion of discovery through travel, both for Europeans and for non-Europeans.[1]

Culture is becoming more and more important in the E.U., which is also evident from the fact that this topic is remembered under the Maastricht Treaty. It can be seen in the Member States of the European Union the rise of a desire for trans-European cooperation which is illustrated by the development of cultural networks and itineraries. These actions taking place at European level show that there is a need to build an European identity while recognizing national and regional cultural diversity.[2]

In 1964, a Council of Europe working group entitled „Continue Europe" established a series of objectives that recognized the potential

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value of cultural tourism and the development of cultural networks.[3] The three main objectives of the above-mentioned Working Group report are as follows:

- Make European culture known through travel.
- Take into account the possibilities of setting up tourism networks connected with the cultural geography of Europe.
- Promote important sites and intersections of European civilization as places of interest for tourists.[4]

Europe's decision-makers wanted to develop a program meant to cultivate and strengthen European social cohesion, which will eventually lead to the establishment of an identity and the extension of cultural tourism to a wider society. In general, the themes chosen for this action come from the historical, artistic or social domain and the main motivating factor behind the development of such cultural initiatives is to encourage European residents to discover and appreciate their cultural heritage that is diverse, but at the same time commune.[5]

The Council for Cultural Cooperation established three main objectives for the Cultural Routes Program:

- Making European citizens aware of a true European cultural identity.
- To preserve and improve the European cultural heritage as a means of improving the environment in which people live and as a source of social, economic and cultural development.
- To grant a special place to cultural tourism among European leisure activities.[6]

Cultural routes have begun to encourage the development of solidarity and tolerance, exchanges between partners in different countries, and the involvement of national and regional institutions, individuals, groups and voluntary organizations. Such initiatives aim at developing tourism and the economy as well as the progress of those regions, with particular emphasis on job creation. These initiatives aim to provide visitors with experiences based on direct contact with genuine European heritage and culture.[7]

According to data released by the Council of Europe in 2002, the program on cultural routes involved at that time the cooperation of more

[3] Ibidem.
[4] Ibidem.
[5] Ibidem, p. 67.
[6] Ibidem.
[7] Ibidem.

than 2.000 partners, with over 20 themes among them: *Pilgrim Way, Rural Habitats, Silk and Textile Routes, Routes of the Monastery Influence, Celtic Routes, Mozart Route, Schickhardt Routes, Viking Routes, Routes of Hanseatic Cities, Routes of Gardens and Gardens, Routes of European Cities of Discoveries, Live Arts and European Identity, Phenicia Routes, Gypsy Routes, Humanism Route, Military Architecture fortified in Europe, „Al-Andalus Heritage" Routes, Aura Boreale Rides, Folk Festivals and Rituals in Europe.*[8]

The Council of Europe has ensured that these routes are easy to identify throughout Europe, signaling them with a common emblem and producing promotional advertising material, especially maps. The Council has also developed a whole cultural program around them. The program is partly related to the development of cultural tourism, education, conservation and interpretation.[9]

Most of these routes are based on the heritage of Europe and the past of the old continent and less on its very diverse contemporary culture. The rural habitat route focuses on the tangible and intangible culture of rural and agricultural communities. Many of these routes have been opened to include countries and regions in Central and Eastern Europe. These changes are welcomed because they reflect the changing nature of European culture and support the notion of integration and inclusion.[10]

There are doubts that such itineraries can attract a large number of tourists. This is largely due to the Council of Europe's insistence that these cultural routes should not be treated as a product and, consequently, not be promoted as such. But the fact that these routes are not so well known may be a blessing, since excessive promotion of an initiative that encourages European integration and identity can in the long run damage the Council of Europe's objectives.[11]

In 1991, the ministers of the EU member states in charge of culture have signed a Resolution on European Cultural Networks that encourages cultural organizations to participate in extensive European cooperation, inviting the European Commission to explore the opportunities that networks can offer to Member States. The European Union has sought to support these networks which facilitate cross-border cooperation, and they are rapidly expanding in all Member States, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.[12]

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[8] Ibidem., pp. 67-68.
[9] Ibidem., p. 68.
[10] Ibidem.
[11] Ibidem.
[12] Ibidem.

The objectives of many cultural networks that have emerged at European level in recent years are the exchange of ideas and experiences, as well as the establishment of common promotional schemes. These can be used as a means of stimulating exchanges between East and West, encouraging joint research and other initiatives that improve the exchange of information between developed and developing countries and international organizations.[13]

Currently, there are over twenty cultural networks in Europe, each serving specific functions, according to the different priorities. Many networks are interested in cultural and artistic policies, fundraising, research and education.[14]

Heritage sites located in remote locations tend to experience considerable difficulties because the costs of attracting tourists are higher than the revenue generated by their arrival at that destination.[15]

For these reasons, increasing the number of initiatives promoting cultural circuits and thematic routes serves a double purpose, especially since visitors rarely choose to travel extensively to visit one place. They can help reduce the number of tourists visiting only large cities by attracting visitors to less known and smaller tourist destinations. This can be done by creating circuits where large cities are visited along with the smallest or even rural settlements.[16]

In recent years, due to the decline of coastal resorts caused by environmental degradation, Europe's popularity as a tourist destination has started to decline. In order to preserve and even recover the lost tourists, it was necessary to rethink the tourism strategies at European level. In this sense, emphasis was placed on the characteristics or attractions that are uniquely European, for example culture and heritage. In addition to revitalizing the already popular tourist attractions, the offer has also been diversified by introducing rural or cultural tourism that has the potential to attract more demanding tourists.[17]

It can also be noticed that in recent years there has been a notable change in demand from tourism practiced on the beaches of the Mediterranean Sea to urban or even rural tourism. Although cultural tourists have existed for hundreds of years, it has been only during the last two decades that cultural and heritage tourism has been identified as specific tourist markets.[18]

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[13] Ibidem.

[14] Ibidem., pp. 68-69.

[15] Ibidem., p. 74.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Ibidem.

[18] Greg Richards, *Cultural Tourism in Europe,* Association for Tourism and Leisure Education (ATLAS), Tilburg, 2005, pp. 13-19.

After the fall of communism, Central and Eastern Europe became sought after by Western tourists, who enjoy fascinating cultural experiences at low cost. Some of the most popular tourist destinations in this part of the world are Prague, Krakow, St. Petersburg and Moscow, but lately regional capitals or smaller towns have begun to gain ground, to the detriment of the capitals of the Central and Eastern European states.[19]

In Romania, great efforts are being made to promote small cultural cities, such as Sibiu, but also the well-known Bran area of Transylvania, where is the famous Dracula's Castle.[20]

It is interesting that cultural and heritage tourism was one of the first forms of tourism that has developed in the Central and Eastern European region, but this is no wonder given the Western curiosity about the life of the people in the communist bloc. In addition, mountain tourism and ski resorts are in continuous development in the Carpathian Mountains of Romania, in the Tatra Mountains of Poland and Slovakia, as well as in the Julian Alps in Slovenia.[21]

Tourist destinations such as Austria are essentially rural except for urban settlements sought for cultural tourism such as Vienna, Salzburg and Graz. In Austria, farm tourism that has taken place on farms has developed a lot because it helps farmers to supplement their income while preserving rural lifestyles. This form of tourism can be closely linked to gastronomy, wine tourism and holiday gastronomy.[22]

The rural areas of France, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia, as well as those from other countries, have recently begun to promote this type of tourism. Thus, trails or packages have been created that allow visitors to try the gastronomy of the region and to witness demonstrations that focus on traditional production methods.[23]

Similarly, tourism that is centered on art and traditional crafts has an interesting evolution and development in many rural areas of Europe. Protecting traditional craft and textile production methods is a priority for many rural communities, especially in Europe's peripheral areas.[24]

The local souvenir-producing industry and craftsman have struggled to meet demand in many tourist destinations, particularly in areas where tourists are eager to purchase authentic products rather than mass-produced goods.[25]

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[19] Melanie K. Smith, *cited works,* 2003, p. 75.
[20] Ibidem.
[21] Ibidem.
[22] Ibidem, p. 79.
[23] Ibidem.
[24] Ibidem.
[25] Ibidem.

At the end of the 1990s, the European Commission financed through DG XVI the EUROTEX project developed by ATLAS. The aim of this project was to develop crafts and textile tourism in three pilot regions: Crete, Alto Minho in Portugal and Lapland. In all these areas the development of craft tourism was perceived as an important tool that has the potential to produce economic development.[26]

The EUROTEX project sought to revive traditional production methods and provide skills training to people in the local community. It wanted to create and encourage closer ties between the pilot regions, and also the dissemination of information and best practice.[27]

All of the aforementioned regions are predominantly rural, and, except for Crete, are little visited by tourists. The development of craft tourism in such regions can help to increase the destination profile, tackle seasonality issues, and diversify the tourist product.[28]

Craftsmen can practice or relearn making traditional crafts, while in the same time, learning how to run a business in order to be able to open their own business. Clearly, this initiative has both economic and socio-cultural benefits for local communities, being a saving solution especially for areas where agricultural industries are declining and unemployment is high. Instead of moving to the urban area to find a job, locals can stay in the rural areas and make a living, while preserving their traditions.[29]

The craft industry today is important not only because it is the expression of the survival of our heritage. The demand for artisanal and crafts objects is steadily increasing due to the fact that people are traveling more and more, and recognize their cultural value. The craft industry, which is in constant evolution, has development opportunities and plays an important role in strengthening and revitalizing the economy in the rural areas.[30]

Adding economic stability to the craft industry can mean the preservation and expansion of our cultural resources. Encouraging rural crafts and the institutions that support them can lead to a new awareness and appreciation of rural culture. Rural residents can increase their income, while at the same time, they can feel more fulfilled by making artisanal and crafts objects.[31]

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[26] Ibidem.

[27] Ibidem.

[28] Ibidem., pp. 79-80.

[29] Greg Richards, *Developing and Marketing Crafts Tourism,* Association for Tourism and Leisure Education (ATLAS), Tilburg, 1999, p. 4.

[30] Program Aid, Issue 1026, Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Extension Service, 1972, p. 1.

[31] Ibidem.

Rural tourism attractions should act as a basic tourism resource, organized and sustained through small-scale local businesses, and act as a vehicle for integrated rural development.[32]

However, this development of the rural communities through tourism must be done with great care. In the „Loving Them To Death" report developed by the Federation of Nature and National Parks of Europe (FNNPE), it is stressed that „the demands of tourists can either fossilize or destroy traditional ways of life, potentially altering the socio-economic balance of rural communities".[33]

Despite our growing knowledge of the social and cultural impact of tourism[34], interactions with, and impact on, the environment have often been the main subjects of sustainable tourism works[35], at the expense of full recognition of the interactions and impact of tourism on communities.[36]

Despite the fact that there is a tendency to equate sustainability exclusively with environmental issues[37], sustainability must include, among other things, the preservation of different lifestyles, the solidity of local social structures and the viability of local communities.[38]

Those who plan and manage tourism must recognize, or be influenced to recognize, the contribution of people, lifestyles and local social structures to their primary product.[39]

One of the most important things is the respect for sustainability in future development planning, especially in the development of tourism, thus avoiding the destruction with which, the much desired development, has come in the same package in many tourist areas.[40]

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[32] Derek Hall and Greg Richards, *Tourism and Sustainable Community Development,* Routledge, London, 2000, p. 55.

[33] The Federation of Nature and National Parks of Europe (FNNPE), *Report Loving Them To Death? Sustainable Tourism in Europe's Nature and National Parks,* Grafenau: Federation of Nature and National Parks of Europe, 1993, p. 3.

[34] Jennifer Craik, *Are there cultural limits to tourism?,* Journal of Sustainable Tourism, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995, pp. 87-98.

[35] Shirley Eber, *Beyond the green horizon: A discussion paper on principles for sustainable tourism,* Godalming, UK: World Wide Fund for Nature, 1992, p. 53-54.

[36] Hermione Lovel and Marie-Therese Feuerstein, *Editorial Introduction. After the Carnival: Tourism and Community Development,* Community Development Journal, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1992, pp. 335-351.

[37] Jennifer Craik, *Resorting to Tourism – Cultural Policies for Tourist Development in Australia,* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991, p. 37.

[38] Bill Bramwell and Bernard Lane, *Sustainable Tourism: An Evolving Global Approach,* Journal of Sustainable Tourism, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1993, pp. 1-5.

[39] Derek Hall and Greg Richards, *cited works,* 2000, p. 123.

[40] Ibidem.

Although we cannot deny the disadvantages to rural communities of excessive popularization as holiday destinations, in general, if the flow of tourists is small and permanent, the development of the rural community can be done in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.

If we previously presented the situation of cultural tourism in Europe and the help it gave to rural communities for economic and social development, we will continue to present the situation in Romania.

Tourism in rural Romania

In the promotion and development of rural tourism activities all natural and anthropic conditions must be considered with priority, and after that the cultural elements specific to the area. The forms of rural tourism, including cultural tourism, are potential reserves for widening the tourist area, as this form of tourism is environmentally dependent, nature is its „raw material" and the tourism-environment relationship has a special significance.[41]

Analyzing the invaluable value of the natural landscapes of the native natural environment, it can be deduced that the rural tourism definitely influences the economic and social-political life of the Romanian village. Romania has a tremendous potential for rural tourism development, and its practice is not only possible but also very necessary.[42]

In Romania the agritourism offer includes: natural and anthropogenic resources, the equipment for „production" of services offered to tourists, food goods (gastronomy), industrial goods, intended for tourism consumption, labour force specialized in specific activities, tourist infrastructure and reception facilities (guest houses and houses for rent), trading conditions (prices, tariffs, facilities, etc.).[43]

In the following table we present briefly the advantages of the original offer represented by natural and cultural factors, forms of transport conditioned by the territorial extent, as well as the advantages of the tourist offer, that includes accommodation, gastronomy, treatment, cultural offers and leisure time.[44]

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[41] Cristian Tălângă, *Rural Tourism, Course Notes,* Year III ID and IFR, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Geography, Bucharest, 2010, p. 18.
[42] Ibidem.
[43] Ibidem, p. 22.
[44] Ibidem, p. 23.

The advantages of the original and the tourist offer[45]

Original offer
Natural factors
The richness of landscapes Diversified and alternating landscape (plain, hill, mountain) Pure landscape, natural Stunning rock formations Warm summers and winters with lots of snow Almost intact environment from an ecological point of view Various natural parks
Cultural factors
Multiple cultural influences (Bulgarians, Serbs, Saxons, Szeklers, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Turks, Tartars, etc.) Traditions and customs of different nationalities Historically well preserved village structures Traces of the history of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, fortresses, churches
Transport
The region has a central position The city is an important node of national and international circulation Acceptable rates for public transport
Touristic offer
Accommodation
Approximately enough accommodation capacity Private accommodation especially in Bran, Moeciu, Fundata Beneficial week-end prices
Gastronomy
Restaurants with region-specific gastronomy Private restaurants with a higher level of service Restaurants specific to certain historical periods The Middle Ages Restaurants with specific programs (classic, folkloric)
Treatment
There are high altitude resorts with ozonated rarefied air Balneoclimateric and balneary resorts
Cultural and leisure offers
Historical cultural monuments Architectural monuments Churches, castles, fortified cities, fortified buildings Traditional holidays Traditional festivals Winter and summer sports activities Possibilities for rest Possibility of hiking and mountaineering Possibility to practice equitation in areas with adequate possibilities

Data Source: Cristian Tălângă, (2010), *Rural Tourism, Course Notes.*

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[45] Ibidem, pp. 23-24.

According to the data presented in the previous table, we can observe the diversified tourist offer with which Romania can be proud. The existence on our territory of all forms of relief and our wonderful landscapes gives us a huge tourist advantage, which is often not exploited to its true potential. Besides the wild nature and the rich fauna existent on these lands, we Romanians still have a treasure that is no longer found in Europe, namely the traditional village frozen in time that has remained unchanged for centuries. Our customs, the Romanian traditional clothing and the Romanian gastronomy are a business card that honours us. Traditional Romanian culture can compete successfully and even win, due to its originality and its complexity, in matches with other cultures better known to the general public.

In conclusion, we shall give examples of villages that are developing with the help of cultural tourism. These communities are visited by many Romanian and foreign tourists interested in the traditional culture and crafts specific to those areas.

A famous village sought by visitors for the pottery technique is Horezu from Vâlcea. In the same region we can find the healing waters from Băile Olăneşti and Călimăneşti-Căciulata, these tourist destinations attract tourists who stay in the surrounding villages. The Oltenia region is famous and visited for its fortified buildings named „cule".

In Dâmboviţa we have as rural tourist attractions the settlement Runcu, one of the most forested communes in Muntenia, the Bucşani Bison Reserve, which is less than 80 km from Bucharest. At 50 km from the capital, we find in Bolovani another important reservation worth visiting, here the wild boars, the deer and the fallow deer can be photographed and admired. Villages like Voineşti and Malu cu Flori are famous for apple and pear orchards, and the village of Băleni is famous for the vegetable gardens owned by Serbians (Bulgarians) and for their traditions and gastronomy.

In the northern part of Moldavia tourists visit the villages around the Voroneţ, Moldovita and Suceviţa Monasteries. During the winter and Easter holidays the villages and the guest houses in Bucovina and Maramures are extremely sought after for the traditions and customs that are still preserved with great pride. For ski lovers, the mountain villages in Ceahlău and Durău area are a well-known destination.

In Dobrogea villages such as 2 Mai and Vama Veche are known for their beaches and the feeling of freedom they offer to tourists.

Transylvania can boast with the commune Jina which has a long tradition in raising sheep and a traditional gastronomy that is highly sought after by tourists. The village of Viscri is famous for the Saxon traditional architecture, Rîmetea village is visited for the medieval fortress

of Trăscău, the village of Cârţişoara in Sibiu is famous due to the autodidact peasant Badea Cârţan who fought for the independence of the Romanians in Transylvania, distributing clandestine Romanian books in the villages in this region.

Conclusions

Romania has a tremendous potential to develop its cultural tourism and especially the rural tourism. All the regions of the country – Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, Dobrogea – have picturesque landscapes that are breathtaking and have preserved their beauty unaltered by the influence of man. Romanian villages with authentic traditional architecture and with their hardworking people can develop successful agritourism business by capitalizing on the traditions, customs, crafts and gastronomy of the area, generating the economic and social development of the region they belong to.

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ENGLISH NEOLOGISMS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY SPHERE

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Abstract: The article deals with theoretical aspects of English neology, specifically the problem of definitions and classification of innovations. English neologisms of biotechnology, which arose in the late 20th - early 21st centuries have been investigated. Special attention has been paid to the discovery of the most common models of the formation of English neologistic lexicon in the biotechnology sphere. The analysis of structural and semantic peculiarities of neologisms of the mentioned branch has been carried out. The conducted research indicates the prospect of studying English neologisms of biotechnology. Due to the rapid development exactly this branch of science can contribute to the emergence of new terms that will spread and acquire the status of neologisms. It is these neologisms of the field of biotechnology that can be the most promising for further research in linguistics. These neologisms of biotechnology sphere may be the most promising for further studies in linguistics.

Keywords: neologism, sphere of biotechnology, structural and semantic peculiarities, morphological structure, word formation.

Introduction

Innovation potential and the latest technologies of the present require a certain nomination. Each new reality finds its specific reflection in the language, obeying its word-formation norms and rules. Globalization processes in all spheres of human activity, the development of information, nano and biotechnologies, the eradication of national boundaries between states and the destruction of sustainable stereotypes – all this is reflected in the most mobile layer of language –in neologisms.

It is neologisms that present almost all the innovative potential and the latest technologies of the present, in particular the sphere of biotechnology. At the end of the 20th century - at the beginning of the 21st century, it was one of the suppliers of English neologisms. This is due to the fact that biotechnology is served exclusively by English language terminology. The progress of biotechnology generates a large number of new knowledge, new industrial trends, each of which gradually forms the terminology apparatus of this sphere.

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The field of biotechnology as a set of phenomena requiring an adequate nomination is one of the main sources of innovation not only in English, but also in other European languages, taking into account the fact that recently English has become the language of international communication. It is the growth of the number of lexical and phraseological units that are thematically related to biotechnology, which explains the increased research interest in this field as one of the sources of replenishment of the vocabulary. It also makes an actual study of the innovative processes in the English language of biotechnology sphere.

The urgency of the description and analysis of English neologisms in the field of biotechnology is due to their lack of knowledge and disorder. It should also be noted that there is insufficient number of lexicographic materials devoted to English neologisms in the field of biotechnology and the importance of their replenishment.

In this regard, in our opinion, it is relevant to conduct a language scientific and analytical study of the process of creating a new vocabulary in the field of biotechnology. Analysis of ways and means to replenish the lexical and semantic level of English of the investigated sphere remains beyond the attention of researchers.

Actuality of the work is determined, on the one hand, by the role of biotechnological vocabulary in enriching the vocabulary of English and, on the other, by the need for a comprehensive analysis of innovative processes and phenomena in the vocabulary of the biotechnology sphere of recent decades, the causes and results of qualitative changes in the ways, methods and means of enrichment of this English vocabulary layer. The emergence of numerous innovations requires a socio-functional analysis of the innovative processes in the English sphere of biotechnology.

The analysis of the scientific literature

The relevance of studing language in the field of biotechnology is evidenced by the works of linguists who have recently paid particular attention to this problem.

The study of biotechnological terminology in English was conducted by such scientists: E. Myshak carried out a structural and derivational analysis of English biotechnological terminology[1],[2],[3],[4], L. Rytikova

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[1] Myshak, E., Strukturno-semantychni osoblyvosti suchasnoyi biotekhnolohichnoyi terminolohiyi. *First independent scientific journal*, 21, 2017, p. 27-31.

[2] Myshak, E., Structural and derivational analysis of English biotechnology terminology. *Cogito-Multidisciplinary research Journal*, 4, 2016, p. 131-136.

[3] Myshak, E., Morphological peculiarities of English one-component terms of biotechnologies. *Cogito-Multidisciplinary research Journal*, 3, 2017, p. 64-71.

[4] Myshak, E., The main means of formation of biotechnological terms. *European Journal of Research*, Vol. 3 (3), 2017, p. 19-40.

conducted a study of the biotechnology term system and the general trends of its development in English[5], morphological features of one-component terms of the biotechnology industry in Russian and English were the subject of research by S. Vasilyeva[6], multicomponent terms in the biotechnology sublanguage (on the material of Russian and English) were studied by T. Kudinova[7].

Insufficient attention is paid to neologisms of the biotechnology sphere, therefore this fact explains the relevance of this study.

In the framework of modern nominative and communicative researches, the works are carried out, the focus of which is on the peculiarities of human linguistic activity, the verbal mechanisms of its adaptation to the environment, and the ways and means of displaying the latter with the help of different types of linguistic units.

Works of the researchers of English neology[8],[9],[10],[11],[12],[13],[14], testify to the urgent need to solve today a whole complex of problems concerning the nominative potential of a new word, its ability to fix, accumulate and reproduce in a human mind a certain meaningful fragment of the real world. Changes in the language are necessary to reflect changes in society: as a sign of new phenomena, and for expressing human thoughts.

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[5] Rytikova, L., Osoblyvosti formuvannya biotekhnolohichnoyi terminolohiyi anhliys′koyi movy. *Ahrarna nauka i osvita*, 9, 3-4, 2008, p. 122-126.

[6] Vasilyeva, S., Morphological features of one-component terms of the field of biotechnology in Russian and English. *Philological Sciences. Questions of theory and practice*, 2 (44), 2015, p. 51-54.

[7] Kudinova, T., *Strukturno-semanticheskiye osobennosti mnogokomponentnykh terminov v pod″yazyke biotekhnologiy (na materiale russkogo i angliyskogo yazykov): avtoref. diss. … k. filol. n.* Orel, 2006, 21 p.

[8] Zatsnyy, YU., Pakhomova, T., *Mova i suspil′stvo: zbahachennya slovnykovoho skladu suchasnoyi anhliys′koyi movy*, 2001, 243 p.

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[10] Kotelova, N., *Neologizmy. Lingvisticheskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar′.* M.: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1990, 331 p.

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[13] Ayto, J., *Introduction. The Longman Register of New Words. Volume II.* Harlow: Longman, 19901-11 p.

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The purpose of the article

The purpose of our study is to analyze the neologistic lexicon of the English language in the field of biotechnology, to identify the most common models of its formation and structural and semantic peculiarities.

Materials and methods of research

The material of the study was more than 1240 words, lexical and semantic variants and phrases, which replenished the English vocabulary of biotechnology sphere over the past decades. Dictionaries and reference books of neologisms, English periodicals, internet sites dedicated to problems of English neologisms, electronic databases of biotechnological terminology were sources of actual material.

The perception of the state of language development at a certain stage as a state of dynamic synchronization, a combination of synergetic, semasiological and onomasiological approaches, methods of linguistic and sociolinguistic analysis enables to identify ways and means of enriching the English vocabulary of the biotechnology field, the tendencies of the study subsystem and its impact on the English language system in general.

Definition of the term "neologism" in the scientific literature

Before proceeding directly to the analysis of the neologisms of the biotechnology sphere, we examined their definitions in the scientific literature.

In scientific researches on the study of the replenishment of the vocabulary such as "new vocabulary"[15], "lexical innovation"[16], "neosem"[17], "neoplasms"[18]," topical evidence"[19], "lexical and derivative neoplasms"[20],

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[15] Rozen, Ye.V., *Novoye v leksike nemetskogo yazyka*, 1971, 174 p.

[16] Muravleva, N., *Leksicheskiye innovatsii obshchestvenno-politicheskogo soderzhaniya v sovremennom nemetskom yazyke: Avtoref. dis...kand.filol.nauk: 10.02.04*, 1978, 16 p.

[17] Khakham, L., *Osnovnyye tipy novoobrazovaniy v sovremennom angliyskom yazyke i sposoby ikh perevoda na russkiy yazyk (na materiale obshchestvenno-politicheskoy literatury):* Avoref. dis... kand. filol. Nauk:10.02.04, 1967, 23 p.

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[19] Tribunskaya, V., *Onomasiologicheskiye aspekty aktivnogo slovoobrazovaniya v obshchestvenno-politicheskom tekste (na materiale sovremennoy amerikanskoy periodiki):* Avtoref. Dis... kand. filol. Nauk: 10.02.04, 1980, 24 p.

[20] Tret'yukhin, A., *Pragmatika proizvodnogo slova: (na materiale ne kodifitsirovannykh prilagatel'nykh v tekstakh politicheskoy propagandy SSHA):* Avtoref. Dis... kand. filol. Nauk:10.02.04, 1985 26 p.

"uncodified vocabulary"[21],[22], coexist along with the term "neologism". There is a need to clarify this concept. The simplest definition of neologism is (Greek néos – new and lógos – word) a word or phrase, the appearance of which is caused by language needs. However, in spite of simplicity, this definition is not completely correct, since all the "new words" are objectively different in nature. Neologisms in English philology have not received a complete and comprehensive systemic coverage by linguists yet. We consider the interpretation given to the Oxford Dictionary of Neologisms quite vague. They are defined as "any word, phrase or meaning that is included in the general use or was fashionable in a certain period"[23]. The definition of neologism as a "linguistic unit created for the definition of a new concept"[24], as "words or expressions created to refer to a new (previously unknown) object"[25] does not include all possible types of innovations.

Thus, many neologisms are formed to refer to existing things and known concepts. At the same time, it is quite common that there are cases where one and the same thing, the same new phenomenon has more than one name *(biomanufacturing, GM engineering)*. Moreover, as you know, to reflect a single concept, to identify one thing, there may be a whole range of names for identifying one thing *(transgenic, transgenetic, genetically modified).* Such "polynomination" is carried out under the influence of factors related to the branching of the language system.

Linguist Yu. Zatsnyy argues that "the definition of neologisms as words or expressions created to refer to a new (previously known) subject or to express a new concept can not be considered exhaustive, since such a definition does not include all varieties of innovation. Also the use of other criteria (denotative, stylistic, lexicographic) also does not cover all neologisms"[26].

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[21] Myholynets′, O., Deyaki osoblyvosti tekstovoyi realizatsiyi prefiksal′noyi onomasiolohichnoyi katehoriyi zaperechennya ta yiyi vidtvorennya v ukrayins′kykh perekladakh. *Problemy romano-hermans'koyi filolohiyi*, 2000, pp. 106-112.

[22] Holyk, S., *Osoblyvosti funktsionuvannya prefiksal'noyi nominatsiyi u suchasniy anhliys'kiy movi:* Avtoref. Dys... kand. filol. Nauk: 10.02.04, 2001, 20 p.

[23] Knowles, E., Elliot, J., *Preface. The Oxford Dictionary of New Words*, ed. by E. Knowles with J. Elliot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 3

[24] Mostovyy, M., *Leksykolohiya anhliys'koyi movy,* 1993, p. 174.

[25] Akhmanova, O., *Slovar' lingvisticheskikh terminov*, 1969, p. 509.

[26] Zatsnyy, YU., Pakhomova, T., *Mova i suspil'stvo: zbahachennya slovnykovoho skladu suchasnoyi anhliys'koyi movy,* 2001, p. 5.

According to O. Selivanova: "Neologism is a word or a combination used in a language in a certain period to designate a new or existing concept in a new sense and it is perceived by native speakers"[27].

If we generalize the definition of neologism by different researchers, then we can distinguish two main approaches: 1. Neologisms as newly created synonyms to existing concepts. In this interpretation neologisms are added conotative elements (shades of meaning) to existing lexical units, thus attracting the attention of the recipient to an appreciable or other tint value. 2. New formation, created on the basis of existing linguistic material (that is, from the existing tokens) according to all the rules of word formation.

Classification of neologisms

A significant number of new replenishments in dictionaries over the past decade makes it possible to highlight certain types of neologisms and to classify them. Linguists offer different approaches to the classification of neologisms.

One of the problems of the analysis of neologisms is the problem of their classification. So, the criterion of "novelty" is a subjective relative concept, which depends on many factors: education, linguistic experience, whether native speakers of professional vocabulary, dialect, etc. In our opinion, the types of new words can be distinguished according to certain linguistic criteria: a) "complete" neologisms (new in form and in content); b) units new in form (for example, abbreviated formations and innovations formed as the result of an elliptic reduction); c) units new in content (semantic neoplasms).

It is possible to separate "word-formation innovations", which are materially embodied in new word-making elements. In abstract form, they are also represented by new word-building models. The role of each productive affix is more important than the role of a separate lexical or phraseological neologism, since each word-making morpheme gives life to many lexical neologisms (some new affixes "gave birth" to hundreds of new words), extends the possibilities of word-formation. At the same time, not only individual words, phrases, but also "new derivation tools and new word-making models, which enrich different functional styles of English are involved language"[28].

Language neologisms of the biotechnology sphere can be divided into lexical (new words), phraseological (new stable phrases), semantic (new

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[27] Selivanova, O., *Suchasna linhvistyka: napryamy ta problemy*, Poltava, 2008, p. 43.

[28] Akulenko, V., *Nimets'kyy vplyv na rozvytok ukrayins'koyi movy: problemy metodolohiyi*, 1, 1997, p. 16.

lexical and semantic variants of words). Confirmation of the state of the new formations is carried out by applying an integrated approach, using linguistic criteria. Quantitative data are presented in Table 1.

<div align="right">Table 1.</div>

Correlation of main types of biotechnology neologisms

Lexical innovations	48.2%
Semantic innovations	21.4%
Phraseological innovations	30.4%
Total	100%

Word formation plays a leading role in the development of neologisms in the field of biotechnology. Quantitative data are presented in Table 2.

<div align="right">Table 2.</div>

Comparative description of the word formation ways of the biotechnology sphere

Method of word formation	Productiveness
Affixation	40.3%
Word composition	22.0%
Abbreviation	18.5%
Conversion	10.5%
Telescopy	5.7%
Total	100%

The widespread use of new derivation elements, traditional affixes provides a high word formation activity of affixation (40.3%).

The most productive suffixes are: *-ion, -tion (bioaugmentation, polymerization, expression, recombination, replication, transcription, transformation, translation, duplication, explantation), -ing (cloning, splicing, sequencing, inbreeding, crossing, mapping, profiling), -ism (mutualism, photoperiodism, commensalism, polymorphism, dimorphism), -er (transfer, marker, dimer, impeller, isomer, promoter), or (attenuator, biosensor, bioreactor, immunosensor operator), -ity (consanguinity, cytotoxicity, incompatibility, instability), -y (allelopathy, dichogamy, exogamy, fortify, lysogeny, karyogamy)*, and others.

In its turn, the most productive prefixes are: *anti- (antibody, anticodon, antigen, antisense RNA, anti-oncogene), hyper- (hyperploid, hypertonic, hyperthermia), dia- (dialysis, diakinesis, diazotroph), endo- (endocytosis, endodermis, endomitosis, endonuclease, endoplycopia), epic (epizome, epistaxis, epitope, epicotyl, epigenesis), im-, in-*

*(inbreeding, inhibitor, intragenic, immunity, immunosensor), inter-
(interference, intermolecular, interaction, co- (co-factor, co-transfection,
co-enzyme, co-linearity, para- (parahormone, paralogous, paratope,
parasite), poly- (polymerase, polygene, polycistronic, polyadenylation,
polymorphism, polypeptide), re- (recombination, regeneration, remark,
recombinant), sub- (sub-clone, sub-strain, substrate), super- (supergene,
supercoil, superbug, supernatant), trans- (transgenic, transposase,
transposon, transcription, transformation, translation), ultra-
(ultrasonication), ex- (excinuclease, excision, explantation, explant,
express).*

An important feature of enriching the biotech vocabulary is the use of
new derivational elements of Latin and Greek origin (*eco-, bio-, macro-*)
such as *esobiotechnology, ecotype, ecobiotic, biotechnology,
bioremediation, bioaugmentation, bio-energetics, biosafety, bioreactor,
bioanalysis, bioassay, macronutrient, macromolecule, macrophage,
macropropagation.* Their use is due to extra-linguistic factors. A large
number of prefixes of *bio-* and *eco-*, suffixes *-tion, -ist / ism*, is due to the
fact that natural sciences continue their unceasing development.

No less active way of neologism word building is word composition.
The leading role of word composition (22%) in the replenishment of the
English biotechnological lexicon is associated with an increase of a number
of complex concepts in the fields affecting the sphere of biotechnology. The
formation of a large number of lexical neologisms by word formation is
due not only to the desire for language economy, which is achieved at the
expense of the semantic capacity of the composites, but primarily by the
analyticity of the English language. By the degree of motivation, the
composites are divided into structurally motivated and partially or
completely reinterpreted.

According to the structure of the components, complex
biotechnological units (composites) are divided into the following types: a)
complex words, formed from several simple bases: *genotype,
gametoclone, gametogenesis, bacteriophage, telophase,
radioimmunoassay, retrovirus, pyrophosphate, pseudogene*; b)
compound derivative words*: electro-blotting, genetically-modified, gene-
altered;* c) compound shortened words: *agro-biotech, high-tech, hightech,
anti-oncogene;* d) lexicalized syntactic formations: *viotechnology-derived,
herbicide-tolerant, plant-incorporated, environmentally-friendly.*

It should be noted that the key neologism of the studied field of
biotechnology was reduced to the form of *biotech* that "absorbed" the value
of the original unit and also turned into one of the key units around which
a certain number of neologisms are grouped, for example, *biotechnique,
biotechnician, biotechnologist, biotech industry, biotech company,*

biothech business. A word building element bio- in the sense of "biotechnology"; "associated with biotechnology" functions for the formation of such innovations.

Among other morphological methods of formation of neologisms of the biotechnology sphere the most active in recent decades is reduction (18.5%).

The desire to save time and effort embodied in the emergence of a huge number of shortened words and phrases – abbreviations, and their number is steadily increasing every year. It should be noted that the term "abbreviation" we understand and use in our work in the broad sense, i.e. as any reduction. Reduction is a morphological derivation, where some part of sound structure of the original word is omitted. It should be noted that the thesaurus takes modern English term "reduction" (shortening, reduction) as a synonym for the term "the abbreviation"[29].

The most commonly used biotechnology models are the following abbreviations:

1) the own-initial graphic abbreviations are formed of the original initial letters: SSCP - single-strand conformational polymorphism DNA, RFLP - restriction fragment length polymorphism, SSR - simple sequence repeat, HAC - human artificial chromosome;

2) the combined initial graphic abbreviations which are not only independent but also service parts of speech: GRAS - generally regarded as safe, IVEP- in vitro embryo production, PIPs - plant-incorporated protectants, CPB - Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;

3) the part-initial graphic abbreviations are formed by initial reduce of one component of a complex term: Bt corn - biotechnological corn, GM food - genetically modified food, catalytic RNA - catalytic ribonucleic acid, Bt toxin - Bacillus thuringiensis toxin, DNA amplification - amplification of DNA, F factor - fertility factor, DNA delivery system.

The number of abbreviations and acronyms of complex terms in biotechnology is constantly increasing. The presence of a large number of thematic groups of abbreviations indicates a high level of development of the language of biotechnology. It should be noted that the desire to linguistic economy is one of the main laws of language development, and the language of biotechnology is no exception. We emphasize that the system of abbreviations in any language is an integral part of its general lexical and semantic system.

The biotechnological lexicon of English is replenished at the expense of telescopic formations. The biotechnological lexicon of English is replenished at the expense of telescopic formations.

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[29] Harmash, O., Zapozychennya yak dzherela zbahachennya slovnykovoho skladu anhliys′koyi movy. *Nova filolohiya.* 24, 2006, P. 8-9.

Telescopic word building of neologisms is merge or simplification. Telescopy is the compilation of two stems, which makes it impossible to determine which component of the telescope word is a common component when a new vocabulary unit is derived from two words or from one complete and part of another word. According to our empirical sample neologisms, which are formed through telescoping, such neologisms as agbiotech (agricultural + biotechnology), reprogenetics (reproductive + genetics), Frankenfish (Frankenstein + fish), Frankenfood (Frankenstein + food) distinguish.

The main factor in the formation of new lexical and semantic variants of existing lexical units is their functional migration, processes of terminalization and transterminalization (transition of terms of biology, medicine, chemistry, physics the biotechnological sphere). For example, the term "ligation" (from the Latin ligare – to "bind") is a medical term, which means the procedure of laying the ligature on the blood vessels. Regarding to biotechnology the term "ligation" means: 1. The incorporation of foreign DNA between the two ends of the plasmid using the DNA of the ligase enzyme. 2. The process of connecting linear two nucleic acid molecules by means of phosphodiester bonds, which are carried out with the enzyme ligase.

The process of phraseological neologization has been quite active, especially the formation of new binary words (semantic codon, stem cell, cromosome walking, cell engineering, gene splicing, bacteriostatic agent).

Also, in the English biotechnological lexicon there are three-component neologisms, among which there are proper phrases and lexical units with transitional status, for example: cell generation time, genetically modified organism, pathogenic related proteins, plant-incorporated protects, single nucleotide polymorphisms, herbicide-tolerant crop, polymerase chain reaction, variable surface glycoprotein.

The phraseology that arose within the biotechnological sphere is rapidly spreading in the general used language through the socialization of concepts (gene engineer, genetic modification, modified plant).

Conclusions

The analysis of the research material allows us to conclude that the English of the biotechnology sphere finds resources to replenish the vocabulary through lexical and semantic derivation. Word building plays a leading role in the creation of neologisms in the field of biotechnology. More productive way of word building of neologisms is a morphological method, which is based on affixation, word formation, conversion, telescopy, reduction in the form of abbreviation and acronymization. The basis of all methods of creating neologisms is the principle of "economy of

speech" when the new words become more informatively complete than their inputs, gaining a new semantic meaning.

Having analyzed the neologisms of the biotechnology sphere by the way of their creation, we found that affixation take the first place by the number of neologisms. The most productive prefixes are bio-, eco-, and suffixes -ion, -tion -ing, -ist, -ism.

A significant number of lexical neologisms in the biotechnology sphere was formed by word composition, that is explained not only by the desire for language economy, which is achieved at the expense of the semantic capacity of the composites, but also primarily by the analyticity of the English language.

Among other morphological methods of creating neologisms of the biotechnology sphere the most active is reduction. Abbreviations are actively involved in the derivation process.

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